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Abstract
Since the earliest human communities, reputation has been used by people to decide
whether they should trust and interact with someone else. Traditionally, reputation was
established through a person’s standing, word of mouth and their associations. How-
ever, with the increasingly widespread use of the Internet, this situation has changed.
In particular, all of the normal cues that help to build reputation are missing. Even the
concept of identity is blurred by the common usage of pseudonyms.
In answer to this problem, many websites on the Internet have developed reputation
systems that allow members to leave feedback about the performance of others in the
execution of their duties. This accumulation of feedback about any individual can be
used to characterise and predict their future behaviour in that context, allowing others
to decide if they want to interact with that individual. Unfortunately, the information in
each instance is limited to the narrow context of the website in which it was generated.
Not only is the reputation information constrained in context, it also limits the poten-
tial scope of what can be determined about an individual. The information that could
be collected about entities includes social, demographic and reputation-based informa-
tion. These are collectively called recommendation information in this thesis. Collecting
this recommendation information from multiple sources and contexts should provide a
wider view by which an entity can be evaluated than reputation alone could produce.
The combination of these multiple sources of recommendation information can be natu-
rally extended in the development of novel applications in areas such as access control
and web service composition.
The GRAFT framework developed in this thesis encapsulates a paradigm shift in the
way that reputation information is handled. It directly supports the collection and distri-
bution goals by building a global distributed recommendation system that can be used
to collect and make available recommendation information about both people and elec-
tronic services. This system can be used as both a drop-in replacement for existing sys-
tems, or it can be used to drive the consumption of recommendation information in novel
new systems.
Recommendation information can be collected from both traditional reputation sources
such as Amazon and eBay, and non-traditional reputation sources such as social net-
works, providing flexibility in what can be collected and subsequently utilised by con-
sumers. The derivation of reputation information from non-reputation sources including
demographic and social information, and the subsequent ability to use this recommen-
dation information in the description and evaluation of policies is unique to GRAFT.
The major contributions of this thesis in the areas of reputation and reputation sys-
tems include the development of a reputation terminology, generalised models of repu-
tation and reputation context, an extensive survey and taxonomy of reputation systems
and a classification of existing reputation systems based on the taxonomy. This thesis also
contributes an architecture for GRAFT, a prototype implementation of GRAFT showing
its usefulness, and an evaluation that includes the results of a large number of simulation
experiments showing how the architecture scales and handles both malicious peers and
churn.
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“Damnum appellandum est cum mala fama lucrum.”
“Profit made at the expense of reputation should be called a loss.”
- Publilius Syrus, fl. 46-29 BC.
“Associate yourself with Men of good Quality if you Esteem your own Reputation; for ’tis better
to be alone than in bad Company.”
- George Washington,
Rules of Civility & Decent Behavior in Company & Conversation, ca 1744.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Since the earliest human communities, reputation has been used by people to decide
whether they should trust and interact with someone else. Reputation was built up and
maintained by a person’s standing and participation in their local community, their fam-
ily and friends, and their participation at a place of worship [261].
In contrast, retailers relied on their physical presence, longevity of their business,
and word-of-mouth [261, 159, 262] for their reputation. As most retailers usually oper-
ated only in the local market, customers could inspect any goods before purchase [262].
This requires little or no trust between the parties, as poor goods would simply not be
purchased. Further, routine interactions with the same local retailers meant that the cus-
tomers would soon know who was trustworthy, and who was not [262].
However, with the advent of the Internet, this situation has changed. The Internet
provides for cheap, fast and easily accessible communications on a global scale. It is now
possible for a single person to have contact with thousands of other people, potentially
from all over the world. These contacts could be either local or remote, since the factor of
distance is effectively removed. Given the millions of people online [263, 262], it is likely
that a single interaction between two participants is both their first and last [88, 261].
In this electronic environment, the normal cues that help to build and establish repu-
tation, such as social standing and word-of-mouth, are missing [88, 159]. Parties meeting
on the Internet generally have no easy way to determine whether they should trust each
other, or even carry out a transaction. Pseudonyms compound this problem further, espe-
cially considering they often change from website to website [112]. For example, a seller
on an online marketplace may have a completely different name on another website, and
it is possible that neither of these names is linked to a real world identity.
In answer to this problem, many websites on the Internet have developed reputation
systems [261, 263, 104]. Typically, members of the website leave some kind of feedback
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about their transactions with other members. This feedback may be in the form of a
numerical rating, a categorisation such as good or bad[263, 327], a vote, or a connection
between members. Online auction sites are possibly the best known examples of these,
but there are others. For example, Amazon[2] and Epinions[7] both use reputation sys-
tems to promote and sell products. These systems allow members of the website to build
up a reputation that can be viewed by others.
Typically, the reputation of a single member consists of nothing more than an aggre-
gation of all trades or interactions (both those with good and bad outcomes) that the
member has had on the website [222]. In essence, members are able to decide whom
they will trust based on past feedback. With a reputation system, members are more
likely to be honest and well-behaved, as they have an expectation that current behaviour
will impact on their future [88]. Since we are not able to build a long-term relationship
with all other members, we instead rely on the feedback from a series of transactions
that other members have had with the member in question. This series of transactions
approximates some of the attributes of a long-term relationship [261].
Members with a better reputation are more likely to be trustworthy; they have a better
track record, and have more to lose should a transaction go badly. In the case of eBay,
the seller does not take on much risk because if they do not get paid, they do not ship
the goods. However, the buyer must place some level of trust in the seller, by accepting
the ‘risk of prior performance’ [159]. A reputation system ensures that the buyer can be
confident about what he or she is going to buy if the seller has a decent reputation, and
can therefore be trusted. As a result, good reputations can lead to more sales, and higher
potential values for goods being sold [112, 263, 177].
In short, the reputation systems allow us to trust strangers by characterising and pre-
dicting [89, 262, 270] their future actions, based on their past actions. These sites would
not be able to function without their reputation systems. Take eBay [6] as an example. It
has over 4 million active auctions at any time [88, 261, 98]. The majority of the auctions
on eBay are successfully transacted. According to Dellarocas [88] over 89% of the trans-
actions on eBay are one-time only trades. eBay simply would not function if it did not
have a reputation system.
This thesis takes a slightly wider view of reputation, considering all endorsements
(good, neutral and bad) of a target entity to be useful in determining that entity’s likely
future behaviour. These endorsements are called recommendations and could be gener-
ated from a target’s reputation, but also from their affiliations, capabilities and character-
istics. However, discussions about the use of recommendations in this thesis will usually
also refer to reputation.
GRAFT, or Generalised Recommendation Framework, supports the collection and
distribution of recommendation information for both people and electronic services. The
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recommendation information is obtained from a variety of traditional and non-traditional
reputation sources, and distributed in structured documents across a peer-to-peer (P2P)
network to remove centralised bottlenecks, and ensure robustness of the overall system.
The remainder of this chapter presents an overview of GRAFT, outlines the research
goals, describes the contributions and scope, and finally, outlines the structure of this
thesis.
1.2 Overview of GRAFT
GRAFT is a distributed framework that enables the collection and distribution of recom-
mendation information about entities. These entities can be either people, or electronic
services such as web services.
GRAFT
ProfilesSources Consumers
Figure 1.1: Overview of GRAFT, showing how multiple sources continuously feed rec-
ommendation information into GRAFT, and how this is continuously made available to
consumers.
As shown in Figure 1.1, multiple sources continuously feed recommendation infor-
mation into GRAFT, and this is continuously made available to consumers. Recommen-
dation information in GRAFT is stored in structured documents called profiles. Every
profile holds one or more recommendations, each from a unique source.
Every source of recommendation information has either explicit, or implicit reputa-
tion information. The feedback about individuals on eBay, for example, are a form of
explicit reputation information, while the networks of professional colleagues formed on
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LinkedIn [10] are an example of implicit reputation.
The consumers utilise the information obtained from the sources to make decisions
about individual entities. For example, access control decisions made by a recommen-
dation consumer about an individual might be influenced by the recommendations held
by that individual. The exact policy implemented at each consumer is unique and only
limited by the information made available by all of the sources.
All of the sources and consumers are nodes in a single, underlying peer-to-peer net-
work. As part of its membership commitment, each node may be asked to store a number
of profiles for GRAFT. Rather than store each profile in the network only once, they are
each replicated multiple times, across many different nodes. Each profile is always tied
to the identity of the entity it describes. This ensures that the profile can be located again,
and that the profile is always available, even as other nodes join, or leave the network.
Profiles are tied to individual entities using OpenID. All entities within GRAFT there-
fore have an OpenID, which acts as both the entity’s identity, and as a key to locate their
recommendation profile.
1.3 Research Goals
This thesis encapsulates a new paradigm for reputation that combines the derivation
of reputation from multiple sources, including non-reputation sources, the integration
of identity and reputation, and the integration of both human and electronic services
into one framework. In particular, it examines different types of information that can
be used as stand-ins for reputation, called recommendations, and the utilisation of these
recommendations in the description and evaluation of policies. To that end, a number
of research gaps were derived from the construction and subsequent analysis of the rep-
utation systems taxonomy in Section 2.4.5. A subset of these gaps were selected as the
research goals for this thesis and are reproduced here:
G.1 The use of recommendation information derived from non-reputation sources, and
the subsequent usage of this information within a reputation system.
G.2 The integration of human and electronic entities, including the investigation of how
these could be combined into one recommendation system.
G.3 The integration of identity and reputation, with a focus on how reputation informa-
tion could be combined with identity information.
G.4 The use of contextual information within reputation systems. In particular, the abil-
ity to capture and make this information available for use in the evaluation of rec-
ommendations.
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G.5 The ability to exchange recommendation information between systems.
1.4 Contributions
This thesis makes a number of contributions in the areas of reputation, reputation sys-
tems and access control. More specifically, this thesis:
1. Defines a terminology for reputation that describes reputation, trust and risk and
then discusses the relationships between them. The term recommendation as it is
used in the context of this thesis is also defined and discussed.
2. Defines a generalised reputation model that can be used to describe reputation in
both online and offline contexts. This model introduces standardised terminology
(based on published research) that is used throughout this thesis.
3. Defines an individual reputation context model that describes all of the contexts
that an individual entity may possess. This model is useful in that it helps to de-
scribe the contextual nature of an individual and makes clear the need for multiple
context support in reputation systems.
4. Provides a survey and taxonomy for reputation systems. The survey, conducted
on both academic and commercial systems, was used to drive the development of
the taxonomy. The taxonomy builds on five commonly accepted dimensions, while
also providing nine new dimensions for those aspects of reputation systems that
had not been covered widely previously, or never considered before. The taxon-
omy is subsequently used to build a classification of existing reputation systems,
generating a large number of research leads.
5. Presents an architecture and prototype for a fully distributed recommendation sys-
tem that supports both human and electronic service entities. The architecture and
prototype encapsulate a paradigm shift in reputation systems and exhibit a number
of unique ideas:
(a) A novel and well-defined three layer architecture stack that underpins the de-
sign and implementation of GRAFT. The stack allows for a modular approach
to building and integrating components into GRAFT, simplifying new design
and development work. In particular, the separation of raw collection from
integration into the peer-to-peer network allows for efficient nodes that only
implement those aspects of the stack they require.
(b) An exploration of identity and reputation integration. All recommendation
information in GRAFT is tied to identity information. Knowing the identity
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of an entity is sufficient to be able to locate and consume their recommenda-
tion information. Previous systems have treated these two concepts as distinct,
leading to classic two-step authenticate and authorise models. GRAFT instead
considers all information about an entity when granting access, leading to bet-
ter decisions.
(c) The integration of both human and electronic service entities into one reputa-
tion system. These two types of entities are treated identically within GRAFT.
Their integration into one reputation system is possible due to the fact that
identity and recommendation information have been combined using OpenID.
(d) The utilisation of a peer-to-peer network to store and replicate recommenda-
tion information. The peer-to-peer network distributes the load evenly across
the peers that make up the network, whilst also ensuring robustness for pro-
files.
(e) The utilisation of both explicit and implicit reputation information. In par-
ticular, the use of information previously not regarded as being useful when
combined with reputation such as demographic, social and derived informa-
tion.
(f) The ability to retain the context in which reputation information was gener-
ated. Understanding the context of the information allows for it to be utilised
in a meaningful way by a consumer.
(g) The utilisation of recommendation information in policy description and eval-
uation. The ability to combine recommendation information from multiple
sources in the building of policies allows for flexibility that is otherwise not
possible. For example, policies can build on the user’s demographics and their
professional standing, but can also utilise their social relationships.
6. Analysis of the performance of the GRAFT architecture. In particular, the perfor-
mance is measured and significant factors affecting performance are identified us-
ing a series of experiments that utilise both the prototype and large-scale simula-
tions. The simulations consider both the “perfect” state and increasing levels of
churn and malicious peers.
1.5 Scope
This thesis has a dual focus. Firstly, the development of a standard terminology, mod-
els to describe reputation and reputation systems, and the development of a taxonomy
for reputation systems. Secondly, the development, prototyping and evaluation of an ar-
chitecture for the GRAFT distributed recommendation framework as enumerated by the
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research goals in Section 1.3. A number of supporting technologies are utilised to build
the architecture, but are not the focus of this thesis. These technologies are introduced
and further discussed in the appendix. In order to limit the scope of the potential work,
the focus of this thesis is the development and evaluation of those components required
to collect, store and make available recommendations.
1.6 Publications
Two full internationally peer reviewed conference papers, and one ERA A* ranked jour-
nal paper were published during my PhD candidature. These papers were used as a
way to explore and peer review the ideas in this thesis. In particular, Chapter 2 is largely
derived from the following paper that was published in an ERA A* ranked journal:
• F. Hendrikx, K. Bubendorfer, R. Chard, Reputation Systems: A survey and taxon-
omy. Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing. 2014.
Chapters 3, 4 and 6 are in part derived from the following paper that was presented at an
ERA A ranked conference:
• F. Hendrikx, K. Bubendorfer, Malleable access rights to establish and enable scien-
tific collaboration, in: eScience (eScience), 2013 IEEE 9th International Conference
on, IEEE, Beijing, China, 2013, pp. 334-341.
Similarly, Chapter 4 is also based in part on the following paper:
• F. Hendrikx, K. Bubendorfer, Policy derived access rights in the social cloud, in:
eScience (eScience), 2013 IEEE 9th International Conference on, IEEE, Beijing, China,
2013, pp. 365-368.
1.7 Thesis Organisation
This thesis is organised as follows.
Chapter 2: Related Work discusses related work in reputation systems. In particular,
this section introduces common terminology and provides a survey of existing academic
and commercial reputation systems. A taxonomy is developed and then utilised to clas-
sify a number of reputation systems. This chapter concludes with an analysis of areas of
research that are under-represented, and then considers existing systems which attempt
to address some of these areas.
Chapter 3: Architecture develops a set of requirements based in part on the research
goals. These requirements are then used to develop the GRAFT architecture. The design
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implications for keeping the profiles secure at each layer of the stack are also discussed.
In particular, weaknesses and some areas for future work are identified here.
Chapter 4: Case Studies presents case studies examining how GRAFT could be utilised
in different situations. In particular, this chapter introduces a number of case studies that
are subsequently utilised in the implementation and evaluation chapters.
Chapter 5: Implementation introduces a prototype implementation of GRAFT, fo-
cusing on a subset of the case studies. The implementation includes the core components
of GRAFT, and three of the case studies presented in Chapter 4.
Chapter 6: Experimental Results and Evaluation presents a series of experimental
results. The experiments consider three key aspects of the architecture: recommendation
sources, the utilisation of the architecture and the ability for the architecture to scale and
efficiently provide profiles to consumers, even when under churn and with malicious
peers.
Chapter 7: Conclusions concludes this thesis by reviewing the design requirements,
contributions and areas for future research.
Chapter 2
Related Work
This chapter1 discusses a standard terminology for reputation systems, a survey of exist-
ing reputation systems, the construction of a taxonomy and finally the use of the taxon-
omy to classify a number of existing systems. The classification is used to find gaps in
the existing research and literature.
The requirement for trust and reputation is evident in many online systems. In online
banking systems for example, the reputation of the service is implicit. In more open
online business systems and electronic markets such as eBay [6], the explicit yet informal
use of reputation through user feedback can be observed.
Building and maintaining a good reputation can be a significant motivation for con-
tributing to online communities, be they scientific, business or socially oriented. It has
been shown that a good reputation leads to more sales, at a higher value than might
otherwise be possible [263]. Existing online reputation models, while diverse, are still in
their infancy and are generally limited in scope, usually focusing on a single context for
their information.
2.1 Terminology
2.1.1 Reputation and Trust
According to the Collins English Dictionary, reputation is “the estimation in which a person
or thing is generally held; opinion”. Every person’s opinion differs from every other person,
making reputation a highly personal and subjective quantity [272]. Reputation is not
what character someone has, but rather what character others think someone has. Mui
et al. [220] define reputation as the “the perception that an agent creates through past actions
about its intentions and norms”; this is the definition that will be used in this thesis.
1The work in this chapter is largely taken from the published paper F. Hendrikx, K. Bubendorfer, R.
Chard, Reputation Systems: A survey and taxonomy. Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing. 2014.
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Reputation and trust (or trustworthiness) are commonly confused [222] and used as
synonyms, even though their meanings are distinctly different. Jøsang et al. [159] define
trust as “the extent to which one party is willing to depend on something or somebody in a given
situation with a feeling of relative security, even though negative consequences are possible”. The
key concepts in this definition are dependence and reliability; these values are measured,
in part, through an agent’s reputation. It can therefore be said that trust can be established
through the use of reputation. Arguably, a better reputation can lead to greater trust.
Risk is often undertaken in the hope of some gain or benefit. Risk can therefore be
viewed as the situation where the outcome of a transaction is important to a party, how-
ever the probability of failure is non-zero [159]. Incorporating the previous notion of trust
into this definition: the amount of risk that a party may be willing to tolerate is directly
proportional to the amount of trust that the party has in the other party.
The main aim of reputation systems is therefore to support the establishment of trust
between unfamiliar parties. Dellarocas [88] states that the aim of eBay’s feedback mech-
anism, and in a generalised sense, all reputation systems, is to “generate sufficient trust
among buyers to persuade them to assume the risk of transacting with complete strangers”.
Despotovic and Aberer [89] talk about “reducing the opportunism” and vulnerability of
the two parties. Using a reputation system, a party may examine the history of another
and decide that it will trust and interact with the other party. This decision is often called
a “trust decision” [183].
Despite the best intentions of reputation systems, it is important to note that reputa-
tion only provides a “hint”, and not clear evidence or proof of an agent’s actual future
intentions. Gaming the system, by generating a series of positive interactions to build up
a good reputation, only to default at the last moment is not unheard of.
2.1.2 Recommendations
Recommendations are endorsements of the target agent by a third party. These endorse-
ments are based on the target’s characteristics, capabilities, affiliations, and reputation.
In the past, letters of recommendation were used, for example, to introduce foreign en-
voys to a new court [315]. These letters were often written by a senior dignitary, and
lent the envoy some of the dignitary’s reputation. In a similar way, modern letters of
recommendation are used to promote the suitability of an agent for a position or task.
Assuming the recommender is of good standing, a recommendation will help to es-
tablish trust between parties, as it might, for example, confirm that the agent is a member
of a given organisation, or provide assurance that they are reliable. Conversely, if a rec-
ommender is not of good standing, a recommendation may carry less weight than if it
came from a more reputable source.
As recommendations are based on information about an agent (for example, their
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reputation), they must be generated from prior knowledge, or past actions. Although the
word recommendation tends to have a positive inclination, the intended usage through-
out this thesis is such that any actions or information can be used to generate a recom-
mendation. In this way, an agent can get positive, neutral and negative recommenda-
tions.
2.2 Reference Models
2.2.1 Reputation Systems
When discussing reputation systems, it is important to define the parties involved and
their potential interactons. Figure 2.1 illustrates a generalised model of reputation sys-
tems that was designed to accommodate both real-world and online approaches to repu-
tation.
Trustor Trustee
Recommender
Reputation 
Information
1 1
1
1..n
1
0..n
interested in
queries
1
0..n
had an interaction with, or 
observed an interaction
Reputation 
Information
Reputation 
Information
0..n
11
replies
Recommendation
0..n
Figure 2.1: A Reference Model for Reputation Systems that accomodates both real-world
and online approaches to reputation. The trustor is a party that wants to trust and in-
teract with a target agent or entity, called the trustee. The trustor may then query 1..n
recommenders that may have previously interacted, or observed an interaction, with the
trustee.
The trustor is a party that wants to trust and interact with a target agent or entity,
called the trustee [89, 183]. In order to make a trust decision about whether to trust
the trustee, the trustor will need to evaluate the trustee’s reputation [182]. It does this
by first consulting its own internal reputation information, to see if it has previously
interacted with the trustee and what the outcome was. However, if there was no previous
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interaction, the trustor will then query 1..n recommenders [274, 270, 183, 193] that may
have previously interacted, or observed an interaction, with the trustee for their opinions.
A recommender may be an entity that provides information from its own history of
transactions, or a system that either observed an interaction between two parties, or col-
lects information from other sources [193]. A recommender with appropriate information
may reply with a recommendation (sometimes also called feedback or a rating). A recom-
mender may have a variety of first and third hand information; this is represented by the
1 : 0..n relationship between the recommender and its internal reputation information.
Using the reputation information obtained from the recommenders, the trustor is able
to make its trust decision. The roles of trustor, trustee and recommender are completely
interchangeable [183]; if the transaction proceeds, both parties will have their own rep-
utation information that may subsequently be made available to other parties making
similar decisions.
2.2.2 Reputation Context
Reputation is context dependent and relies on contextual information to give data mean-
ing [24]. The definition of context with respect to reputation systems is often difficult to
determine and there is no common definition used by researchers.
Societal
Organisational
Professional
Personal
or
Individual
Non-
personal
Figure 2.2: A Reference Model for Reputation Context. Starting with the innermost ring,
reputation context can be personal, professional, organisational and societal.
Reputation systems are often discussed as utilising additional contextual dimensions [272],
facets [130], or attributes [77] to provide greater meaning and usability to the informa-
tion generated during a transaction. In order to unify this concept, the term contextual
attributes has been adopted. Contextual attributes are like metadata, in that they help to
describe the transaction in greater detail. For example, the date, the price, the buyer and
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the seller are all possible attributes of a transaction between two parties.
However, contextual attributes are not the entire picture. For that, a context is re-
quired, which is the domain in which the information was generated. Most reputa-
tion systems employ a single, or personal, context. In other words, most systems con-
sider only the reputation of an entity in the “function” of the system (whether that be
e-commerce, expert advice, or file sharing).
Reputation systems employing more than one context often add additional domains
of information. For example, the addition of a social context to an existing personal repu-
tation context can help to determine if an individual contributes to his or her community,
and therefore if they are more trustworthy.
In an effort to summarise and clarify the relationship between context and reputa-
tion, a reference model based on a psychological framework of personal identity [299]
has been developed. This reference model is presented in Figure 2.2. Starting with the
innermost ring, reputation context can be personal (who), professional (what), organisa-
tional (which/membership) and societal (where).
Most online reputation systems focus only on the personal reputation of a person,
whilst many real-world situations deal with non-personal aspects, such as a user’s pro-
fessional and organisational membership.
2.3 Reputation Systems Survey
In this section a number of academic and commercial reputation systems are examined.
These systems were selected based on their impact or importance. Each reputation sys-
tem has been considered in a systematic way so that comparisons could be drawn be-
tween them. The academic systems are organised in chronological order, while the com-
mercial systems are organised alphabetically.
2.3.1 Academic Systems
The Regret [273, 272] reputation system is designed to operate within an electronic mar-
ketplace setting. The system utilises multiple contextual attributes and classifies informa-
tion as coming from an individual, social, or an ontological dimension. The individual
dimension considers information directly gathered from interactions between two enti-
ties. The information is fine grained and often relates to the frequency of overcharging,
late delivery and quality of the transaction. The social dimension is an addition to the
Regret system, where trust can be extracted from the groups and communities associated
with the target entity. A key benefit of the social dimension is that it allows new and
unproven entities to bootstrap their trustworthiness by belonging to reputable groups.
Alternatively, because the entire group’s reputation is associated with the behavior of its
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members, it is pertinent for a group’s members to moderate the behavior of those associ-
ated with them.
The work also includes an ontological dimension, where reputation collected for
atomic aspects are combined to construct more complex graph structures in order to de-
rive further insight. Ratings, or impressions, are recorded as a value between positive
and negative one. An entity’s reputation is then the aggregation of the result of all trans-
actions they have taken part in. When utilising the ontological dimension, each atomic
aspect is calculated using individual and social dimensions, and then combined through
a weighted graph for more complex evaluation. The computation of the ontological rep-
utation, ORij is achieved through Eq. 2.1. Where each child in the graph is computed
with a weight wxy to establish a score. An example of this computation can be seen in
Eq. 2.2 where the social dimension SRij for each aspect is weighted and used. The Regret
system also employs a degree of reputation decay, called a forget factor, where only the
most recent transactions are considered.
ORij(x) =
∑
y∈children(x)
wxyORij(y) (2.1)
ORij(good seller) = 0.2× SRij(delivery date) +
0.2× SRij(product price) +
0.6× SRij(product quality) (2.2)
Confidant [52] incorporates a reputation system into a Dynamic Source Routing pro-
tocol in mobile Ad-hoc networks. The Confidant protocol is a structured system designed
to identify and isolate misbehaving nodes in the network. The system allows entities to
monitor the behavior of others, regarding their ability to manipulate information and cor-
rectly route, forward and participate in the protocol. Nodes are inherently trusted and
malicious behavior is reported, resulting in a form of punishment.
An alarm message is generated when a node experiences, observes or receives a re-
port of malicious behavior. Observed information is gathered by examining the inter-
actions among neighbors. Alarm messages are then passed on to other nodes in the
network to warn them of the misbehaving node. When an alarm message is received
from another entity, their trustworthiness is considered before passing the alarm on. Rat-
ings are stored as local lists and black lists at each node, and are potentially shared with
friends. Confidant proposes to lessen the effect of false accusations with a reputation
death property and revocation lists, meaning entities are capable of redeeming them-
selves over time as historic actions are removed from the system. No specific aggregation
equations are published.
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XRep [82] is an extension to GNUtella-like peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. XRep al-
lows for the creation and maintenance of reputation for both resources and nodes in the
network. Each node maintains a personal history for both resources and nodes. For re-
sources, a simple binary rating is used, while for nodes a count of the number of success-
ful and unsuccessful downloads is maintained. Reputation messages are piggybacked
on existing connections and allow nodes to select resources based on criteria other than
purely resource based. When deciding where to download a resource, a node first con-
tacts its peers for their advice (using a poll operation), and then evaluates the responses.
Once the node has selected the appropriate resource, it can evaluate potential nodes that
offer the resource and select one based on reputation. Assigning reputation ratings to
both resources and nodes in the network gives XRep a number of advantages. These
include judging new resources by the nodes offering them, load balancing using a re-
source reputation rather than purely the node reputation, and whitewashing avoidance
as changing pseudonyms removes nodes from being selected. A set of extensions to
XRep, called X2Rep [81] were created later and addressed some of the weaknesses in
XRep.
EigenTrust [166] is a peer-to-peer (P2P) reputation framework that allows entities to
decide which others they will trust when it comes to downloading files. It is fully decen-
tralised, and utilises a distributed hash table overlay. Each entity maintains a personal
history for other peers, which is simply the sum of positive and negative interactions they
have experienced with them. These values are normalised between 0 and 1. An entity
calculates the global Trust for another entity, Tij , by using personal histories which are
obtained from others in the network. These histories are weighed by the credibility of the
reporting entity, as seen in Eq. 2.3, where eix denotes a local trust value of entity i for en-
tity x. In essence, the system uses the direct experience of others and a local perception of
the reporting peer to compute trust [144]. To compute trust in a distributed environment,
the aggregation model represented by Eq. 2.4 is used. This is a component-wise method
of computing the global trust of i which aggregates the trust each peer holds in i over a
time period k. Where α is a constant less than 1 and p is used to add trust to new entities
in the network.
Tij =
∑
k
eixexj (2.3)
Ti
(k+1) = (1− α)(e1iT1(k) + · · ·+ eniTn(k)) + αpi (2.4)
P-Grid [24] is a peer-to-peer (P2P) platform for distributed information management.
P-Grid is completely decentralised and self-organising. Information is spread across
the environment among peers via a distributed search tree, similarly structured to dis-
tributed hash tables. As is the case with Confidant, entities in P-Grid are considered
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inherently trustworthy, and only malicious behavior is deemed relevant. Entities are able
to forward complaints about transactions to others within the environment. These com-
plaints are distributed in the form of messages to arbitrary entities. P-Grid implements a
binary trust model, where entities are either trustworthy or not. When an entity wishes
to evaluate the trustworthiness of a target, it performs a search for complaints. These are
fed into a trust function such as that shown in Eq. 2.5. The function is used to determine
whether i can trust the entity j. Where Cr denotes complaints received and Cf repre-
sents complaints filed. Criavg and Cfiavg are the aggregate of all observations the entity i
has made over its lifetime. If the equation computes as true, then the entity is considered
trustworthy, otherwise they are not.
Crnormx (j)Cf
norm
x (j) ≤ (
1
2
+
4√
Cri
avgCfi
avg
)2Cri
avgCfi
avg (2.5)
PeerTrust uses a structured peer-to-peer (P2P) overlay network to host a distributed
implementation of their transaction-based feedback system. The simulation used to demon-
strate PeerTrust utilises P-Grid to distribute feedback scores. The system incorporates a
combination of fundamental reputation sources, such as direct feedback, and the quan-
tity of transactions performed, while weighting feedback with credibility. The work in-
troduces two novel trust metrics, a community context factor and transaction context
factor. The simulation presented in the work has entities generate a rating of either zero
or one.
The trust of an entity i is computed by Eq. 2.6. Given Ni is the total number of trans-
actions entity i has taken part in. Pij denotes the other entity involved in the transaction.
Sij is the normalised level of satisfaction i received from peer Pij from the transaction.
Cr denotes the credibility of the feedback received from the entity Pij . TFij represents
the adaptive transaction context factor for entity i’s jth transaction, and CF denotes the
community context factor for i during a period of time. The normalised weighted factors
α and β are the collective evaluation and the community context factors, respectively.
Ti = α
Ni∑
j=1
SijCr(Pij)TFij + βCF (i) (2.6)
RateWeb [202] is designed to facilitate trust between Web services. RateWeb utilises
a decentralised and unstructured approach. The system’s goal is to provide a method in
which Web services can reliably be used as independent components in a service-oriented
enterprise without the intervention of humans.
When selecting a Web service to accomplish a task, the consuming entity queries the
community for a list of suitable services. A set of eligible Web services are then returned
to the consumer. The response also includes a list of past consumers that possess feed-
back for each service. Rather than acting as a centralised repository of feedback, the
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community acts as a directory of raters. Each entity stores a personal perception of each
Web service it has invoked. The feedback is stored in a vector of values that represent the
promised quality against the delivered quality of an attribute.
The reputation of a service si can be computed by an inquiring consumer through
Eq.2.7. Where L denotes the set of consumers which have interacted with, and rated,
the service si. PerEvalxi represents the personal perception a consuming entity has of
the service si. The credibility Crx of each consuming entity, as viewed by the inquiring
consumer, is within the interval [0, 1]. A reputation fader, or decay factor, Df , is also
incorporated and is a value within [0, 1].
Reputationsi =
∑L
x=1[PerEval
x
iDfCr(x)]∑L
x=1Cr(x)
(2.7)
A credibility-based model is also included within the framework. In this model, each
service contains a set of trusted entities to query when requesting ratings. If none of the
group contain experience with the entity in question, each group member can refer the
request to their own trusted set of entities.
R2Trust [304] is a fully distributed reputation system for large-scale, decentralised
overlay networks. The system is designed to incorporate reputation and risk to pro-
vide trust within an unstructured network. The reputation of an entity in the network
is calculated by examining any direct interactions an entity may have had and obtaining
recommendations from other peers. Recommendations are weighted using local trust
values for the originating peers. The trust value assigned to any given peer is built using
social relationships and considers the risk inherent in those relationships. This allows the
framework to react quickly when the behavior of a given peer changes. R2Trust deter-
mines quality of service as probabilistic ratings between zero and one. These values are
then aggregated and accumulated to give an entity a reputation value. In order to filter
out untrustworthy second-hand opinions, a credibility score is used to weight feedback
during aggregation. A decayed trust value, DTij reduces the significance of feedback
over periods of time, as shown in Eq. 2.8. Where λk = pn−k is the decay factor of time
period k, and 0 < λk < λk+1 ≤ 1, 1 ≤ k < n. etkij denotes a local trust value of entity i for
entity j over the time period tk.
DTij =
∑n
k=1(λke
tk
ij )∑n
k=1 λk
(2.8)
2.3.2 Commercial Systems
Amazon [2] allows its registered users to write reviews on products. A user must first
buy a product from Amazon, however they may then review any product carried by
Amazon using a numeric rank (5 stars). Another Amazon user may then leave a boolean
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feedback rating of either “helpful” or “not helpful” for a product review. Reviews may be
ordered by the number of “helpful” votes they have received. The reputation of a review
author rises with each ’helpful’ vote [193]. Amazon maintains a ranked list of reviewers
based on their reputation, allowing them to apply badges such as “top 10 reviewer” and
“top 500 reviewer” to their reviewers.
When considering online reputation systems, eBay is both well researched and much
written about [261, 263, 262, 147, 213]. eBay is an online auction site, allowing sellers
and buyers to trade goods through an auction process. At the end of a transaction, both
parties to the exchange leave feedback for each other. This allows potential future parties
to examine the reliability of any target party that has had a previous interaction. Feedback
is left in the form of a single overall rating (Good, Neutral and Negative), a series of
numerical ratings (for the following facets: Accuracy, Communication, Shipping Time
and Shipping Charges) and a comment. The comment often provides further information
about the actual quality of the item, shipping or any problems encountered.
Epinions [7] is a consumer products review site, founded in 1999. Users do not have
to purchase anything and may write reviews on any product they chose, although they
are encouraged to focus on new or previously unreviewed products. Good reviews can
earn royalties on sales of the product that was the subject of the review.
Users do not have any visible reputation rating, however badges such as “top re-
viewer” and “popular author” are assigned to active users with good review ratings.
Users are however able to maintain a list of other users that they trust. The number of
users that trust a given user is publicly displayed, and acts as a form of reputation.
Slashdot [13] is a technology news website, founded in 1997. It is one of the earlier
sites to utilise a reputation system. All registered users have an amount of “karma”
that changes over time to reflect their level of activity, which includes the posting of
articles and commenting. Users with a good level of karma are able to become comment
moderators [249].
Stackoverflow is a dedicated Question and Answer site for developers, both “profes-
sional and enthusiast”. Users post questions that may then be answered by other users.
Reputation points are awarded for all tasks (including asking and answering questions).
However, more points are awarded for comprehensive answers as chosen by other users.
As a user gains more points, they are able to access further features on the site, including
the ability to vote up, vote down and act as a moderator (i.e. edit other user’s questions
and answers). A user that votes down a particular answer will lose 1 reputation point.
Presumably this is intended to stop users from voting down too much.
Each user has a profile that features their reputation score, and how they achieved
that score. The reputation score is represented using a discrete value; the more reputation
points a user has, the higher their score.
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Turkopticon [17] is an third-party reputation system for crowdsourced workers using
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT). It allows workers to check the reputation of work
providers when viewing potential jobs. In particular, it allows a worker to view and rate
a work provider on 4 facets of their behavior (Communicativity, Generosity, Fairness and
Promptness).
Turkopticon is integrated into a worker’s experience of AMT using a browser plugin.
The plugin inserts the rating information into the AMT pages as they are rendered on the
user’s browser. Rating information is centrally maintained by Turkopticon, and main-
tained using worker input. Regular software updates improve the worker experience
and resolve technical issues.
2.4 Reputation Systems Taxonomy
2.4.1 Related Work
In Mui et al. [222], the authors present a reputation typology. This typology includes
only a small number of dimensions as it tries to combine reputational literature from a
number of different disciplines.
A set of classification dimensions for trust and reputation models is introduced in
Sabater and Sierra [274]. These are subsequently used to classify a number of well-known
trust and reputation systems.
A taxonomy for peer-to-peer reputation systems is introduced in Marti and Garcia-
Molina [207]. The goal of their paper is to organise existing ideas and work, so that design
and implementation can be better achieved. They have 11 dimensions in three areas of
interest: information gathering, scoring and ranking, and response.
A framework for the comparison of reputation-based trust systems for peer-to-peer
applications is presented in Koutrouli and Tsalgatidou [182]. The authors investigate 14
dimensions, spread across three key areas of interest: information gathering, feedback
aggregation and output. The focus of their paper is on peer-to-peer e-commerce, file
sharing and cooperative applications.
In Wang and Vassileva [327], the authors introduce a classification of trust and reputa-
tion systems based on system structure. Their particular focus is on using trust and rep-
utation information for web-service selection. The three classification criteria discussed
in their paper are each directly related to the underlying architecture of the reputation
system. Although aspects of system structure are identified by this work, other details
are also considered in the classification.
A survey of trust and reputation systems is presented in Jøsang et al. [159]. The au-
thors focus on and thoroughly investigate reputation calculation, and how it is imple-
mented in currently deployed systems.
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In Hoffman et al. [144], the authors present a survey of attack and defense techniques
for reputation systems. An analytical framework for breaking down and comparing rep-
utation systems is introduced in order to identify common issues. This framework con-
siders aspects such as dissemination and calculation of reputation. They also discuss
existing reputation systems in the context of security weaknesses and the defenses that
are employed by these systems.
A taxonomy of attacks for peer-to-peer reputation systems is presented in Koutrouli
and Tsalgatidou [183]. Their taxonomy breaks down reputation attacks into three pri-
mary categories: Unfair recommendations, Inconsistent behavior and Identity manage-
ment attacks. The authors then present a series of defense mechanisms, and conclude
with a roadmap for system designers.
Yao et al. [349] address common vulnerability issues in reputation systems. As part of
their work they present a “decomposition” of reputation systems that examines dissemi-
nation and calculation in a number of systems.
2.4.2 Construction Methodology
The taxonomy was constructed using an iterative approach, as described by Nickerson et
al. [225], where both an “empirical to deductive” and “deductive to empirical” approach
are used. In this overall approach, the primary purpose of the taxonomy is used to drive
the identification of the key dimensions and their characteristics.
Given that the purpose of the taxonomy was to contrast and compare the architec-
ture, organisation and management of different reputation systems, the key dimensions
focus on the structure, design and organisation of these systems. Dimensions in existing
commercial and research reputation systems were examined, and those that related to
the chosen dimensions were included. Further dimensions that are important as regards
reputation systems architecture, organisation and management were then added.
The dimensions and characteristics were then used to classify a diverse set of reputa-
tion systems. The dimensions and characteristics were then further refined by ensuring
that they could fully describe this set of systems. A number of other reputation systems
were then classified. These were used to identify the dimensions and characteristics that
required further work or were not defined clearly enough. This process was repeated
until no further changes were required.
2.4.3 Taxonomy
The reputation taxonomy is given in Figure 2.3. The first level of the taxonomy distin-
guishes between explicit and implicit reputation systems. An implicit reputation mecha-
nism represents systems that have not defined a reputation system, however reputation
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information is still employed by its members to assist in making decisions. The oldest
and simplest form of implicit reputation system is the social word of mouth system as
discussed by Dellarocas [88]. These “systems” have little or no structure, and have been
used for centuries to ensure that participants in transactions remain honest, even when
faced with the temptation to cheat the other party for short-term gains.
In more recent times, examples of implicit reputation systems can be found in social
networks such as Facebook or LinkedIn [10]. Entities within a social network can extract
some degree of trust for the information gathered through friends of friends. Although
neither Facebook nor LinkedIn directly implement a reputation system, members of both
systems are able to utilise reputable connections through friends within the environment.
Another well-known implicit reputation system can be demonstrated in Google’s [9]
search engine. The order of the search results represents a ranking of pages, based on
the reputation of each page. The reputation is determined by the number of links that
point at the page, and where the links originate. A link originating at a page with a high
reputation is likely to mean that the target page has some value. Pujol et al. [253], discuss
utilising a similar kind of topology analysis in social networks to determine reputation.
Explicit reputation systems are those that have been purposely implemented to fa-
cilitate estimation of trust between members of an environment. They are typically used
within an environment that relies on frequent interaction with a sufficiently sized, diverse
set of members.
The second level of the taxonomy details the core dimensions of the taxonomy. The
first five of these dimensions represent those aspects of reputation systems that are most
often discussed in the existing literature:
Common Dimensions
1. History.
A user’s history is the set of stored information recording their past interactions
and their outcomes. It is often used to determine the likely outcome of current,
or future transactions, and is therefore central to the concept of reputation. A past
transaction is often recorded in the form of an exchange between two entities, where
each entity leaves feedback about the performance of the other in executing their
duties and obligations. This feedback is often called a rating.
• Personal: personal history is created and maintained using directly collected
or observed information, leading to personal views of other entities. The sub-
jective nature of these views means that others in the system may disagree
with these views. This is sometimes also called localised or subjective history.
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Figure 2.3: A Visual Representation of the Taxonomy.
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• Global: global history is created and maintained from information shared by
other members in a system, leading to a consistent, global view of every entity
in the system.
Further discussion on these terms can be found in Mui et al. [222], Casare and Sich-
man [59], Sabater and Sierra [274], Koutrouli and Tsalgatidou [182], Wang and Vas-
sileva [327], Marti and Garcia-Molina [207] and Zhao and Li [358].
2. Context.
Contextual information can give a lot of meaning to data by describing a range of
details regarding how interactions take place [91]. In Section 2.2, it was proposed
that context refer to the domain from which information is generated. In order to
discuss and categorise reputation systems that utilise fine grained and transaction
specific, contextual information, the term contextual attributes has been adopted.
Employing this definition, the majority of reputation systems can be classified as
operating within a single context, as few systems employ information from distinct
domains. However, contextual attributes are frequently used to give additional
meaning to transactions and can greatly increase the usability of reputation infor-
mation. Schlosser et al. [281] discuss contextual attributes when providing an ex-
ample of goods being sold. They explain that not only the price and quality of an
item are important when buying an item, but other information such as the delivery
time and after sales services should also be considered.
In addition to a typical feedback score in which a peer’s behavior in a network is
analysed, Gupta et al. [130] include an explicit capability attribute when building
a peer’s reputation. Peers that provide desired resources to the network, such as,
computing time, are given a greater supplementary reputation than those that pro-
vide few or no resources.
Reputation information can be generated from a vast number of transaction in-
stances which are each accompanied by a significant amount of contextual informa-
tion. Reputation systems have been categorised as either incorporating information
from a single or multiple contexts as well as maintaining contextual attributes.
• Single: a single context is assumed or maintained within the system.
• Multiple: one or more contexts is maintained within the system. Support for
multiple contexts is discussed by Bagheri and Ghorbani [32], Tavakolifard et
al. [301] and Grinshpoun et al. [127].
• Attribute: Contextual attributes are maintained by the system. This property is
sometimes called multi-faceted, dimensional, or attribute-based, and is further
discussed by Gupta et al. [130], Sabater and Sierra [272], and Conner et al. [77].
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Further general discussion on context can be found in Sabater and Sierra [274],
Koutrouli and Tsalgatidou [182] and Wang and Vassileva [327].
3. Collection.
For a reputation system to establish trust the behavioral information of entities
needs to be captured. There are a number of techniques a reputation system can
offer to enable the collection of information on interactions between entities.
• Direct: information is generated explicitly either from an individual’s personal
interactions, or observation of other’s transactions. This term is further dis-
cussed in Sabater and Sierra [274] and Mui et al. [222].
• Indirect: information is obtained from other entities (either individuals or
groups) based on transactions that the querying entity was not privy to. This
is sometimes called witness information. This term is further discussed in
Sabater and Sierra [274] and Mui et al. [222].
• Derived: information is obtained from a source that was not explicitly de-
signed to be used as a reputation source in the current context.
4. Representation.
The format employed to describe, exchange and interpret reputation information.
After investigating a number of frameworks and the method used to symbolise the
information to members, the commonly used types of information are:
• Binary: information is stored using boolean values. This term is discussed by
Kinateder and Rothermel [177], Sabater and Sierra [274], Hoffman et al. [144].
• Discrete: information is stored using discrete integer values. This term was
also used by Hoffman et al. [144].
• Continuous: information is stored as a floating point number. This term is
discussed by Sabater and Sierra [274] and Hoffman et al. [144].
• String: information is stored in textual form, allowing a wide range of data to
be maintained. This term was also used by Kinateder and Rothermel [177] and
Conner et al. [77].
• Vector: information that is either provided by multiple sources or is explicitly
separated for individual use. This term is discussed by Koutrouli and Tsalgati-
dou [182].
5. Aggregation.
Aggregation describes how a reputation score for an entity is computed. The sim-
plest form of reputation aggregation is the summation of all of the positive and
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negative ratings for an entity [159]. Each positive rating adds one to the sum, while
each negative rating subtracts one. The final rating can be used to rank all the en-
tities in a system. A slightly improved approach is to average all of the ratings
to produce a single rating for each entity. Averaging is often used in conjunction
with normalisation to evaluate entities on a specific scale. Weighting the ratings
by factors such as, age, reputation of the source or importance of a transaction, can
provide further ways to enhance this approach. Summation, averaging, weighting
and normalisation are common aggregation methods and fall into a single class of
simple computation called counting.
A different approach is to consider reputation as multiple discrete values as op-
posed to continuous values. Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [21] present a model where
an entity is judged to be either ”Very Trustworthy, Trustworthy, Untrustworthy and
Very Untrustworthy“. This is simpler for humans to work with [159], but is not op-
timal during computation, as the discrete rating values must be converted using
look-up tables, weighted and converted back to discrete values.
Another class of aggregation involves fitting prior knowledge about another entity
into a probability model and computing the likelihood of a hypothesis being cor-
rect. The hypothesis often takes the form of “is entity x trustworthy?”. In other
words, knowledge of prior events is used to predict future outcomes.
Aggregation using fuzzy logic is discussed by Song et al. [292]. In their system,
fuzzy rules are used to determine the reputation score for both buyers and sellers.
• Counting: reputation is computed by either summing positive and negative
ratings, or averaging ratings. The ratings may be weighted to provide a bias
towards, for example, recent ratings or those from more reputable sources.
This term was also used by Yao et al. [349].
• Discrete: reputation is computed by converting discrete rating values using
look-up tables. This term is also present in Jøsang et al. [159].
• Probabilistic: ratings are fitted into a probability model and used to predict the
likelihood of a hypothesis being correct. This term is discussed by Ruohomaa
et al. [270], Koutrouli and Tsalgatidou [182], Hoffman et al. [144] and Yao et
al. [349].
• Fuzzy: fuzzy logic is used to process or compute ratings, allowing these sys-
tems to work with a degree of uncertainty. Jøsang et al. [159] and Yao et
al. [349] use this term.
• Flow: reputation is computed by examining the flow of transitive trust. This
term was also used by Jøsang et al. [159] and Yao et al. [349].
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Good general discussions on aggregation can be found in Jøsang et al. [159], Hoff-
man et al. [144] and Yao et al. [349]. Discussions on preserving privacy during
reputation aggregation can be found in Pavlov et al. [243], Steinbrecher [294] and
Gudes et al. [128].
Uncommon Dimensions
In addition to the five common dimensions already presented, further aspects of reputa-
tion systems that are not widely discussed in the existing literature have been identified.
Each of these aspects were captured as dimensions in the taxonomy and each has been
investigated and discussed below:
6. Entities.
Entities are the primary focus, or target of a reputation system. The targets of a
reputation system are typically either people or resources (for example, books or
films) [327]. However, with the expansion of reputation systems there are now
websites that need to cater to both. For example, Amazon allows members to rate
both reviewers and resources, and Damiani et al. [82] talk about combining peer
and resource reputations in peer-to-peer networks. Both people and resources are
typical first class members of a reputation system. They have some similar reputa-
tional requirements, and are therefore not considered distinguishing factors in this
taxonomy. Mui et al. [222] presents a reputation typology that includes the notion
of “individual and group reputation”. Reputation can be collected and accrued for
these two different types of entities. The entities category has been included to pro-
vide a basis to differentiate between systems that operate on individuals and those
that function over groups of entities.
• Individual: these systems are focused on people or specific resources. This
concept is further discussed in Wang and Vassileva [327].
• Group: these systems are focused on groups rather than individuals. Groups
can be both formal and informal in nature, with the former assuming some of
the characteristics of an organisation. Systems that utilise groups are discussed
by Mui et al. [222], Gal-Oz et al. [116] and Tong and Zhang [306].
7. Presence.
Presence describes how closely a reputation is tied to its underlying reputation sys-
tem. In most early reputation systems, an entity’s reputation information was only
available to be fetched or updated by a central server. Later systems distributed the
reputation information, however the entity holding the information is still required
to be online.
2.4. REPUTATION SYSTEMS TAXONOMY 27
• Online: those systems that require the continuous presence of authority in or-
der to be able to distribute reputation information. This is the default position
for most reputation systems.
• Partial: those systems that do not require the continuous presence of authority
in order to be able to distribute reputation information. Initial discussions can
be found in Ismail et al. [154] and Prashant and Dasgupta [90].
• Offline: those systems that do not require the presence of authority in order to
be able to distribute reputation information. This is a logical extension to the
other categories in this dimension. However, it should be noted that there are
not thought to be any systems that could be classified as offline.
8. Governance.
Reputation systems are volatile environments with entities and information chang-
ing frequently. In order for the system to function properly, providing trust within
a community, some level of authority is required. Governance describes that au-
thority, and in particular, how the system is controlled.
• Centralised: a centralised group or organisation manages the system. Most
commercial reputation systems exhibit centralised governance, including Ama-
zon, eBay and ePinions. In each instance, the underlying architecture may well
be distributed, but the management is most likely by a single organisation.
• Distributed: multiple entities working together, often with no centralised man-
agement. Entities within such a system may come and go as they please. Most
recent peer-to-peer systems display distributed governance.
9. Fabric.
Fabric describes how the nodes of the reputation system are organised. The organ-
isation of a reputation system is a fundamental attribute, allowing systems to be
easily categorised and differentiated between.
• Structured: new nodes are assigned a location and a set of neighbors in an
organised fashion when connecting to a network [207]. The topology may be
formed using an overlay and therefore unrelated to the underlying network
[284].
• Unstructured: networks do not exhibit any organised arrangement and gener-
ally allow new nodes to connect randomly [207].
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10. Interoperability.
Interoperability describes the underlying principles by which the system operates
and shares information. At present, most commercial reputation systems are tightly
controlled and the information contained within them is not shared with third par-
ties. This is because they consider their reputation information to be commercial
property. As a result, members with good reputations are typically reluctant to
leave and build up a new reputation with another provider.
• Open: entities may freely access and utilise the reputation information con-
tained within a system using data standards or APIs. Most academic systems
fall into this category.
• Closed: reputation information is proprietary and not usually shared outside
of a system. Most commercial systems would fall into this category.
11. Control.
Control describes the manner in which a reputation system motivates and controls
entities to act in a desired manner, and is a fundamental aspect of any implementa-
tion. Arguably reputation systems are themselves are socially corrective, however
this dimension is only concerned with explicit rules and incentives/disincentives
used within a reputation system in order to get entities to behave in the desired
manner.
• Rules: an entity is forced or limited to act only within a prescribed manner.
• Incentives/Disincentives: an entity is motivated or guided using rewards and
punishments to obtain appropriate behaviors. Incentives are further discussed
in Jurca and Faltings [163], Wongrujira and Seneviratne [331] and Marti and
Garcia-Molina [207].
12. Evaluation.
When obtaining or viewing the available reputation information for a given target
entity (the trustee), reputation systems may provide two different views of previous
transactions.
• Atomistic: a detailed transaction-based view that potentially shows all of the
interactions that the trustee has had. This can be used to window-in on only
one aspect of the available reputation information.
• Holistic: all of an entity’s interactions are considered and weighed to provide
a single, overall view of the trustee to the trustor. No detailed information is
provided, only the summarised information is available for evaluation.
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13. Data Filtering.
• None: data provided by the system is not limited or filtered in any way. Trustors
may utilise the full available history for a given trustee.
• Subset: data provided by the system is limited by the application of data fil-
tering. Trustors may utilise only a subset of all available history for a given
trustee. A subset is most usually based on the age of the data, or some manual
selection.
14. Data Aging
Data Aging essentially reduces the confidence of information as time passes and
more information is collected. The decay in value of information allows entities
to distance themselves from historic behavior. Information decay helps prevent
attacks on the reputation system in which entities build a sufficient level of trust
and then begin acting maliciously. As the most recently gathered information is
given the largest weight of confidence, new negative behavior will have the largest
impact when making decisions.
• None: reputation information is retained indefinitely.
• Decay: reduces the confidence and granularity of older reputation information
as time passes. Koutrouli and Tsalgatidou [182] discuss this idea further.
• Death: an extension of decay that allows older reputation information to be
discarded [351]. Information is usually discarded based on age, or a manual
selection.
2.4.4 Classification of Reputations Systems
In this section the reputation taxonomy is used to classify a large number of academic
and commercial reputation systems, see Tables 2.1 and 2.2. In these tables a ’?’ in a cell
indicates that information on the characteristic was not available in the published work.
Multiple entries in a cell indicate that multiple characteristics are supported.
1. History. Only a small number of the reputation systems use personal history, while
the majority utilise global history. As the name implies, personal history is formed
from the personal experiences of a single entity, and is the only type of history that
can be fully relied upon. Lai et al. [187] argue that personal history does not scale
well, as the chance of interacting repeatedly with the same entity is fairly small.
As a result, personal history is less efficient, as other entities are not learning from
your experiences. Jurca and Faltings [163] argue that personal history can be used
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as a form of competitive advantage in certain circumstances. They suggest that a
payment scheme can be used to incentivise truthful sharing of information with
others.
RateWeb [202] proposes model where history can be fetched from a “rating clique”.
However, the members of these groups still act as individuals.
Global history is available to either everyone, or the members of a selected group.
Lai et al. [187] notes that although global history scales well, it is vulnerable to some
types of malicious attacks. Over time, a global history should give a consistent,
long-term view of an entity that approximates a relationship [261].
2. Context. The majority of reputation systems only employ information from a single
context. The systems that allow information from multiple contexts to be utilised
by members differ substantially.
PeerTrust [335] incorporates two additional forms of contextual information; trans-
actional attributes and a community-based context. The transactional attributes
include the value of the trades being participated in, such that users can establish
which trades are most relevant to their current situation. The community-based
context is used to measure the level of participation within the community, for ex-
ample, whether an entity often provides feedback.
Regret [273] expands on PeerTrust and stores reputation information in the form of
a vector. Individual reputation values are associated with each contextual attribute,
such as the chance to overcharge, deliver late or provide a low quality item. Sabater
and Sierra have also extended the Regret system to include a social context for
reputation information, where trust is extracted from groups and communities (the
professional and organisational rings from the context model) to which an entity
belongs [272].
3. Collection. The majority of systems use some combination of direct experience and
individual indirect. Tong and Zhang [306] argue data is more reliable if collected
directly rather than through a third party. The authors state that inaccuracies and
lying reputation sources are reason enough to promote the direct observation col-
lection technique. Indirect approaches involve information being obtained from
other entities based on transactions that the querying entity was not privy to.
EigenTrust [166] explains that utilising both an individual’s personal experience as
well as other’s indirect experience allows for making better decisions. Third party
entities can be discovered and queried in a variety of ways. However, information
received from others that have been discovered through either single or multiple-
hop transitive trust chains should be more reliable than that discovered by querying
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a random entity in the network [343].
RateWeb [202] proposes a collection model that involves a set of trusted entities be-
ing contained within each entity. When making a decision on whether or not to in-
teract with another entity in the environment, the trusted entities are consulted for
their historic actions with the target entity. RateWeb also suggests another method
of indirect collection using groups and communities.
Mui et al. [222] talk about “prior-derived” reputation; however this is reputation
based on prior beliefs and prejudices. As expected, none of the systems surveyed
utilised derived data. Deriving information from an open repository can provide a
unique view of an entity’s disposition in that context. An example of this could be
using an online literature library such as CiteSeer [121], to determine how promi-
nent an entity is in the computer science domain.
4. Representation. Commercial systems mostly favor a representation of the repu-
tation that utilises both a numerical value and textual content. Academic systems
however tend to exhibit a range of representations, although textual content is not
as prevalent as in the commercial systems.
5. Aggregation. Most commercial, and many early academic systems use a simple
counting-based aggregation, either by summing all of the ratings together, or pro-
viding an average. None of the systems surveyed utilised a discrete model of ag-
gregation, probably because of the non-optimal computation aspects of aggregation
with this model.
Beta [158] and Travos [242] both implement a probabilistic approach using the Beta
probability density function, as this is considered suitable for processing binary
ratings [349].
EigenTrust [166] utilises a flow approach to calculating global reputation values.
In particular, global reputation values are calculated using the “left principal eigen-
vector of a matrix of normalised local trust values”. The local, or personal, trust val-
ues in EigenTrust are sums of the positive and negative ratings. PowerTrust [364]
employs a similar approach to EigenTrust, but uses a Bayesian method to calculate
the personal trust values.
A fuzzy approach to aggregation is utilised by FuzzyTrust [292] when aggregating
personal trust ratings.
6. Entities. The concept of group reputation is introduced by Mui et al. [222]. Barring
three exceptions, all reputation systems that were classified in the taxonomy focus
on individuals. These individuals could be either people or specific resources.
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The first exception is the work presented by Gal-Oz et al. [116], where communities
are broken down into smaller sub-communities the authors call “knots”. Knots are
formed from community members who have strong trust relationships amongst
themselves. The reputation information within a knot is therefore more valuable
and is given a higher weighting.
The second exception is the work presented by Tong and Zhang [306]. In their
paper, they propose using direct observation of the size of the group to determine
its reputation. If individual entities are seen to be joining a group, then clearly that
group has a positive reputation, and vice-versa. Although not explicitly stated, they
are in fact looking at the size of the group over a period of time. A simplified view
of group reputation is basically the change in the number of members over time.
The last exception is discussed in Zhao and Li [358], where nodes are able to calcu-
late the reputation of other entities, either individuals or groups, using their own
private history and choice of algorithm.
Finally, although Regret does not support group entities directly, Sabater and Sierra
introduce the idea of a “neighborhood reputation” that is based on the reputation
and relationships of neighboring entities to the target entity. A given entity there-
fore inherits a reputation by default, allowing even entities that are less well known
to have reputation.
7. Presence. Of the systems examined, none is fully offline, and only Ismail et al. [154]
and Pride [90] support a partial presence. The former talks about distributing repu-
tation information to third-parties via certificates. An authority is utilised to create
the certificates, but not needed to distribute and interpret the information contained
within them.
The latter introduces the Pride reputation system which has been constructed for
decentralised peer-to-peer networks. The system enables self-certification of enti-
ties with digital certificates and employs an elicitation storage protocol to distribute
reputation information.
8. Governance. Most commercial reputation systems exhibit centralised governance,
including Amazon, eBay and ePinions. The terms centralised and distributed are
most often used in conjunction with the description of reputation system architec-
ture such as in Wang and Vassileva [327], Jøsang et al. [159], Gupta et al. [130], Dutta
et al. [101] and Wang and Li [321]. However, it is often difficult to establish with any
degree of certainty how a given reputation system is actually implemented, partic-
ularly commercial systems that rarely provide operational details. For example, in
Wang and Vassileva [327] eBay is noted as being centralised, when in reality it may
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well be distributed in order to cope with the traffic load. However, it is possible to
say that the system has centralised governance.
9. Fabric. There is a good mix of systems showing both structured and unstructured
characteristics. PowerTrust [364] employs a structured approach to reputation col-
lection and aggregation. The system utilises a trust overlay network to model trans-
actions and nominates trustworthy entities as power nodes, responsible for aggre-
gating global reputation scores.
10. Interoperability. Although reputation information within academic systems is of-
ten freely accessible, none of the systems surveyed had any explicit support for
importing or exporting reputation information.
For a short period of time, Amazon allowed its members to import their feedback
scores from eBay, effectively removing the need to establish a new reputation. How-
ever, once legal action was taken, Amazon was forced to remove this functionality
[261].
11. Control. The control category is often overlooked due to an underlying assump-
tion that trustworthy users are rewarded. The practice of disincentivising entities
in a reputation system is also not trivial. The following examples demonstrate a
disincentive technique to promote good behavior in the environment, however the
environment itself is typically restricted. Confidant [52], for example, utilises the
disincentive principle, by placing consequences on badly-behaved routers. Once
entities are discovered that appear to be acting maliciously, Confidant works to re-
strict the use of that router in future transmissions.
P-Grid [200], is another system that punishes rather than rewards certain behavior.
Entities within the system are assumed to be co-operative, meaning that only mali-
cious behavior has an effect on one’s reputation score. Both of these examples occur
in a system where entities can easily be neglected and avoided. Other environments
that use reputation systems may not be able to enforce such penalties as easily. For
example, in a Grid setting, the process of excluding an entity from joining a virtual
organisation can be extremely costly if they provide a sufficiently limited resource.
12. Evaluation. All systems surveyed for this taxonomy implement a holistic evalua-
tion of the trustee. A small number of the systems also support an atomistic evalu-
ation method, allowing the user to drill-down on particular aspects of the available
information.
13. Data Filtering. Filtering is employed by a few systems. RateWeb [202] uses an
approach where the trustors in the system apply limitations on data to determine
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what is too old to be considered useful. RateWeb includes a method called “repu-
tation fading”. Each rating is time-stamped, allowing newer feedback to be given a
higher weighting when computing reputation scores. This is considered data filter-
ing and not data aging because the data is not discarded, but rather filtered by the
trustor.
14. Data Aging. A number of systems implement Data Aging. The Regret [272] system
provides a time-dependent method to calculate an individual reputation. As infor-
mation gets older, its weight in the calculation diminishes. The authors cite Karlins
and Abelson [170] as support for the feature. Zacharia et al. [351] implements a
method to age and remove information through a “dumping function”. The au-
thors state that larger amounts of feedback increase the accuracy of the reputation
system. Due to entities being able to alter their behavior at will, the authors assert
that it is beneficial to disregard old ratings to move the behavior predicted by the
reputation system closer to an entity’s current performance.
2.4.5 Analysis
The application of the taxonomy to a number of academic and commercial systems in
the previous section has identified several areas of reputation systems that are currently
under-represented in research:
A.1 Contextual information is still largely under-utilised within reputation systems. Rep-
utation information is context dependent, however few reputation systems support
more than a single context. Wider investigation is required into the maintenance
and utilisation of information from multiple contexts. In particular, the aggregation
of contextual rating information into a single value for consumption, or maintaining
distinct values. The importance and procedures behind the exchange of reputation
information between distinct reputation systems is a weak area of the current re-
search.
A.2 Derived information sources require wider investigation. In particular, the identifi-
cation of derivable reputation sources, the ability to aggregate and utilise the derived
information within a reputation system, and the policies to integrate and embed dis-
tinct sources. The value of including derived information from abstract sources that
were not explicitly designed to generate information for decision making is a rich
area for new research.
A.3 Individual entities are pervasive in current reputation systems. There is little ma-
terial on group entities. Group entities have an important role to play in future
reputation systems. In a virtual organisation, individual and group entities may join
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together temporarily to solve a common problem or work on a task. Reputation can
play a key role in such environments.
A.4 Although partial presence is exhibited by two of the systems that were examined,
none of the systems had the ability to distribute reputation information fully-offline.
The ability to operate fully-offline would allow for robust decentralised reputation
systems.
Although not explicitly addressed by either the survey or the taxonomy, the following
gaps were also raised during the analysis of existing reputation systems:
B.1 The integration of human and electronic entities within reputation systems was not
discussed in the taxonomy, however it is an area that requires wider research. In par-
ticular, how human and machine users could be incorporated into a single reputation
system, and any complexities associated with such a merger.
B.2 Implicit support for the import and export of reputation information is another area
for further research. The ability to import and export reputation information be-
comes more complex as the contexts vary. For the base-case of exchanging informa-
tion between systems with similar contexts, we only require a set of standards that
describe how reputation information should be encoded and exchanged. For more
complex cases, where systems have differing contexts, this would require a set of
standards that enumerate the contexts, and a way to generalise reputation values as
they move between these contexts.
B.3 The integration of identity and reputation is not widely considered, and requires
further thought. In particular, storing reputation information along with identity
information would help in the transfer of reputation between different contexts, and
would aid in the bootstrapping of existing users on a new system. Further, the ability
to centralise both identity and reputation information would help to break down
reputation silos and make reputation information more useful in a wider sense.
B.4 The ability to utilise reputation as a service is only just in its infancy. As with any
other service, being able to query and update reputation as a service would be useful
in many environments.
B.5 The ability for a reputation system to support not only reputation, but also recom-
mendations. In particular, the ability to use personal, professional, organisational
and societal contexts would aid in the utilisation of the information by different con-
sumers.
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Research Goals
The research goals for this thesis reframe a number of gaps that have not been adequately
addressed in the existing research and literature:
G.1 The use of recommendation information derived from non-reputation sources, and
the subsequent usage of this information within a reputation system.
G.2 The integration of human and electronic entities, including the investigation of how
these could be combined into one recommendation system.
G.3 The integration of identity and reputation, with a focus on how reputation informa-
tion could be combined with identity information.
G.4 The use of contextual information within reputation systems. In particular, the abil-
ity to capture and make this information available for use in the evaluation of rec-
ommendations.
G.5 The ability to exchange recommendation information between systems.
2.5 Related Systems
This section discusses and examines existing reputation systems that attempt to address
the same issues as the research goals of this thesis. These reputation systems are dis-
cussed in chronological order, starting with the oldest system first.
In [329, 330], Windley et al. introduce Pythia, a reputation-based authorisation sys-
tem. Reputation information is obtained from a number of source applications and stored
in a central repository. Relying Parties (RPs) are then able to query the system and obtain
reputation information about users that has been processed through a rules engine.
The approach presented in Pythia is limited. In particular, the architecture is cen-
tralised, and exhibits strong centralised governance. Relying Parties are presented with a
pre-calculated reputation, limiting the flexibility of the information usage. For example,
knowing that an individual possesses a grade better than 90% of the population is use-
ful in nationwide comparisons, but does not help to determine their individual level of
attainment. It also assumes that reputation values from different applications can be nor-
malised consistently. While this approach makes sense in a small system with a limited
number of applications, it does not scale because it is harder to reconcile reputation val-
ues across increasing numbers of systems. Finally, Pythia is focussed only on reputation-
based models, and does not consider other recommendation information such as a user’s
demographics or their social connections.
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Pingel and Steinbrecher [245] introduce a centralised system that collects and makes
available reputation information. However, in this instance the information is collected
from, and distributed to, participating communities. The authors call this “Cross-Community
Reputation”, and argue that reputation information from multiple communities, and
hence sources, is more accurate. Users register a single pseudonym, however in order
to preserve privacy, access to another community is via a credential that only the identity
provider is able to map back to the original pseudonym. While this preserves privacy,
it depends on a single centralised identity provider and reputation manager. This work
is limited by its centralised governance and an underlying assumption that reputation
values from different sources can be normalised. This work also separates identity and
reputation, by storing reputation values in a stand-alone reputation manager.
In [127], Grinshpoun et al. introduce a Cross-Community Reputation (CCR) model.
They also argue that reputation information sourced from multiple communities is more
accurate, and removes the need to bootstrap a new reputation for every new commu-
nity. The model discusses pre-conditions for sharing, reputation conversion and map-
ping of information from one community to another. Reputation information can be
shared amongst different communities. A separate policy controls how much informa-
tion is shared between the communities.
This work is limited in that it only talks about a model for reputation sharing and
does not provide an architecture or discuss implementation experiences. Reputation is
discussed as being an important component of identity, however the model does not pro-
vide any further guidance on these concepts. OpenID is discussed briefly, but not utilised
in any way. The authors note that their model does not deal with time-dependencies such
as decay of older reputation data.
Augo et al. [26] introduce a federated reputation model that focuses on the user trust
problem: once a user is authenticated, how can trust be established between two parties
on the same Relying Party (RP). The approach presented in the paper discusses building
a federated solution that builds upon a single identity provider within a federation of ser-
vices. Reputation is held by a separate reputation manager within the identity provider.
The services provide a snapshot of the user’s reputation to the reputation manager as
the last step in the authentication sequence. Reputation is considered a four-dimensional
vector (“Ego”, “Reward”, “Fear”, “Profit”), and as such values can be compared across
different contexts by considering the different dimensions.
Once again, this work is limited in that there is no actual architecture or implementa-
tion. The federated model works well across a small set of well-defined services, but
does not scale. The separation of the identity provider and the reputation manager
fails to recognise that the models should be combined, while the construction of four-
dimensional vectors is subjective, requiring careful human intervention during construc-
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tion. Finally, there is an underlying assumption that reputation values from all contexts
can be normalised into one consistent representation.
In [205, 307], Marmol et al. discuss enhancements to OpenID to support the collec-
tion of reputation information. The system works by displaying reputation information
about a Relying Party (the service provider) when a user authenticates with their OpenID
Provider (OP). The user can then either elect to proceed or cancel authenication, depend-
ing on what kind of reputation is held by the RP. Assuming the user proceeds to use the
RP, once they are finished with the service, the user is able to provide an evaluation of
the RP which is then stored by their own OP. A subsequent user connecting to the same
RP obtains a list of recent OPs from the RP, each of whom are queried about their users’
feedback. This feedback is aggregated and displayed to the user, allowing them to cancel
the authentication if required.
This approach is limited to only providing reputation information about RPs. Being
able to provide a reputation for users and OPs would be useful, for example, as it would
allow service providers to also avoid malicious users. Further, also being able to provide
reputation for OPs would allow users to determine which OPs provide the best service.
The obvious issue of trusting the RP to provide a list of recent OPs leaves this system
open to malicious behaviour. In particular, an RP could maintain a list of its own OPs
that always provide favourable reputation for the RP, and that it would always return as
being the most recent. Reputation on each of the OPs might overcome a component of
this issue.
The aggregation computation uses a dynamically interchangeable reputation compu-
tation engine. The intention is that the computation engine can be changed for another
when conditions change, for example, as more feedback is available. This leaves the ag-
gregation with the system, rather than the consumer of the information, and limits the
flexibility of how the information could be utilised. If the raw reputation information
were provided to the consumer, it could decide on the best reputation computation, al-
lowing it to tailor the results to its own needs.
2.6 Summary
This chapter introduced a number of aspects that are important to this thesis: a terminol-
ogy for reputation, two standard reputation models, a survey and taxonomy, an analysis
to find research gaps and an examination of existing systems.
The standard reputation terminology and models for both reputation and reputation
context are important as they allow for a consistent discussion of reputation and reputa-
tion systems within this thesis.
The survey of existing reputation systems was used to build and refine the reputation
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systems taxonomy. This taxonomy was used to classify a large number of academic and
commercial reputation systems. The classification was used to find gaps in the existing
research and literature. A subset of these gaps were selected as the research goals for this
thesis.
Finally, a number of reputation systems that attempt to address some of the research
goals were examined. None of the systems addressed all of the research goals.
42 CHAPTER 2. RELATEDWORK
Chapter 3
Architecture
GRAFT is an open and distributed framework that collects and makes available recom-
mendation information about entities1. Recommendations about entities may include
reputation, competency and demographic information. There is no centralised gover-
nance, with all participants in the framework required to contribute storage and band-
width resources to a peer-to-peer network (P2P). Entities are typically real-world users,
however they may also include electronic entities such as web services. Every entity in
GRAFT is uniquely identified by their OpenID2.
Figure 3.1 shows an overview of the major components of the GRAFT framework. At
the centre, GRAFT nodes store all of the recommendation information about entities in
profiles. Every entity has a single profile that may contain multiple recommendations
(each from a different recommendation source). These profiles are replicated across a
peer-to-peer network, ensuring that nodes leaving the network do not adversely affect
the availability of profiles. Replication of profiles also limits the impact of malicious
tampering, by making multiple copies available for comparison. A simple threshold vote
can be used by a recommendation consumer to determine the most prevalent copy of a
profile in the network.
Recommendation sources are the origin of recommendation information, both explicit
and implicit. Explicit recommendations are those that were designed with the intent of
representing reputation, such as “karma” and rating scores. Implicit recommendations
are those that can be used as a stand-in for reputation, such as the number of friends
in a social network. Recommendation sources include specialist websites (for example,
auction or expert sites), databases and social networks. These sources push regular up-
dates onto the network about those entities that they know about. The information that
1The work in this chapter is partially based on the published paper F. Hendrikx, K. Bubendorfer, Mal-
leable access rights to establish and enable scientific collaboration, in: 9th International Conference on
eScience, IEEE, Beijing, China, 2013.
2OpenID is further discussed in Section A.1.
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the major components of the GRAFT framework. At the centre,
GRAFT nodes store all of the recommendation information about entities in profiles. Ev-
ery entity has a single profile that may contain multiple recommendations, each from a
different recommendation source.
is pushed by these sources is in the context of the source system and is not normalised.
Recommendation sources are envisaged as being long-lived nodes, that are present the
majority of the time.
Recommendation consumers utilise the information contained in profiles to make de-
cisions. For example, a decision to continue with a transaction, or grant access to a re-
source. A recommendation consumer will fetch copies of the profiles of those entities
in which it is interested. Policies maintained by the consumer are then utilised to eval-
uate the profiles. Recommendation consumers are intended to comprise nodes that are
both short and long lived. In particular, some consumers may join the network simply to
obtain profiles for the purpose of decision making.
3.1 Requirements
GRAFT was designed with eight requirements in mind. Section 1.3 discusses the key re-
search goals that influenced the requirements. All of the requirements and their impacts
on the design are discussed below. The influence of the research goals on the require-
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ments is also noted where appropriate.
1. Multiple sources of information:
(a) Multiple sources: GRAFT has been designed to allow multiple recommen-
dation sources, some of which may even represent competing interests or
approaches. This approach allows a recommendation consumer to pick the
source that has the best reputation, or best fits its own requirements. For exam-
ple, a recommendation consumer may pick a source based on locality rather
than reputation.
(b) Use of derived sources: GRAFT sources can be either explicit or implicit sources
of reputation information. A number of examples of derived information
sources including a source based on relationship information and a source
that utilises academic-ranking information are presented in this thesis. This
requirement is based on research goal G.1.
2. Support for both humans and electronic entities: GRAFT is designed to treat both
humans and electronic services equally. In particular, the GRAFT profile was con-
structed in such a way as to support recommendation information for both classes
of entities. Using OpenID as the unique identifier further supports this goal by
making access to profiles identical in each instance. Electronic services are easily
identified by their URL, which is the same as their OpenID. This requirement is based
on research goal G.2.
3. Integration of identity and reputation: Every entity in GRAFT has an OpenID and
as a direct result of that, a profile. Every entity can therefore be evaluated based
on their prior feedback, including recommendation sources and consumers. This
allows a recommendation consumer to pick a source from two competing sources
based purely on their recommendations. This requirement is based on research goal
G.3.
4. Context support: GRAFT has been designed to support the storing of contextual in-
formation. In particular, all recommendation information is enhanced with a source
context. This context allows a consumer to determine the usefulness of a piece of
information in relation to its own context. This requirement is based on research goals
G.4 and G.5.
5. Flexible:
(a) Policy-based decision making: Recommendation consumers utilise policies
to process profiles and make decisions. The use of policies has a number of
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benefits, including rapid fabrication of new rules, straight-forward changes to
existing rules, ability to share policies and little to no programming knowledge
required to implement policy changes.
(b) Support for a variety of recommendation sources: A wide-range of recom-
mendation sources allow consumers to construct more nuanced policies that
take into account a variety of factors when making decisions. A recommen-
dation source that publishes information about an entity’s occupation may
allow a consumer to maintain, for example, policies that utilise chronological
information to determine whether an entity is allowed access to a particular
resource at a given time.
(c) No normalisation: The information contained in the profiles is not normalised.
This is because normalisation potentially limits the overall flexibility of the
system, as it assumes a standard approach to rating and normalisation across
all possible contexts. A normalised value may not make much sense outside
of the original context, hence reducing its usefulness. This requirement is based
in part on research goals G.4 and G.5.
6. Scalable:
(a) Scalable Architecture: GRAFT has been designed to provide recommenda-
tion information in a number of scenarios. These range from acting as a drop-
in replacement for existing reputation systems, through to providing a global
recommendation system. In order to be able to scale up to the large sizes re-
quired, the architecture has been designed to be decentralised and distributed.
(b) Automated: Profiles are maintained autonomously, requiring no human inter-
vention or management. In particular, recommendation sources push regular
updates to the network, ensuring that the profiles always have recent infor-
mation. New recommendation sources may start operating in the network
without any prior knowledge of existing entities or profiles.
(c) Decentralised: GRAFT does not have any centralised governance or compo-
nents. All participants in the network are members of a single peer-to-peer net-
work, implemented using a Distributed Hash Table (DHT), that allows them
to communicate and share profile information. As a result, bandwidth and
storage are evenly spread and utilised throughout the network.
(d) Minimal resources: A key reason for using a decentralised approach is that
it reduces the infrastructure requirements. Many reputation systems are cen-
tralised and would require significant investment in order to scale them to a
global size. Utilising a distributed approach ensures that bandwidth and stor-
age requirements are evenly spread across participants in the network.
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7. Secure: Although recommendations provide only a “hint” of an entity’s character,
and should only be used in support of other information, it is still sensible to limit
the potential for fraudulent behaviour. To that end, GRAFT incorporates design
decisions which help secure the recommendation information.
8. Open and Standardised: Where possible, GRAFT leverages existing technical stan-
dards, approaches and protocols in order to maximise interoperability and reduce
cognitive overhead. In particular, GRAFT leverages OpenID to obtain a single,
durable identifier for each entity in the system. GRAFT also extends the existing
OpenID approach to OpenID provider (OP) discovery, and information exchange.
This requirement is based in part on research goals G.3 and G.5.
3.2 Architecture Overview
A key design feature of the architecture is that it is fully distributed, with no centralised
control or management. A consequence of this design decision is that profiles must be
replicated multiple times, thus increasing the chance that a given profile will be avail-
able. The recommendation information in each profile is obtained from multiple sources.
Sources include explicit reputation sources such as auction and forum websites, but may
also include non-explicit sources of reputation, such as social networks.
Each source pushes regular updates about entities to GRAFT. An entity’s OpenID is
used as their key, allowing GRAFT to combine the information from each source into a
single profile per entity. The continuous nature of updates to a profile means that they
are dynamic and act only as a cache for an entity’s recommendation information, and
should therefore also not be thought of as belonging to the entity. For example, although
an entity may own a particular OpenID, the profile that can be located in GRAFT using
this same OpenID should be considered dynamic information that describes the entity at
this point in time.
Figure 3.2 shows a high-level view of a profile with three recommendations. Each
recommendation has a source, target and rating with context. The source is the OpenID
of the source that generated the recommendation. Within a profile the target will always
be the OpenID of the profile owner. The target is always included as this ensures that
recommendations are complete within themselves. The rating is the “reputation score”
for that entity in the context of the source. For example, for a source that represents a
Forum, the rating may be an integer that represents the reputation of the target as a forum
contributor. Access to entity profiles in GRAFT is possible via two distinct models:
1. Lightweight Model: This model extends OpenID and allows an entity to obtain
and update target profiles using a web-services approach, similar to what is found
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Recommendation 3
Source: http://scholar.dblp.org/
Target: http://id.example.net/alice/
Rating: 31 in “academic.scholarship”
Recommendation 1
Source: http://www.forum.net/
Target: http://id.example.net/alice/
Rating: 126 in Context “public.forum”
Recommendation 2
Source: http://some.source.com/
Target: http://id.example.net/alice/
Rating: 0.5 in Context “public.other”
Profile
Figure 3.2: A sample profile with some recommendation details shown. This profile
contains three recommendations.
in OpenID itself. The focus of this model is on the distribution of profiles, and as
such it is most suitable for web-based services that would like to augment their
information about an entity with recommendations.
2. Integrated Model: This model includes all of the functionality from the lightweight
model, but also allows an entity to verify target profiles. Profiles are replicated
across a peer-to-peer network, allowing a consumer to determine the authoritative
copy (using threshold voting).
From the perspective of simple, web-based information access, it is sufficient to im-
plement only the lightweight model. However, this model affords no ability to verify a
profile, so all results obtained using this model should be treated with caution. A more
complete approach is presented by the integrated model, which ensures that profiles are
verified prior to their use.
3.3 Lightweight Model
In the lightweight model, GRAFT leverages and extends the existing OpenID infrastruc-
ture to also include recommendation access, storage and retrieval. In particular, GRAFT
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providers (GP) are just like standard OpenID providers (OP), but instead of handling
only OpenID authentication, GPs also handle GRAFT profiles.
3.3.1 Entities
Any entity connected to the Internet, whether human being or electronic service, is given
equal status within GRAFT. Each entity must have an OpenID, and by implication, a
GRAFT provider (GP). The usage of OpenID allows all GRAFT nodes to uniquely identify
an entity, and locate its GP via standard discovery processes that leverage OpenID.
3.3.2 OpenID
With the recent release of OpenID Connect, OAuth 2.0 [133] has become the latest ap-
proach to authentication and authorisation for web-based applications. However, OAuth
is not as interoperable as OpenID, as the specification actually describes a framework,
rather than a protocol. Commercial federated identity offerings like Facebook Connect [366]
are not sufficiently open to meet the design requirements for GRAFT.
OpenID was selected as the base-building block in GRAFT as it is a well documented
and widely supported protocol for decentralised authentication. Key features of OpenID
that enable the GRAFT framework include global uniqueness of each OpenID, the ability
to dereference an OpenID in order to discover more information about an entity, and the
fact that it is widely supported in existing software.
3.3.3 OpenRep
The extensions to OpenID to deal with GRAFT profiles are collectively called OpenRep3.
OpenRep has two approaches to making profiles available for consumption.
In the first approach, a profile is discovered using the OpenID of the target. The profile
can then be fetched using a RESTful [109] interface to the GP. This approach is similar to
that discussed in OpenID, and is useful for obtaining profiles in a web-based context.
This approach could be implemented as a simple way to fetch background information
on an entity.
In the second approach, a profile is sent to a relying-party (RP) as the last step of the
standard OpenID authentication process. Figure 3.3 outlines a typical OpenID authen-
tication sequence [99] which has been augmented to include a GRAFT profile transfer
from the GP to the RP. The profile transfer step (9) ensures that the RP receives a copy
of the authenticating entity’s profile. This copy is obtained using the Attribute eXchange
(AX) extension [134] to OpenID. This extension is widely supported and is often used to
transfer nickname or email address details to the RP. In this instance the AX extension is
3The technology used in OpenRep is discussed in further detail in Section A.2.
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RP
(Web App.)
User Agent
(Browser)
GP
(Authentication
Service)
1. OpenID URL
6. Redirect user to RP 
with Auth. response
7. Authentication response
OpenID 
URL
2. Discovery
(Yadis/HTML)
3. Association (optional)
4. Redirect user to OP with 
Authentication request
5. Authentication request
Username + Password
8. Verification (optional)
Profile
Profile
Profile
9. OpenRep Profile Transfer (optional)
Figure 3.3: OpenID Authentication Sequence [99], augmented with the profile transfer
step.
used to transfer a profile with a single recommendation. The recommendation is the one
previously generated by the RP, or one from another site, but in the same context. The
latter case allows the RP to bootstrap an entity’s reputation from a site with a similar con-
text (for example, an expert forum could use an entity’s reputation from another expert
forum).
3.3.4 Analysis
The lightweight model is limited because it does not deal with the verification of profiles.
All profiles are fetched directly from the GP, and because the GP can be self-hosted, the
accuracy of a profile is potentially compromised. This model is therefore only really
useful within limited and contained situations. Two such situations are described below.
In the first situation, a trusted GP makes available recommendation information to
consumers within the same governance. This could be useful in situations where a num-
ber of consumers require the information, but do not want to implement the entire pro-
tocol stack. For example, an organisation that maintains its own GP and has the need to
utilise recommendation information outside of that GP.
In the second situation, the information provided by a GP is useful during a login
sequence. Section 3.3 describes how the current user’s profile is transferred to the RP as
the last step in a login sequence. This information, although not trustworthy, could be
used to provide an initial “snapshot” of the user’s reputation, weighted by the level of
trust that the RP has in the GP. For example, a GP with a low level of trust from the RP’s
perspective could use a low weight such as 0.2, while a GP with a higher level of trust
might have a weight of 0.8 applied to its reputation ratings. The RP could then obtain
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a validated profile via the integrated model as a background task, adjusting a user’s
reputation if it differs from the “snapshot” provided during login.
The initial development of GRAFT with the lightweight model supported both fetch
and store operations for profiles held at a GP. The store operation should not be present
for any public system as this provides an easy way to compromise the content of profiles.
3.4 Integrated Model
The integrated model extends the lightweight model, and was designed specifically to
address the issue of profile veracity. By distributing multiple copies of a profile across
a distributed hash table, the effects of malicious profile changes might be minimised or
nullified.
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Figure 3.4: GRAFT Stack. Every GRAFT node is designed around a modular stack that
comprises three layers, each with its own distinctive functions. A separate and extensible
policy backbone enforces collection, integration and interpretation policies.
Within the integrated model, every application or system that intends to connect to
GRAFT and utilise the profiles to their fullest extent is called a GRAFT node. Every
GRAFT node must implement a minimal set of features from the GRAFT stack in or-
der to be able to communicate with other GRAFT nodes, and provide their share of the
resources required to support the GRAFT framework.
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As shown in Figure 3.4, every GRAFT node is designed around a modular stack that
comprises three layers, each with its own distinctive functions. A separate and exten-
sible policy backbone enforces collection, integration and interpretation policies. The
remainder of this chapter presents the three layers of the stack and the policy backbone,
including detailed descriptions of the components and protocols that make up each layer:
1. Collection Layer: This layer ensures that raw information collected from an origi-
nating source is formatted into recommendations, and passed up to the next layer
of the stack.
2. Integration Layer: This layer is responsible for each GRAFT node’s integration into
the overall peer-to-peer network. Recommendations may be received from either
the collection layer, or from other GRAFT nodes. This layer may pass profiles up to
the next layer of the stack.
3. Interpretation Layer: This layer is responsible for the verification, ranking and or-
dering of profiles.
4. Policy Backbone: The policy backbone enforces policies across the collection, inte-
gration and interpretation layers.
3.5 Collection Layer
The collection layer is responsible for obtaining raw information from, for example, an
application, database or web scraper to which it is connected. These are called originating
sources.
The connection to an originating source may be as simple as a database link, or the
output of a process. Every unique originating source of information will require its own
custom collection layer, with the output of this layer always being a recommendation.
In most instances, the collection layer will need to define or generate metadata that de-
scribes the origin and context of the information.
Depending on the source, the raw information may be aggregated or simplified at
this point, however no further interpretation of the information takes place at this layer.
All information is formatted into recommendations and passed up to the next layer of
the stack. The context in which the information was generated is always maintained, as
this allows a recommendation consumer to make sense of the information later.
3.5.1 Entities
In order to allow a custom collection layer to create a valid recommendation for an entity
at a given originating source, the entity must have provided an OpenID to the source, ei-
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ther by authenticating itself using OpenID, or providing a mapping from its local identity
to its OpenID. Recommendations cannot be generated for entities without an OpenID, as
GRAFT will have no way to uniquely identify that particular entity.
It is expected that entities will be able to turn on and off the export of their recom-
mendation information from a source. For example, in the case of the source being a
website, the entity should be able to login and choose to turn off the exporting of their
recommendation information. However, providing an entity did not authenticate itself
with OpenID, or provide a mapping to the source, this remains an “opt-in” exercise, as
there is no way for a source to obtain this information otherwise.
3.5.2 Recommendations
Every recommendation can be thought of as describing a relationship from a recommen-
dation source to a target entity. Each relationship can, in effect, be good, neutral or bad.
Each recommendation is complete in itself, as individual recommendations may be ex-
changed between the different layers of the GRAFT stack. Every recommendation con-
sists of a source and a target entity, and one or more assertions that describe either the
relationship between the source and target, or an evaluation of the target. In either case,
the assertion is made relative to the perspective and specific context of the source. For ex-
ample, a source for an auction site may provide an assertion that relates to a user’s rating
in buying and selling at auctions. A seller may have additional assertions that indicate
their honesty, level of service and shipping time for goods that they sold, while a buyer
may have assertions that indicate reliability, and speed of payment.
In those cases where a recommendation source operates in more than one context, it
may include multiple assertions, each with a unique context. The context is important
as reputation information is context dependent [222, 325]. As discussed previously, as-
sertions containing rating values will not be normalised. The context is also useful for
bootstrapping the reputation of a target registering itself on a new site. The new site will
be unable to find its own recommendation in the target’s profile, but may instead try to
find a recommendation from another site that is from the same, or similar context4.
Depending on the recommendation source and the type of recommendation, an eval-
uation of a target may be summarised from a number of underlying transactions. The
details of these transactions may also be included in the recommendation. This is useful
in those cases where a component of each of the transactions is relevant to the overall
evaluation of a target. For example, in transactions involving a monetary exchange, the
value of the transaction may play an important part in determining its significance [261].
A transaction with a value of $1000 is more significant than one of $5, and should there-
4The enumeration and construction of a taxonomy of contexts has been left as future work.
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fore be weighted more heavily when making decisions5.
3.5.3 Originating Sources
The originating sources from which GRAFT provides recommendations are varied. Rec-
ommendations are formed from raw source information that is collected from applica-
tions, databases and interfaces. These sources range from those with explicit reputation
information, through to implicit and non-traditional sources.
Explicit reputation sources include sites that implement reputation mechanisms us-
ing approaches such as ratings, karma, votes and user feedback. These approaches are
widely implemented on the Internet, with many sites using one or more variants to sup-
port their communities.
Implicit reputation sources include sites that have not defined a formal reputation
system, however reputation information is still utilised by the community to assist them
in making decisions. Social networking sites can be considered to utilise an implicit rep-
utation system, as members can extract a degree of trust from the information obtained
from friends, or friends of friends.
Any corrections to the information obtained from a source should be made by the
originating source. This same approach to information is widely utilised in the real-
world, where corrections must be made at the source of the information. For example,
if the bank generates an incorrect credit score for a given customer, then it is up to that
customer to contact the bank and have this corrected.
Figure 3.5 shows two examples of how the collection layer could be implemented for
different originating sources. In the first example, the source has been granted direct
access to the database of the originating application. The collection layer is able to see
certain tables within the database and is therefore able to query these as required. This
particular collection layer might be implemented as a series of SQL queries by someone
with knowledge of the database. This source would only require minimal maintenance,
as database structures are unlikely to change rapidly. Further, this source will always
have access to all relevant information, and will therefore always be up to date.
In the second example, a web scraper that is unaffiliated with the application must
utilise the publicly available web interface in order to download appropriate web pages
via HTTP or HTTPS. This source is not as efficient as the first, as it requires regular main-
tenance to ensure that updates to the web interface do not adversely impact on its ability
to find content. In addition to maintenance, there are other issues that impact on the
efficiency of this approach. Firstly, the source must consider information recency, as in-
5eBay does not make this distinction however, as all transactions are weighted equally, regardless of their
value. This allows sellers to artificially increase their reputation by selling lots of small value items, and then
defaulting on high value transactions.
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Figure 3.5: Database and Web Scraper raw sources. Two examples of how the collection
layer could be implemented for different originating sources. In the first example, the
source has been granted direct access to the database of the originating application. In
the second example, a web scraper that is unaffiliated with the application must utilise
the publicly available web interface in order to download appropriate web pages via
HTTP or HTTPS.
formation may change between visits from the web scraper. Secondly, visibility must be
considered, as public access may limit what the source can see. Finally, long-term access
can be problematic, as web scraping is often considered a grey area and may eventually
cause the web scraper to be locked out.
3.5.4 Recommendation Sources
Figure 3.6 shows a generalised sequence of events that a recommendation source must
follow in order to update a recommendation within a profile. After authenticating itself
with the originating source, the source uses the collection layer to fetch the latest infor-
mation for the entity it is currently interested in. At this point the source will form a
new recommendation. The source then fetches all of the profiles for this entity, using
the integration layer. Once all of the profiles have been fetched, a threshold vote in the
interpretation layer is used to determine the best profile. The recommendation that was
formed earlier from the raw information is now inserted into the profile, and the profile
is pushed back into the network.
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Figure 3.6: Recommendation Source Update Sequence. The generalised sequence of
events that a recommendation source must follow in order to update a recommendation
within a profile.
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3.5.5 Analysis
The collection layer deals exclusively with raw information obtained from originating
sources. On initial inspection there are no apparent issues, however it is important to
remember that this layer is responsible for the generation of all recommendations within
GRAFT. To this end, a number of issues must be handled by this layer:
1. Securing the interfaces and applications
2. Securing the recommendations
3. Intent of originating source
Securing the Interfaces and Applications
The security of the originating source interfaces and applications is essential, as a com-
promise in these systems will allow an attacker to control the recommendations that are
generated from the data held by these systems. This particular point cannot be addressed
by a design change in GRAFT, and must be handled during the development, deploy-
ment and ongoing maintenance of the collection layer for an originating source.
Securing the Recommendations
A standard approach to securing the content of a digital object, or in this instance a profile
in the form of an XML document, is to sign it using an XML signature6. As GRAFT dis-
tributes only profiles, any signatures across the profile must form an inherent component
of the profile itself. Further, as each recommendation comes from a unique source, each
source must individually sign its own recommendations, rather than the whole profile.
These design constraints mean that each recommendation is signed by its source us-
ing an enveloped signature (as opposed to an attached signature, which would be dis-
tributed in a separate file). As shown in Figure 3.7, having a single signature per rec-
ommendation allows a receiver to confirm that a given recommendation is accurate and
has not been modified. In particular, XML signature protects signed content against both
simple modifications and attacks where the content and checksum have both modified
in an attempt to hide the changes.
XML signature also provides a receiver with the ability to authenticate the signer.
Since the signer identity within GRAFT is the same as the source identity, it is a simple
matter to confirm that the source and the signer are the same. Confirmation of the source
identity can be achieved by checking the public key of the source against the signature
on the recommendation.
6http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/ - last accessed October 2014.
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Figure 3.7: Enveloped Signatures in the GRAFT Profile. A single signature per recom-
mendation allows a receiver to confirm that a given recommendation is accurate and has
not been modified.
Intent of Originating Source
It is assumed that all sources joining GRAFT have good intentions. However, it is possi-
ble that a source may join the network with bad intentions. In particular, a source may
generate false recommendations about individuals, attempt to corrupt profiles by chang-
ing recommendations, or remove some or all recommendations from a profile.
The first case, where a source generates false recommendations, is handled by exam-
ining the other recommendations in a profile, and by examining the recommendation
profile of the source itself. In particular, a source with few, or poor recommendations
should be considered suspect. In the case of profile corruptions, these changes would be
detected using the XML signatures. Finally, in the case of recommendation removals, the
profile would gradually “recover” as sources updated their recommendations over time.
At worst, an entity might have missing recommendations until the majority of sources
had updated their recommendations.
3.6 Integration Layer
The integration layer receives recommendations from the collection layer and profiles
from other GRAFT nodes. Recommendations from the collection layer may be integrated
into new or existing profiles, before being pushed up the stack to the interpretation layer,
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or pushed back into the network. This layer is mandatory for all GRAFT nodes, as it
is this layer that permits the exchange of recommendation information between nodes.
In particular, this layer implements a peer-to-peer network (using a Distributed Hash
Table7) that underlies the entire network.
3.6.1 Profiles
Every entity in GRAFT has a single profile potentially made up of multiple recommen-
dations. This profile is constructed using XML, which allows humans to easily read the
profile, and allows for machine parsing. Further, text based formats such as XML can be
easily transferred over HTTP and HTTPS, which is an important consideration given the
potential uses of the GRAFT framework.
A timestamp field can be used to compare two profiles to decide which is newer, while
a counter records the number of recommendations in a profile. Each of the recommen-
dations in a profile is indexed by a unique key. This key is always the recommendation
source’s OpenID. This allows a source to easily find its own recommendation in a profile,
and ensures a one-to-one mapping of sources to recommendations.
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Figure 3.8: Profile and Recommendations Lifecycle. This figure illustrates the lifecycle of
a profile and the recommendations contained within it.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the lifecycle of a profile and the recommendations contained
7The concept of distributed hash tables is further discussed in Section A.3.
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within it. In particular, the lifecycle has two distinct phases: update and usage. In the
update phase, a recommendation is first created by the recommendation source. The
profile is then fetched from the network and updated with the new recommendation. The
profile is then pushed back into the network. In the usage phase, the profile is fetched and
recommendations within it used by consumers. For example, a profile may be fetched
and consumed during login, when a consumer wants to check the recommendations held
by the authenticating entity.
3.6.2 Concurrency
A key assumption of the architecture is that profile updates from every source occur reg-
ularly. However, the time between updates may be measured in days or weeks. In par-
ticular, for those sources that represent many entities, or require intensive computation,
the time between updates may be long.
The architecture does not explicitly consider the impact of concurrency issues on pro-
files, leaving the outcome of simultaneous writes to the same profile entirely to chance.
For example, two sources attemping to update a profile at the same time will lead to
unexpected results in terms of the profiles that are stored in the network.
However, the integrated model provides the architecture with an approach for deal-
ing with the outcome of this situation: threshold voting. By selecting the most preva-
lent copy of a profile, the architecture already has a mechanism to decide which is the
authoritative profile. Unfortunately, churn and malicious nodes reduce the chance that
any profile will reach a threshold. Rather than burdening the threshold voting mecha-
nism with yet more issues, future research needs to consider either the introduction of
a concurrency mechanism, or seek to avoid the issue altogether. These two options are
discussed further below:
Concurrency Mechanism
Concurrency mechanisms come into two essential types: Optimistic and Pessimistic. Op-
timistic mechanisms assume that a transaction can be progressed until it is time to com-
mit, at which time it can be aborted if anything is wrong. For example, in the GRAFT con-
text, a profile could be updated with a new recommendation. However, pushing this pro-
file back to the network could be aborted if another update transaction was found to be
in progress. Pessimistic mechanisms try to avoid these situations by putting safeguards
in place that prevent undesirable outcomes. For example, in the context of GRAFT, a
pessimistic mechanism would seek to lock a profile before an update was allowed to take
place. As a result, pessimistic mechanisms do not perform as well as optimistic mecha-
nisms.
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An optimistic mechanism would be much better suited to GRAFT and not hamper its
performance significantly. However, this does require the addition of an approach that
allows a node to detect an “in progress update” to a profile. This exercise is left for future
research.
Avoiding Concurrency Issues
Reducing the granularity of information within GRAFT from profiles down to individual
recommendations would remove the need for any concurrency mechanism. This is be-
cause each recommendation comes from a unique source, and only that source will ever
update its own recommendations, thus allowing simultaneous writes to the profile. This
is clearly a desirable situation, however the larger problem in this instance would be the
ability to efficiently locate recommendations, and use that information in the construction
of a complete profile. This is also left as future work.
3.6.3 Overlay Network
Every GRAFT node belongs to a single peer-to-peer network implemented using the
Kademlia distributed hash table. Kademlia8 was selected as the Distributed Hash Ta-
ble (DHT) implementation because it is well researched and supported in the scientific
community. In addition, many of the widely deployed overlay networks in use on the
Internet are based on Kademlia [41], and it has proven robust against certain types of
attacks.
The DHT provides GRAFT nodes with the ability to store and retrieve key/value
pairs that are distributed over the nodes in the network. This is used by GRAFT to store
multiple profile replicas, using the OpenID of the entity as the key. The built-in Kademlia
key/value pair replication is not used in GRAFT because sources regularly fetch and
write updates to profiles, obviating the need for additional replication. Figure 3.9 shows
two sources, two providers and two consumers as GRAFT nodes in the DHT. The source
nodes are each the point of origin of a single item of recommendation information within
a profile. Each profile will contain entries from many sources.
3.6.4 Analysis
The integration layer implements the distributed hash table upon which much of the
GRAFT functionality depends. A distributed hash table is a form of overlay network, in
that it is built on top of the TCP/IP network that comprises the Internet. Urdaneta et
al. [309] define three key attacks on overlay networks:
8Further information about Kademlia can be found in Section A.3.1.
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Figure 3.9: DHT Structure. Two sources, two providers and two consumers as GRAFT
nodes in the DHT. The source nodes are each the point of origin of a single item of rec-
ommendation information within a profile.
1. Sybil attack: an attacker creates a large number of nodes in the network, until the
attacker controls a fraction of all nodes. The aim of this attack is the introduction of
malicious nodes into the network.
2. Eclipse attack: an attacker tries to isolate a benign node, such that all messages to
or from this node are routed over a malicious node. The aim in this attack is the
isolation of a node, or series of nodes from the main network.
3. Routing and Storage attacks: where malicious nodes subvert routing protocols and
corrupt stored data. The aim of this stack is the modification of node behaviour and
data in the network.
Sybil attack
In a Sybil attack, an attacker attempts to gain an overly large influence over a peer-to-
peer network by creating many nodes. These nodes are all controlled by the attacker
and can act in unison to modify communications, or make changes to information being
routed over part of the overlay. As a peer-to-peer system is distributed, it is easy to
create many new nodes as there is no centralised control over resources. An attacker can
continue to create nodes until they control some fraction of all nodes in the network [41].
Douceur [96] proved that this attack cannot be prevented, but only limited.
In centralised systems a limit might be placed on new nodes by requiring that they
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are “bound” to an individual, or that they pay some kind of monetary fee [41]. For
distributed systems, a number of solutions have been presented that attempt to address
this issue. These solutions can be grouped into a number of classes. The following is
loosely based on the classes presented in [309]:
• Centralised certification: New node identifiers are issued by a central authority.
An application for a new identifier is checked by this authority to ensure that the
requestor has not previously obtained an identifier. This makes the central author-
ity a key target for attacks, but potentially also limits the scalability of the network.
A certification system that uses a secure protocol and authentication between nodes
is discussed by Aiello [28]. Similarly, Singh [290] uses cryptographic identifiers.
• Distributed registration: Similar to centralised certification, this approach attempts
to maintain a number of registers. New nodes register themselves with a register,
which tries to limit the number of nodes that may be registered at a given IP ad-
dress. This approach is limited by the fact that it relies on the DHT itself to maintain
the registers and is therefore open to all of the same attacks.
• Physical network characteristics: Physical network characteristics are assumed to
be difficult to fake, and therefore new node identifiers are based on these charac-
teristics, or the characteristics are measured to try and detect multiple nodes from
the same source. Measuring network characteristics is transparent to the nodes,
however the required infrastructure is itself vulnerable to attack. Assigning a new
identifier based on a node’s IP address is attractive, however this limits every host
to a single node and does not deal with NAT.
• Social networks: Yu et al. [345] propose SybilLimit, an approach that utilises social
networks to provide resilience against Sybil attacks. Lesniewski-Laas [190] pro-
poses a similar approach using one-hop networks (where friends are within a single
hop of each other).
• Computational Puzzles: Nodes must periodically validate their identity using a
computational puzzle, with the goal that completing these puzzles requires signif-
icant computational resources and as such an attacker would have trouble main-
taining their multiple identities. This approach does not work as it assumes a ho-
mogeneity in computing resources. A crypto-puzzle approach, along with multiple
disjoint lookup paths is discussed by Baumgart et al. [41].
• Game Theory: As with the centralised approach, this solution requires nodes to pay
a “monetary fee” to join the network. Aside from the difficulties in implementing
such a solution, a distributed currency would potentially be open to the same issues
as the DHT overlay.
64 CHAPTER 3. ARCHITECTURE
• Reputation: This approach promotes the idea that the reputation information al-
ready held in GRAFT could be used to limit the creation of new nodes. This could
be accomplished by linking the creation of new nodes in Kademlia to an OpenID,
and therefore a profile. Profiles with a greater overall reputation should be able to
create more nodes, and each node should receive a share of the overall reputation
of the creator. In other words, the number of new nodes that can be created should
be proportional to the reputation of the creator. Poor behaviour by any of the nodes
that were created would be reflected back on the creator.
As shown by Douceur [96], this attack cannot be prevented, and as such any solution
selected needs to weigh the costs of its implementation against its potential effectiveness.
For example, as GRAFT’s design goals include scalability, restricting node identifiers to
IP addresses would limit its usefulness on the Internet given the prevalence of NAT and
CGN (Carrier Grade NAT). In a similar vein, introducing centralised certification or reg-
istration services simply limits the ability for the architecture to scale.
Given its use of the Kademlia distributed hash table, GRAFT is currently open to Sybil
attacks. As with many peer-to-peer systems, GRAFT relies on the existence of multiple
nodes and data redundancy to ameliorate the effects of malicious nodes [96, 340].
Future research needs to consider the function and operation of GRAFT. In particular,
using the reputation information available within GRAFT to limit the effectiveness of
attacks needs to be considered. As noted above, it might be possible to use the reputation
of an entity to limit the number of new nodes that it may create. Further, as GRAFT may
have a number of long-lived nodes in the form of the source nodes, adopting an approach
that uses the long-lived nodes to control a form of distributed registration may also work
for GRAFT.
Eclipse attack
In an Eclipse attack, the attacker attempts to control a sufficiently large proportion of
nodes such that any target nodes are “eclipsed”, or cut-off from the rest of the net-
work [103]. In effect, all information to and from the target nodes must transition over an
attacker’s nodes. This attack, also known as route-table poisoning [309], is related to the
Sybil attack, but is possible even in cases where the Sybil attack has been prevented [290].
A number of solutions have been proposed. The following approaches are loosely based
on the solutions presented in [309]:
• Induced churn: Subsets of nodes are assigned new identifiers once per “period”,
making it harder for attackers. This introduces a lot of additional overhead into the
system, and depends heavily on a centralised “randomness” server.
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• Region-based routing tables and induced churn: New nodes are assigned identi-
fiers based on consensus, further, all nodes in that “region” of the identifier space
must leave and rejoin with new identifiers.
• Constrained routing tables: Strong constraints are imposed upon a second routing
table that only contains verified information [62].
• Connectivity Auditing: Nodes anonymously audit each other’s connectivity. Nodes
found to have a significantly higher “in-degree” than the average may be mounting
an attack and should thus be avoided by other nodes [290].
Urdaneta et al. [309] discuss how there is no single best approach to securing a DHT,
and note that the exact approach selected to security is best determined by the needs of
the application using the DHT. For example, PlanetLab uses OpenDHT, which because it
does not generally need to be concerned with NATs uses hashed IP addresses for node
identifiers. Similar to the previous section, GRAFT is open to eclipse attacks because of
its use of the Kademlia DHT. Eclipse attacks are often mitigated using replication and
“self-authenticated content” [290]. The solutions presented in the previous section may
help to mitigate some of the effect of eclipse attacks, however further research is required.
Routing and Storage attacks
After the creation of malicious nodes using the sybil attack, and the isolation of target
nodes using an eclipse attack, routing and storage attacks can proceed to damage the
DHT. In routing attacks, the goal is for malicious nodes to disrupt routing in the network
by, for example, failing to forward a lookup request, or forwarding a request incorrectly.
Storage attacks are similar, however the focus is on providing tainted responses, for ex-
ample, a malicious node may pretend to be responsible for a given key when it is not.
According to Urdaneta et al. [309], defences against storage and routing attacks are based
on two approaches:
• Redundant storage: Data replication is used to achieve storage redundancy. Multi-
ple copies of the data are stored in the network, either at locations that are numeri-
cally close to the original key, or spread over the identifier space.
• Redundant routing: Messages to nodes are sent over multiple routes, or sent to
multiple nodes simultaneously.
Unlike the previous sections describing sybil and eclipse attacks, GRAFT is not open
to routing and storage attacks because Kademlia implements some features that are hard
to attack. In particular, the routing table in a Kademlia node is hard to attack as the proto-
col tries to keep only highly available peers in the table [309]. Additionally, node lookup
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in Kademlia uses redundant routing, and GRAFT implements a form of redundant stor-
age when storing profiles.
3.7 Interpretation Layer
The interpretation layer supports consumer decision making by ensuring that profiles
have been fetched and verified, and that these are ranked and ordered in a meaningful
way. Although fetching profiles is handled by the integration layer, the verification of
these profiles is handled by the interpretation layer.
Profile verification is accomplished by conducting a threshold vote. Each profile
should have at least p copies in the network. If m of p copies are the same, such that
m ≥ t, where t is the threshold, then we can be confident that the given profile is most
prevalent in the network. The natural value for the threshold is just over 1/2, however
using a higher value such as 2/3 could be used to increase confidence in the result as more
copies must be in agreement.
This layer is typically only implemented by recommendation consumers such as rank-
ing or reporting services, however an interpretation layer may also be used by service
providers to evaluate the reputation of a service consumer. This allows service providers
to avoid some types of denial of service attacks, by avoiding those consumers that have
poor recommendations.
3.7.1 Analysis
Profile Replication
As discussed in Chapter 3, profiles are replicated across the peer-to-peer network. For
each profile, p different hash functions are applied to the OpenID, allowing GRAFT to
store and retrieve p profile copies, but using only a single OpenID as the key. When
fetching a profile, a GRAFT node simply hashes the OpenID in the same p ways, and
is then able to access all of the copies stored in the peer-to-peer network. The selected
hashing algorithms must be able to distribute the keys in a uniform way, and generate
160-bit hash values, as these match the default SHA algorithm used in Kademlia. Given
the random distribution of profiles across the network, there is little chance of duplicity.
However, threshold voting may be used to verify any given profile.
Threshold Voting
It was previously discussed how threshold voting can be used to determine the most
prevalent copy of the profile in the network. The digital signing of recommendations
at the collection layer prevents modifications to the individual recommendations, and
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threshold voting ensures that attempts to add or remove recommendations are detected.
This is important, for example, as a GP has full access to modify the profiles of any entities
registered with it. As an entity can host their own GP, it has the ability to whitewash its
own profile by removing certain recommendations.
3.8 Policy Backbone
The policy backbone is common to all three layers of the stack and is used to enforce pol-
icy at each of these layers. Policies guide decisions, and help to drive consistent decision
making.
Within the collection layer, the policy backbone enforces how information is collected
from a source. In particular, policies at this level control the frequency of collection up-
dates, the age and granularity of the information collected and stored in a recommen-
dation, and if any summarisation should take place. The policies at this layer are also
responsible for enforcing an entity’s privacy; it is assumed that every entity wishing to
participate has an OpenID and has set a flag that announces their willingness to have
their recommendation information exported from a particular site.
At the integration layer, policy is used to enforce which GRAFT nodes the current
node may connect to. However, policy also enforces the reverse situation, where a GRAFT
node may reject incoming connections. This allows a GRAFT node to avoid those other
GRAFT nodes that are deemed to have a poor reputation.
Within the interpretation layer, policy is used to control profile verification using
threshold voting. The number of profile copies p is determined by a global GRAFT set-
ting, however the number that are actually fetched, and the threshold value t are both
controlled by policies. The number of profile copies fetched is defined as an integer,
while the threshold t is defined as either a ratio or percentage of profiles that must match
in order for a profile to be seen as being correct.
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Chapter 4
Case Studies
This chapter examines a number of case studies that explore how the GRAFT framework
might be used. The case studies are organised into three sections: Access Control1, Com-
position and Acquisition2. Each is explained in further detail below.
• Access Control: the process that either allows or denies access to a resource based
on the recommendations held by an access seeker.
• Composition: the process used to compose a higher-level web service from a num-
ber of lower-level services, using the recommendation information for each service.
• Acquisition: the process used by an access seeker to acquire the rights to utilise a
web service.
4.1 Access Control
The Internet has seen significant growth over the past decade [232, 76], and even the
more modest growth rates seen recently [75] point to an increasing number of partici-
pants and usage. Since the advent of Web 2.0, the trend is towards using collaborative
systems to meet, organise, discuss and cooperate. Within an organisation this improves
communications and decision making, and reduces both time and cost [31] as it allows
an organisation to apply the best people to any given situation. Collaborative computing
(hence collaborative systems) encompass “the use of computers to support coordination
1The work in this section is largely taken from the published paper F. Hendrikx, K. Bubendorfer, Mal-
leable access rights to establish and enable scientific collaboration, in: 9th International Conference on
eScience, IEEE, Beijing, China, 2013.
2Some of the work in this section is taken from the published paper F. Hendrikx, K. Bubendorfer, Policy
derived access rights in the social cloud, in: 9th International Conference on eScience, IEEE, Beijing, China,
2013.
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and cooperation of two or more people who attempt to perform a task or solve a problem
together” [31].
As with any computer system, collaborative systems require access control (and au-
diting) to prevent unauthorised access and change. Access control is defined in [275] as
a process that requires “every access to a system and its resources be controlled and that
all and only authorised accesses can take place”. Access control policies can be classified
into four groups: Discretionary, Mandatory, Role-Based [275, 276] and Attribute-Based.
• Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policies restrict access to an object based on
the identity of the current user and a set of rules [276]. These systems typically
assume that all objects have an “owner” [107], and users may reassign their privi-
leges to others [275]. Privileges to an object are assigned to users when they create
an object, and can be changed or revoked by an administrator.
• Mandatory Access Control (MAC) policies restrict access to objects using a global
policy. The policy is centrally controlled by an administrator, and cannot be changed
by the users. Every user and object is given a security classification. Users must
have the same or higher security in order to read an object with a given security
classification [276].
• Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) policies are based on the concept that access to
an object is limited to certain roles that have been defined within an organisation.
The responsibilities and qualifications of any particular user determine the roles
that are assigned to them [275, 107, 276] and hence which objects they may access.
• Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) offers an approach that is well suited to
service-oriented environments. In ABAC, all access decisions are based on char-
acteristics of three elements: the requestor, the resource being requested and the
environment [348, 323, 252]. Despite this, it should be noted that there is no widely
accepted model for ABAC and only initial work in that direction [156].
A number of collaborative services are defined by Bafoutsou and Mentzas [31]. This
section will examine and utilise two of those services: Forums (called Bulletin boards in
the original paper) and File and document sharing.
• Forums allow for online discussions and interactions between participants with a
similar interest. The main drive for a forum is the exchange of ideas, whether it be
for problem solving, discussing politics or collaborative work between academics.
All posts to a forum are effectively read-only, with each participant adding new
content to the discussion. Off-topic posts can be ignored, while offensive ones can
simply be removed by a moderator. Forum access controls are often based on a
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simple RBAC scheme: users acquire a participant role, which allows them to take
part in the forum. A separate administator role is assigned to the forum owner,
who maintains the forum. This user may promote other users by assigning them a
moderator role.
• At its most basic, File and document sharing allows for the simple sharing of files
between users. The users work with the files on their own equipment [31]. At its
most complex, file and document sharing may be implemented using collaborative
authoring system like a wiki. A wiki is an “interactive website” that allows users
to view and edit their document content as pages [254]. All pages in a wiki are
theoretically editable by any authenticated user [181]. All changes to a document
build upon previous changes, allowing users to rapidly increase and enhance their
content. Wiki access controls are usually based on a simple RBAC scheme, similar
to forums: users acquire a participant role, which allows them to edit pages in the
wiki. A separate administator role is assigned to the wiki maintainers.
There are a number of issues that may be identified in these collaborative systems,
whether they use DAC, MAC, RBAC or ABAC access control policies. Some of these
issues are:
• Costly role analysis and definition. RBAC requires a costly initial phase to identify
and define an appropriate set of roles [310]. The definition of roles and permissions
can sometimes lead to what has been called “role explosion” [185].
• Maintenance of users, objects, roles and attributes. DAC, MAC, RBAC and ABAC
all require regular and ongoing maintenance of users, objects, roles and attributes.
• Low level of flexibility. DAC policies typically implement only a coarse level of
access to objects, restricting what is possible. RBAC systems are slow to adapt
in fast changing environments, and may not support policies that have dynamic
components such as the time of day [185].
• Tight coupling of access control to systems. Access control is often hard-coded
into systems, limiting both their flexibility and extensibility.
• Standardisation. In order to be useful, access control models must be well un-
derstood and standardised. Although implementations and standards do exist for
ABAC, it has been argued that there is no consensus on what features ABAC should
have and what the model should look like [156].
As discussed, these approaches all require ongoing administration and maintenance.
In the case of RBAC, a costly initial analysis is required when starting with a new system,
72 CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES
while DAC and MAC both offer limited flexibility to their organisations. Further, tight
coupling of access control to systems limits their overall flexibility and extensibility.
In this section the case studies propose a new approach based on the user’s demo-
graphics and behaviour, rather than simply their identity. Information derived from an
entity’s attributes and past actions are utilised by access control policies for decision mak-
ing. At the simplest level, a user’s rating from one website can be used at another, while
a more complex case study involves obtaining information about a user from multiple
sources and combining these. Since the information about the users is automatically de-
rived from one or more sources external to the consumer, any changes to the user at these
sources is made available to the consumer and reflected in the access control decisions
that are made. This obviates the need for regular maintenance.
4.1.1 Forum
Web-based forums are a standard way for interest groups to communicate and exchange
information on the Internet. In most cases, the forums are broken into multiple sub-
forums, each with a number of discussions called threads. A thread may contain a num-
ber of messages in response to the initial message which started the thread.
A common feature present in many web-based forums is the ability to “vote up”
a given message. A vote may increase the visibility of the message, or confer additional
“karma” on the author of the message. A good example of this approach is SlashDot [13],
where authors strive to maintain “good karma”, by posting insightful or meaningful mes-
sages in the threads. In those instances where additional karma is conferred on the au-
thor, the amount of karma, or karma score, held by that author may, for example, give
his or her new messages a higher default visibility, or grant the author additional rights
within the forum. The latter approach is used within Stackoverflow [14], where users
obtain further privileges as they gain reputation. Examples of additional rights include
the ability to comment on postings, or the ability to vote on the relevancy of postings.
In this case study, the GRAFT framework re-implements the karma feature found in
many forums. GRAFT is used to capture recommendation information from a web-based
source forum, and make it available to a web-based consumer forum. In the simplest im-
plementation, a single forum could be both the source and consumer of the recommen-
dation information. However, in this case study it is considered from the perspective of
two separate forums, with the consumer forum using GRAFT to store and bootstrap its
karma scores. The goals of the case study are twofold: show how GRAFT can automate
the maintenance of user profiles and access control policies, and how it can be used to
implement existing features such as the karma scores used on SlashDot.
In the source forum, participants use a local pseudonym, but are authenticated using
their OpenID. Assuming they have opted into using GRAFT, the collection layer is able
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Figure 4.1: GRAFT enabled Forums. Recommendation information flows from the source
forum to both the GP and the network.
to obtain their current karma score from the local database, and export this information
to GRAFT. As shown in Figure 4.1, recommendation information flows from the source
forum to both the GP and the network.
At a more detailed level, the source is able to map the local pseudonym to an OpenID,
either because an OpenID was used for authentication, or because a mapping was pro-
vided by the user. The source uses the OpenID to retrieve the profile for the participant
from GRAFT. The source then updates the profile to include a recommendation from it-
self. This recommendation contains the karma score of the participant, and the context
for the source forum. The modified profile is then pushed back into the network.
Upon authentication of a participant, the consumer forum will be able to use either
the lightweight model to receive a profile, or the integrated model to receive a verified
profile. Assuming it was able to receive a profile, it will then search for a recommenda-
tion that has its own OpenID as the key. Recommendations are found within a profile
using a unique key, which is always the OpenID of the source. In the case of a new par-
ticipant it will be unable to find this recommendation, and may therefore choose to look
for another recommendation, but in the same context as itself. This last feature allows a
new participant to bootstrap their karma score at the consumer forum from the source
forum, assuming they share the same context and that the consumer forum is willing to
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trust the source of the recommendation. The consumer forum could determine this by
examining the profile of the source forum.
Policy
The policies in the consumer forum grant additional access rights to participants based
on their recommendations. As described earlier, the karma rating stored within an ap-
propriate recommendation could be used by the consumer forum to grant access to a
feature, but only if it exceeds a given threshold.
r ≥ t (4.1)
Equation 4.1 describes this threshold relationship. If the rating r exceeds threshold t, then
access will be granted to the feature or resource.
4.1.2 Wiki
The current situation faced by scientists is one in which they are required by funding
bodies and the changes to endemic scientific practice to share and preserve their data.
Kaye et al. [173] state that “Funding bodies have recently introduced a requirement that
data sharing must be a consideration of all funding applications in genomics. As with all
new developments this condition has had an impact on scientific practice, particularly in
the area of publishing and in the conduct of research”.
Tenopir et al. [302], carry out a survey of 1329 scientists across a wide range of sci-
ences and institutions, including, medicine, biology, environmental sciences etc., and
concluded that “Barriers to effective data sharing and preservation are deeply rooted in
the practices and culture of the research process as well as the researchers themselves”.
The authors also state that most researchers “agree they are willing to share their data” if
“certain conditions are met”. Significantly, scientists report “insufficient time and lack of
funding” [302] as barriers to scientific data sharing and preservation.
The goal of this case study is to simplify the management of access control to a set
of resources, with a particular focus on the ease of sharing in an academic context. In
a traditional approach, explicit access control policies for a given resource and a set of
users are written, and are then maintained by adding and removing users as, for example,
relationships or employment situations change.
The approach advocated in this case study allows for the writing of a policy that
adapts to these changes in the environment. In particular, user eligibility changes over
time, but these changes are captured automatically. Figure 4.2 illustrates how the GRAFT
framework is used to capture recommendation information from two different academic
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Figure 4.2: GRAFT enabled Wiki. This figure illustrates how the GRAFT framework is
used to capture recommendation information from two different academic sources: a
bibliographic source and a ranking source.
sources: a bibliographic source and a ranking source. These sources and the information
obtained from each is described below:
• The bibliographic source provides information about academic papers and their
authors. In particular, this source can be used to derive information about co-author
relationships. This allows the creation of chains of co-authors, such that it is possi-
ble to determine co-authorship relationships separated by several degrees. This is
called “degrees of co-authorship”, and can be expressed as a number, such that the
first degree represents all the authors a target author has worked with, while the
second degree is all the authors that the 1st degree authors have worked with, and
so on.
• The ranking source provides information about the academic standing of authors.
An academic rating based on the number of papers and citations for a given author
is provided by this source. A metric that is often used in this space is the Hirsch
Index (H-index) [142]. The H-index value is computed from the number of publi-
cations and citations per publication for an author. It is worth noting that H-index
values are not consistent across disciplines [142] and as such the examples given
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below use only relative values.
The information that each source provides can be used to complement the other, and
together they provide a more complete picture of a target author. In this case study, the
type of access control made possible by these two sources utilises a two-tier approach,
where access to a given wiki page is controlled by the degrees of co-authorship relation-
ship to the page owner, and subsequent editorial rights to the page are controlled by the
academic standing of the access seeker. For example, a wiki page created by Alice may
have a policy attached that states that her co-authors (1st degree) have access, and that
those with a medium academic rating may have the ability to comment, while those with
a good academic rating may have edit access. If Bob publishes a paper with Alice, then
he automatically gets access to the wiki page, and his academic rating controls the level
of editorial access that he has within the page. If Bob is a junior researcher, then he may
get read-only access, while a more seasoned researcher gets the ability to comment and
those producing influential works are given edit access.
Policy
The policies in the wiki grant access rights to participants based on their academic mem-
berships and standing.
x ∈ S (4.2)
Equation 4.2 describes a policy that uses set membership to control access to a resource.
If an entity x is in set S, then access will be granted. In this case study, S represents a
“degree of co-authorship” to the page owner to which an access seeker must belong in
order to be granted access to a particular wiki page.
(x ∈ S) ∧ (r ≥ t) (4.3)
Building on the previous policy, Equation 4.3 combines both set membership and a thresh-
old check. If the entity x in question belongs to set S, and their academic rating r exceeds
threshold t, then access will be granted. In this case study, S represents a “degree of
co-authorship” to the page owner to which an access seeker must belong in order to be
granted access, while t represents a threshold that controls a particular editorial right
the access seeker is able to obtain. The thresholds, and the features made available by
reaching each one are specific to each site.
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4.2 Composition
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is an approach that utilises software services as
“fundamental elements for developing applications/solutions” [240]. Services are im-
plemented using standard protocols [347, 66] and can represent any level of functionality,
from simple request/response through to complex processes [240].
Web services are an implementation of SOA that utilise XML-based standards [353]
to deliver services that are loosely coupled, interoperable [240, 363, 361] and location in-
dependent [240]. The wide availability of standardised web services makes it possible to
build new functionality by composing multiple web services together [353]. The ability to
compose new functionality by combining existing web services from different providers
is a key concept in service-oriented computing [240, 308]. However, there is some com-
plexity in the composition of web services, in part due to the large number of offerings
available [255].
In this section, GRAFT is utilised in the composition of services. In the first instance,
GRAFT provides recommendations to a composing service. These recommendations al-
low the service to determine the best possible service to select in each instance where
there are multiple choices. In the second instance, GRAFT is utilised to provide recom-
mendations for sources of information, and for selecting services from multiple choices.
4.2.1 Travel Planner Service
Consider a “Travel Planner”, based on that given in Zeng et al. [353]. In this example
a composite travel planning web service is created from the aggregation of a number of
specialised services: flight booking, hotel booking, attraction search, driving-time calcu-
lation, bike rental and car rental, see Figure 4.3 for an overview.
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Figure 4.3: An example of Web Services Composition for a Travel Planner.
In a typical Travel Planner interaction, a client submits their travel request and their
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personal search criteria (e.g. cost vs time, day of travel, etc.) to a selected Composing ser-
vice, which in turn submits the various aspects of the user’s request to the encapsulated
services. However, some of these services may have alternatives or substitutes available
from different providers. The number of alternatives available for a given service may
be large and constantly changing [352]. Therefore, when composing the new service,
the question arises: which instances of these specialised services should be used in the
new service? Both the client’s search criteria and the requirements of the composing ser-
vice can impact the choice of encapsulated service, in which case, such selections need
to be made dynamically. The criteria of the composing service may include: price, rep-
utation and quality of service (QoS) parameters such as availability and reliability [353].
The exact balance of these QoS parameters and the client’s criteria are determined by the
composing service.
Figure 4.4 illustrates how GRAFT is used as a clearinghouse of recommendation in-
formation for use in the ranking of, and reporting on, the components of the composing
travel service. The composing service queries a ranking service for the services it needs
to fulfil the client’s request and supplies its own ranking preferences with the client’s
criteria as a modifier. The ranking service, in turn, encapsulates a discovery service that
returns matching candidate services and then ranks them by obtaining the GRAFT profile
for each returned match. The ranked set of profiles are then returned to the composing
service which makes the final selection. Multiple ranked services are returned, as po-
tentially some services may be unavailable or semantically incompatible [208]. Once the
encapsulated services are selected by the composing service, the client’s query is pro-
cessed and the performance of the encapsulated services are reported back to GRAFT via
a reporting service.
A similar sequence of events may occur at different levels, such as, the client initially
selecting the travel planner, the ranking service selecting the discovery service, and so
on.
4.2.2 Meteorological Workflow
Linked Environments for Atmospheric Discovery (LEAD), Gannon et al. [117], is an ideal
scenario in which to consider how a recommendation mechanism such as GRAFT might
be integrated into a workflow. To clearly distinguish LEAD from the speculative exten-
sion described in this section, it will be referred to as GRAFT Enabled LEAD (GE-LEAD).
LEAD is a project that focuses on the capture, storage, analysis and visualisation of atmo-
spheric data, with the goal of increasing the accuracy and timeliness of predictions related
to hurricanes and tornadoes. Weather prediction is traditionally broken into four phases:
data collection, data assimilation, prediction and generation of visualisations. LEAD’s
approach to this problem is to introduce flexibility into each of these four phases. In
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Figure 4.4: Web Services Selection; GRAFT is used as a clearinghouse for service recom-
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particular, LEAD utilises a portal that allows users to create, manage, and monitor work-
flows as they are executed. The high level relationship between LEAD and GE-LEAD is
illustrated in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: A simplified example of Web services composition in the LEAD [117] work-
flow engine augmented with the decision points at which GRAFT recommendations are
applied in GE-LEAD.
LEAD is built using Service Oriented Architecture, with web services organised into
a three tier model. The first tier represents basic services such as authentication. The
second tier provides data management and workflow execution, while the final tier rep-
resents applications “wrapped” as web services so that they can be utilised by LEAD.
LEAD employs a Resource Catalogue that describes available services and their param-
eters. These descriptions are referenced by the workflow composer and allow scientists
to compose new workflows based on the service descriptions. A key feature of work-
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flows in LEAD is that they may be modified by external events. In particular, new data
may start a workflow, or change the execution of an already in-progress workflow. It
is this feature that is extended in GE-LEAD, in particular there are two opportunities
within LEAD for the application of GRAFT recommendations. Firstly, in the selection of
the workflow (which occurs prior to workflow execution, see GRAFT A, Figure 4.5) and
secondly during composition of workflow services (which occurs dynamically during
execution, see GRAFT B, Figure 4.5).
Dynamic Workflow Selection
In the case of dynamic workflow selection (GRAFT A), GRAFT provides recommenda-
tion information about data sources. For example, when the GE-LEAD workflow engine
receives notification of a new data input, it would first query a ranking service for a rec-
ommendation on the expected quality of the source of the data. Depending on the result,
the GE-LEAD workflow engine can process each data source differently. In the case of
high quality data, a workflow with no cleansing component can be executed. Where the
data is of lower quality, a workflow with a rigorous cleanser may be chosen. In the case of
poor quality data sources, GE-LEAD might choose to await a corroborating data source.
In the extreme case of a malfunctioning data source, the data may be discarded. The
rankings formulated by the ranking service from the GRAFT data can include contextual
aspects such as institution, hardware specification, location and QoS (Quality of Service)
measures on past performance.
Dynamic Service Selection
In the case of dynamic service selection (GRAFT B), GRAFT provides recommendation
information about web services to the workflow engine. A scientist building a work-
flow can utilise the recommendations in the initial composition of a workflow, or the
recommendations can be used dynamically by the workflow engine, to select appropri-
ate (possibly alternative) services at execution time.
Consider a meteorologist at the U.S. National Weather Service (NWS). In creating an
initial workflow, she may exhibit a preference for services created or used by immediate
colleagues and collaborators, or those from other well known institutions. In addition,
she may also only select services for which she has been previously given credentials, and
those credentials must still be valid at execution time. In the case of alternative services
which may be substituted at runtime when the preferred service is not available, she
may well wish to apply a ranking that encodes her implicit trust model and experience.
This can be set out in a policy and embedded into the GE-LEAD workflow for reference
during execution.
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For example, such a set of policies are shown in Equation 4.4, where her first pref-
erence is for services from her organisation, followed by those by co-authors and their
immediate co-authors (degree of separation of 2) and then by established researchers at
top ranked universities (using the Hirsch index [142]). In this sample, m is the member
and c is the country. S represents a “degree of co-authorship” to the scientist, while T is
the set of top ranked universities. r is the H-index value that must exceed 20.
((m = ’NWS’) ∧ (c = ’US’)) ∨ ((x ∈ S) ∨ ((x ∈ T ) ∧ (r ≥ 20))) (4.4)
Once the workflow engine has made the selection, the execution of the workflow contin-
ues. The workflow engine later makes a report on the performance of the selected service
to the reporting service. This can be done immediately after the service has been used, or
towards the end of the workflow as this reporting is not time critical.
4.3 Acquisition
The acquisition of web services components is an important consideration in the utili-
sation of web services. In particular, as web services become more ubiquitous, access
control becomes an important issue that must be addressed [336]. As web services are by
their nature distributed, any approach to this problem must be automated and scalable.
There are two phases in the construction of a composite web service or workflow. The
first is the selection of web services that will make up the final composite entity, while
the second is the acquisition of those web services, that is, the demonstration of the right
to access and use those services.
Access to a service could be controlled by authentication, however using recommen-
dations allows a service to be more flexible and descriptive as to who may utilise the ser-
vice. Attributes of the access seeker such as organisation, location and prior behaviour
are useful in the aquisition phase.
4.3.1 Travel Planner Service
In the Travel Planner presented in Section 4.2.1, multiple web services are composed into
a single web service without reflecting on their actual acquisition. A point to note is
that the acquisition decision flows in the opposite direction to the composition decision.
In the composition decision, the composer, using recommendations determined which
services to use to satisfy a client’s request. In the acquisition decision, the selected service
determines if the client or the composer is permitted to use the service.
Considering what it would mean to exclude or limit access to services in the travel
planner and why it might be useful to limit access, even if the encapsulated service in
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question was free and public. If the Travel Planner repeatedly sent malformed requests,
or overloaded this or other services with impulse loading (which makes it difficult for the
service to manage its own resource requirements) then the service might wish to reject the
travel planner’s requests. In this situation the service itself can request a GRAFT profile
for the travel planner to determine if access should be granted. Only once the service
has granted access is it possible to say that the service has been acquired by the Travel
Planner.
If services are pay-per-use or account based, financial criteria should also be consid-
ered, such as credit rating, past payment performance etc. There may also be wider access
control considerations, for example, some services may require some form of credential,
even if there is no payment. For example, in the travel planner example, access to a flight
booking service may only be open to registered travel agents, or made unavailable to
direct or co-located competitors.
4.3.2 Meteorological Workflow
In the LEAD workflow scenario described earlier, access to the services that make up a
workflow are assumed to be either open, or restricted using OGSA-DAI authentication.
As an alternative, it is now worth considering the application of GRAFT malleable access
rights [136] in the acquisition phase of the LEAD workflow (applied during GRAFT(b),
Figure 4.5). GRAFT malleable access rights permit more flexible and richer access policies
to be defined in a GE-LEAD scenario. In addition they are not only easier for a provider
of a service (in this case most often a professional scientist, not a software developer)
to maintain, as they do not require exhaustive lists of access permissions, but rather en-
courage a more natural, or perhaps humanistic, set of descriptive access principles to be
defined.
Returning to the example of the meteorologist at the National Weather Service. She
wishes to use a new forecast service in her workflow, unfortunately the service is only
available at Indiana University where the prototype was developed and she is not known
to the author. The author of the service, is not yet ready to make it public, as it is critical
to his own research and not provisioned for large scale use. At present the meteorolo-
gist’s only recourse would be to approach the author of the service and request explicit
permission to use the service. This would involve considerable overhead in the creation
of new credentials and the consequent time delay incurred during this process.
Consider instead, the same situation with GRAFT, in which the author of the service
has defined a set of access policies that will permit fellow researchers to experiment with
the new forecasting service, while retaining significant control over access. One way to
limit access would be for our author to only give access to collaborators and recognised
researchers at top institutions, as these are the people that he is most interested in ob-
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taining feedback and data from. The approach taken earlier in this chapter was to utilise
degrees of co-authorship or H-index measures to determine the set of collaborators.
4.3.3 Social Cloud
The Social Cloud [68] is another scenario in which GRAFT can be used for service acqui-
sition. The Social Cloud endeavours to utilise Social Networking for the construction of a
distributed resource sharing infrastructures. Social networks have seen massive change
and growth since the launch of SixDegrees [48], for example, Facebook now has over 1.1
billion users3, with 50% of social network users checking their pages 3 times a day or
more [86].
Boyd [48] provides a number of definitions for social networks, including that social
networks allow users to articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection. This
feature of social networks is leveraged by Social Clouds to allow the sharing of resources.
In particular, the Social Cloud uses existing relationships established in social networks
to control sharing of resources. Although controlling access via social constructs, such
as “circles”, is a trivial task when the number of friends is small, it quickly becomes
problematic as the number of friends increases. Indeed, studies have shown that the
mean number of friends exceeds 240 people [320].
One approach to this problem is to enhance the friend relationship data that is held
in the social network with additional metadata. This approach has been called a socio-
technical adapter [64], and can be provided by GRAFT to help enrich the friendship data
held in social networks.
The simplest form of a Social Cloud is a photo storage service [69], if this were ex-
tended to permit sharing of photos amongst friends, then an access policy in which fam-
ily and close friends are given access to photos is shown in Equation 4.5. Close friends are
defined in this policy as those with a direct friendship relationship (no friends of friends)
who have regularly kept in touch (more than 100 interactions). Work colleagues (presum-
ably also excluding the employer) are explicitly excluded. This policy is determined (as
in the other examples) by the owner of the photos. In this sample policy, F represents the
set of family members, while R represents the “degree of friendship” relationship and W
the set of co-workers.
(x ∈ F ) ∨ ((x ∈ R) ∧ ((i ≥ 100) ∧ (x /∈W ))) (4.5)
In a Social Compute Cloud [51], the requirements are very different, and indeed more
closely align with the policies presented in the LEAD case study in Section 4.2.2. When
considering technical services, such as compute, users are more likely to prefer to provide
3https://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts - last accessed November 2013.
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resources to colleagues and collaborators. However, a close relationship with the resource
requestor is not required, it is sufficient to develop a loose metric for competence to avoid
misuse.
(x ∈ C) ∧ (x ∈ S) (4.6)
Equation 4.6 presents one such example, from the point of view of a researcher in Com-
puter Science. In this example the Computer Scientist prefers to grant access to fellow
computer scientists, whom she feels are more likely to be reliable, but places a limitation
on social distance by requiring a maximum degree of separation based on co-authorship
(so that social pressure can still be realistically applied in a case of misuse). In this sample,
C represents the community, while S represents the “degree of co-authorship”.
Chapter 5
Implementation
This chapter discusses the prototype implementation of the GRAFT framework, includ-
ing implementations of the forum, wiki and workflow case studies presented in Chap-
ter 4. The prototype implements two GRAFT providers (GP), a number of generic nodes,
and a series of source and consumer nodes as appropriate for each case study. The nodes
in the prototype are spread equally across two hosts. The prototype implements the inte-
grated approach for profile retrieval, allowing recommendation consumers two ways to
access profiles.
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Node n
Application
Provider
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API API
APIAPI
OpenIDOpenID
Application
OpenRepOpenRep
Figure 5.1: GRAFT Prototype Framework. The key components in the prototype, includ-
ing the providers and the nodes, are shown in this figure.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the key components in the prototype, including the providers
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and the nodes. The underlying Kademlia network is implemented using the Python
Entangled library1. This library implements a fully functional Kademlia-based DHT.
• The providers are based on SimpleID2 which implements a complete OpenID provider
in PHP. This package has been extended with OpenRep support3, including the
ability to maintain a single profile per registered entity.
• The nodes in the network were authored in the assumption that source and con-
sumer applications will not have full GRAFT integration, or that they are written in
a language other than Python. To this end, each node implements a TCP API that
allows it to communicate with their respective source or consumer applications and
query or update profiles. In an ideal scenario, a library would be available for all
popular languages, allowing the application to participate in the network directly.
5.1 Forum
A standard feature of many web based forums is the ability for participants to confer
“karma” on authors of particularly relevant messages by “up voting” those messages.
This karma is summed and the resulting karma score can then be used to obtain ad-
ditional rights or privileges within the forum. A good example of this approach is the
technology forum SlashDot [13], where authors with good karma obtain better default
visibility for their messages.
This section discusses the implementation of a consumer forum that utilises GRAFT
to implement karma scores. This implementation is in fact a re-implementation of the
karma feature found on many forums, and is based on the Web-based forum case study
discussed in Section 4.1.1. As in the case study, there is both a source and a consumer
forum, with GRAFT acting as the intermediary between the two.
Recommendation information, in the form of karma scores is generated in the source
forum as a component of normal use. The source node makes this information available
in GRAFT so that it can subsequently be used in the consumer forum. Participants in the
consumer forum can use the recommendation information to bootstrap their karma score
at the consumer forum when they are newly registered users, or use it to augment their
karma score if they are existing users.
Figure 5.2 demonstrates the architecture of this two forum implementation. It should
be noted that this figure illustrates only the key information flows. All users are regis-
tered at one of the two providers, and use their OpenIDs to authenticate to the source
1http://entangled.sourceforge.net/ - last accessed October 2014.
2http://simpleid.sourceforge.net/ - last accessed October 2014.
3OpenRep is further discussed in Section A.2
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Figure 5.2: GRAFT enabled Drupal Forums. Recommendation information, in the form
of karma scores is generated in the source forum as a component of normal use. The
source node makes this information available in GRAFT so that it can subsequently be
used in the consumer forum.
and consumer forums. Both of the forums are instances of the Drupal4 framework. This
framework was selected for this implementation as it comes with integrated OpenID
authentication, and allows for the installation of additional functionality in the form of
modules. In this instance the forum, userpoints and userpoints karma modules were also
installed. Together, these modules add a highly configurable forum, with user karma
functionality, to the base Drupal installation. The two Drupal instances and their respec-
tive MySQL databases are installed on separate hosts. The source and consumer nodes
are implemented in PHP, as this allows for integration with Drupal, and have read/write
access to the underlying Drupal databases.
5.1.1 Source Node
In this implementation the source node implements only limited functionality: the export
of recommendation information from the source forum. It is a genuine source-only node,
in that it does not use profiles for its own purposes. The source node is integrated directly
with the Drupal database, and regularly exports every user’s karma score. For every
4http://drupal.org/ - last accessed October 2014.
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user, a single SQL JOIN query combines the user’s details with their karma score. This
information is used to generate a recommendation from itself (that is, the source forum).
Using the user’s OpenID, the source node is able to fetch the user’s profile from GRAFT,
amend the profile with the new recommendation, and finally push the profile back to
GRAFT5. For this prototype implementation, a relatively short delay of 60 minutes was
set between update cycles.
5.1.2 Consumer/Source Node
The consumer/source node is so named because in this instance it both consumes rec-
ommendation information from another source, and because it is the source for recom-
mendations about its users. The consumer/source node is integrated directly into Dru-
pal. Upon user authentication to the forum, the node fetches a profile for the user from
GRAFT. There are two possible scenarios at this point: either this is a returning user, or
this is a new user. If the user is a returning user, then the node will be able to find a
recommendation from itself, and this is subsequently used to establish the user’s karma
score. If the user is new to the forum, then the profile will not contain a recommenda-
tion with itself as the source, and instead it searches for a recommendation from another
source that has the same context as itself. This value can be used as the karma score for
the user in the consumer forum if it trusts the source of the recommendation. This trust
could be established by examining the profile of the source, although that step has not
been implemented for the consumer node.
In using the karma score from the source node, the consumer node may apply a
weighting. If the level of trust it places on the source forum is high, then it may put
additional weighting on the karma score, and conversely, if the trust is low then a lower
weighting is appropriate. In this instance the weighting was set to 0.8 (high level of trust)
as trust evaluation was not implemented.
Finally, upon logout, or at a regular interval, the consumer node will generate a rec-
ommendation (with itself as the source) that will be placed in the user’s profile. This
recommendation will be present in the profile the next time the user authenticates to the
consumer forum.
5.1.3 Policy
On the consumer forum, policy is enforced using Ruler6, a stateless rules engine for PHP.
The following equations describe two common situations in the forum. In Equation 5.1,
read access is restricted to a given sub-forum or thread, based on the user’s karma score
5A sample profile can be found in Section D.1
6https://github.com/bobthecow/Ruler - last accessed October 2014.
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and administrative status.
(rating ≤ 10) ∨ (administrator = false) (5.1)
In a similar fashion, Equation 5.2 is used to grant the moderator role to users that exceed
a karma score of 100, and are not in the “administrator chat” sub-forum.
(rating ≥ 100) ∧ (forum 6= “administrator chat”) (5.2)
5.2 Wiki
In a survey carried out by Tenopir et al. [302], scientists were “willing to share their data”,
however a lack of time and funding was an impediement for many. Access control is an
important component of data sharing, traditionally requiring the ongoing maintenance
of access control policies and user lists. This maintenance can become particularly time-
consuming as the number of users grows.
This section discusses the implementation of a wiki that leverages GRAFT to simplify
the management of access control. In particular, an access control policy is authored
once, with regular updates from GRAFT obviating the need to maintain user lists. This
implementation is based on the Wiki first introduced in Section 4.1.2. Similarly to the case
study, two academic sources provide the recommendations used to drive access control
in the wiki.
Figure 5.3 illustrates the architecture of this implementation. There are two sources
of recommendation information, and a single consumer in the form of a wiki. The two
sources are the co-authorship relationship and academic ranking sources. The Wiki is an
instance of the highly flexible PmWiki7 application written in PHP. The GRAFT consumer
node is integrated directly into the Wiki.
5.2.1 Source Nodes
This implementation uses two recommendation sources: a bibliographic source and a
ranking source. Both of these sources are source-only nodes, as the nodes do not consume
the profiles, other than in the creation of recommendations that are subsequently placed
into the profiles. Both sources are described below.
Bibliographic Source
This recommendation source provides information about academic papers and their au-
thors. In particular, this source is used to generate “degrees of co-authorship” as this
7http://www.pmwiki.org/ - last accessed October 2014.
90 CHAPTER 5. IMPLEMENTATION
Source
Provider
Updates
Consumer
Queries
PmWiki
Node 0
Node n
MAS
Source
DBLP
Figure 5.3: GRAFT enabled PmWiki. Two sources of recommendation information feed a
single consumer in the form of a wiki. The two sources are the co-authorship relationship
and academic ranking sources.
information is not readily fetchable from the Internet.
DBLP8 was selected for this implementation as its main database is published un-
der the Open Data Commons Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0)9, and is available for
download in XML format10. DBLP provides an online bibliography of a large number of
computer science journals and conferences. The information it makes available for each
published item includes a list of the authors, which can be used to construct the degrees
of co-authorship relationships described in the original case study.
The downloaded bibliographic database was converted from XML and written to a
PostgreSQL database. This database provides the source with the ability to query the
publications belonging to a given author, and from each of the results extract the co-
authors. This provides a first degree relationship. The second degree relationship, co-
authors of co-authors, is subsequently extracted by querying each of the co-authors, and
so forth. It should be noted that the prototype implementation does not differentiate
between two authors with the exact same name.
8http://www.dblp.org/ - last accessed October 2014.
9http://opendatacommons.org/licenses/by/summary/ - last accessed October 2014.
10http://dblp.uni-trier.de/xml/ - last accessed October 2014.
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As with other GRAFT sources, this source puts its degrees of co-authorship informa-
tion directly into the relevant profiles. A key difference in this instance though is the fact
that co-authorship information is more verbose than simple integer ratings, as it consists
of lists of OpenIDs for each “degree”. This information is stored in a hash of arrays in
JSON format and compressed in order to bring the size down.
As the OpenIDs for all possible authors were not known, the source created dummy
OpenIDs to represent most authors, while key authors were replaced with valid OpenIDs
so that they could be resolved to profiles.
Ranking Source
This recommendation source provides ranking information for academic authors. As in
the original case study, the Hirsch Index (H-index) metric was used as a rating value. This
value cannot be fetched for every potential author because not every author has a profile
on an academic website, but also because some search engines block robots. Instead, it is
computed from an academic source by examining all the articles, and the number of cites
that each article has.
In this implementation, Microsoft Academic Search (MAS)11 was used as the aca-
demic source, because it provides a well-documented and usable API to registered users.
The API returns results to the requestor in either JSON or SOAP formats. JSON was
used in this instance as this is consistent with the approach taken in other parts of the
implementation.
A random selection of authors was used to “seed” the ranking source. For each of the
authors, the source needs to know the author’s name, and a mapping to their OpenID.
The source queries MAS for their publications, with the results sorted by citation count.
As each result page is limited to 100 results, pages are fetched from MAS on a page-by-
page basis until there are no further results. The H-index value is then computed. As
with other sources, the profile for each author is fetched, updated and pushed back into
the network. There is an underlying assumption in this implementation that H-index
values are best computed non-interactively. This needs to be experimentally confirmed.
5.2.2 Consumer Node
The consumer node in this implementation is a genuine consumer-only node, as the wiki
does not maintain its own karma or rating scores. The consumer node is integrated into
the PmWiki application as a separate module that is included for every page load. Im-
mediately after login, the user’s profile is fetched, analysed and the ranking score stored
with other session variables such as username in the session cookie. The degrees of co-
11http://academic.research.microsoft.com/ - last accessed October 2014.
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authorship information (in JSON format) was deemed too large to store this way and
was written to disk. In order to speed up testing, all degree values that were requested
during policy evaluation were cached. This ensured that later requests using the same
two authors were faster in second and subsequent runs.
Access to each wiki page is controlled by two-tier policy that first examines the co-
authorship degree between the page creator and the current user. If the two users are
within the number of degrees specified by the policy, then the second tier is used to
compute the level of access the user may have to the page. In this case study, users could
obtain read, write and moderator access to a page based on their H-index. Similarly to
Stackoverflow, the levels were set to 1 (read), 20 (write), and 50 (moderator) respectively.
5.2.3 Policy
On the consumer wiki, policy is again enforced using Ruler. The following equations
describe two policies that can be used to limit access to a wiki page based on both the
academic standing of an individual and their degree of co-authorship to the page creator.
In Equation 5.3, read access is granted to a page based on the user being within three
degrees of co-authorship to the page creator, and having a single cited work.
(degree ≥ 0 ∧ degree ≤ 3) ∧ hindex ≥ 1 (5.3)
Equation 5.4 is used to grant write access to a wiki page. This policy is more restrictive
than the previous policy, in that the set of individuals has been limited to two degrees
of co-authorship. In addition, the H-index requirement has been raised to a significant
number of published and cited works.
(degree ≥ 0 ∧ degree ≤ 2) ∧ hindex ≥ 20 (5.4)
5.3 Workflow
In the workflow case study presented in Section 4.2.2, an example of dynamic service
selection was presented. Dynamic service selection allows a workflow author to build
workflows where web services are selected at runtime, rather than being encoded in the
workflow. This implementation demonstrates a standard workflow engine that has been
augmented with the ability to dynamically select a web service based on their recommen-
dation information.
As shown in Figure 5.4, GRAFT provides recommendation information, via a ranking
service, to the Anduril workflow framework. The Anduril12 workflow framework [236]
12http://www.anduril.org/ - last accessed October 2014.
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Figure 5.4: GRAFT enabled Anduril Workflow. GRAFT provides recommendation infor-
mation, via a ranking service, to the Anduril workflow framework.
was developed to provide a component-based approach to scientific workflows, with a
particular focus on those in biomedical research.
Within Anduril, each workflow consists of a number of commands, and each com-
mand is defined by an Anduril component. Some components are provided by the core
engine, however additional components can be authored in a variety of languages. All
of these components are loaded by Anduril upon start-up, and utilised by the workflow
engine as required.
The implementation in this section delivers two additional components for Anduril,
and a ranking service for GRAFT. The two new components for Anduril provide it with
the ability to call a web service, and the ability to call the GRAFT ranking service.
5.3.1 Anduril Components
The first new component, called CallService, takes a list of URLs and a data file as pa-
rameters. The list of URLs are tried in order, using HTTP, until one succeeds within a
pre-defined number of retries. The contents of the data file, if it exists, are passed along
with the call, and the results from the web service are returned to the workflow engine.
The second new component RankService takes only a context as a parameter. It calls
the GRAFT ranking service with the context and returns a list of matching web services,
in the form of a URL list, to the workflow engine. This list can subsequently be passed to
the CallService component. For ease of implementation this component only knows the
location of a single ranking service.
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5.3.2 Ranking Service
The ranking service is a prototype web service that provides a ranked list of services that
match a requested context. Upon request, the ranking service returns an ordered list of
URLs that match the given context. Each URL is also the OpenID of the web service.
In a real-world implementation, the ranking service would provide ranked lists of
services to requestors, and accept feedback on the performance of services it had pre-
viously recommended. Accepting feedback would allow it to track the performance of
services over time, allowing it to adjust its internal rankings as the situation changes.
In this prototype implementation, the ranking service has a number of deficiencies.
The first is that the ranking service has no ability to accept feedback on its previous rec-
ommendations. Secondly, the ranking service is aware of only a fixed number of contexts.
Each context is represented by a string that designates the name of the context. For each
context, the ranking service maintains a list of OpenIDs, sorted according to their rating.
Finally, the act of fetching and ranking the profiles only occurs once, during initiation
of the service. The profiles are ranked by the ranking service recommendation found in
each profile.
5.3.3 Anduril Workflow
As shown in Figure 5.5, the workflow first calls the RankService component in order to
get a ranked list of services matching the given context. The workflow then attempts to
call the best matching service. As noted above, a fall-back mechanism in the CallService
component ensures that failures are handled gracefully, by trying the next best match
when the first fails13.
13Sample Anduril workflows are provided in Section D.3.
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Figure 5.5: The workflow first calls the RankService component in order to get a ranked
list of services matching the given context. The workflow then attempts to call the best
matching service.
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Chapter 6
Experimental Results and Evaluation
This chapter describes the experiments that were conducted on the GRAFT framework
prototype which was introduced in Chapter 5. There are three important aspects of the
framework which require experimental validation.
Firstly, sources of recommendation information are critical to the architecture as with-
out these, recommendation consumers do not have any information to consider when
making decisions. Section 6.21 and Section 6.31 describe experiments conducted for the
“degrees of co-authorship” source, which show it is a feasible source for non-interactive
profile updates, while Section 6.41 discusses an experiment that analyses Hirsch Index
calculations using Microsoft Academic Search (MAS). This experiment also shows the
feasibility of this source for non-interactive profile updates.
Secondly, recommendation consumers must be able to efficiently utilise the architec-
ture to provide services, but without incurring significant overheads. Section 6.5 dis-
cusses an experiment with the prototype workflow implementation that examines the
performance of the ranking service implemented in Chapter 5. This experiment shows
that the ranking service adds only a small overhead when choosing web services in a
dynamic workflow environment.
Lastly, the architecture must be able to scale and efficiently provide profiles to con-
sumers, even when under churn and in the presence of malicious peers. A key aspect of
this includes the ability for consumers to be able to verify the profiles they have received.
Section 6.6 builds a simulation of the ranking service that is scaled up to thousands of
nodes. This experiment validates the distributed architecture at a large scale, and shows
its usefulness in time-critical applications up to approximately 400,000 nodes.
The application and execution of policies were considered a component of the imple-
mentation discussed in Chapter 5, and are not further addressed here.
1The work in this section is largely taken from the published paper F. Hendrikx, K. Bubendorfer, Mal-
leable access rights to establish and enable scientific collaboration, in: 9th International Conference on
eSciece, IEEE, Beijing, China, 2013
97
98 CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND EVALUATION
6.1 Experimental Testbed
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Node n
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Web Service Web Service Web Service
Consumer
Host 1 Host 2 Host 3 Host 4
NodeNodeNode n
Figure 6.1: Evaluation Testbed. The testbed comprises four dedicated hosts.
All of the experiments presented in this chapter, except for the simulation work, were
conducted on a single testbed that is spread over four dedicated hosts. Figure 6.1 is a
high-level view of the experimental architecture. Each host is further described below.
• Host 1: AMD Athlon 64 3200+, 4 GB RAM, Debian/GNU Linux 7.4
• Host 2: Intel Core i7 2.0 GHz, 8 GB RAM, Windows 7
• Host 3: Intel Core 2 Duo 3.0 GHz, 4 GB RAM, Debian/GNU Linux 7.4
• Host 4: Intel Xeon E5640 2.67 GHz, 8 GB RAM, Debian/GNU Linux 7.4
Hosts 1 and 2 reside on the same local LAN, while Host 3 is within the same top level
country domain, with an average latency of 50ms from hosts 1 and 2. Finally, host 4 is
approximately 18,500km away and has an average latency of about 350ms from hosts 1
and 2. All four of the hosts were dedicated to the experiments, with non-essential services
shutdown before proceeding with any measurements.
Each experiment was conducted on between 1 and 4 of the hosts in the testbed, de-
pending on the exact nature and requirements of the experiment. The experiments de-
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scribed in Section 6.2, Section 6.3 and Section 6.4 utilised host 3 (as this was the first host
acquired for the evaluation), while those in Section 6.5 utilised all of the hosts.
All performance measurements are taken from either the perspective of the consumer
or the service provider, depending on the requirements of the experiment. Consumers
log all actions taken, including when requests are made and when responses are received.
Similarly, service providers log incoming requests and when responses to those requests
are sent out again.
6.1.1 Prototype Limitations
The prototype discussed in Chapter 5 had a number of limitations that could affect the
experimental results presented in this chapter.
In particular, the prototype was a “proof of concept” that used a distributed network
implemented in one language, while the core logic was written in another. Communica-
tion between these components was achieved through TCP sockets, potentially adding
unnecessary delays. Further, the extensive use of interpreted languages in the imple-
mentation of GRAFT (such as PHP and BASH) may cause additional slowness when
compared to faster C or C++ implementations.
The slower execution caused by the choice of languages is likely to have had an effect
on the results presented in this chapter. In particular, the evaluations discussed in Sec-
tion 6.2: Degrees of Co-authorship Calculation, Section 6.4: Hirsch Index Calculation and
Section 6.5: Workflow are likely to be slower than they might have been if they have been
implemented in another language. As such, the results presented should be considered
worst-case scenario.
6.2 Degrees of Co-authorship Calculation
In Section 5.2, a bibliographic source and a ranking source were implemented for the
Wiki case-study. The bibliographic source was used to generate degrees of co-authorship
information from a DBLP database, and allowed a page creator to give access to his or
her co-authors, or co-authors of co-authors.
6.2.1 Design
On his website, usability expert Jakob Nielsen talks about website responsiveness [226].
In particular, Nielsen notes that humans do not perform well when they have to wait for
a result, as this taxes our attention and short term memory. Humans also like to feel in
control, and a long wait leaves us feeling at the mercy of a computer. Nielsen proposes
three response time-limits for web usability (June 2010). The first limit is 0.1 seconds,
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where a response feels instantaneous, and as a result, the user experiences a sense of
direct manipulation. The second limit is 1 second, where the user’s thoughts remain
uninterrupted, and hence they retain a feeling of control, despite the slight delay. Users
will tolerate longer delays; however, at 10 seconds (the final limit) the user’s attention
span limit has been reached. Users experiencing this level of delay will often leave a
website immediately.
This experiment considers the time required to fetch and compute increasing degrees
of co-authorship. In particular, this experiment was intended to be run until the time
taken to compute any single degree was clearly no longer suitable for an interactive ap-
plication. According to Nielsen, this would limit the time to 10 seconds at most.
Degrees of co-authorship were calculated using a local copy of the DBLP database
running on PostgreSQL. A sample of twenty computer science authors was selected us-
ing the number of publications they each had, ensuring that the sample included authors
with both small and large numbers of publications. For each author, their actual publica-
tions were determined, and from that their set of unique co-authors. The set of co-authors
were then used to determine their publications and co-authors, and so on for each addi-
tional degree.
6.2.2 Results
Figure 6.2: Degrees of Co-authorship vs Time in seconds. Only the 2nd, 3rd and 4th de-
gree co-authorship results are plotted in this graph, because the 1st degree co-authorship
results are measured in thousandths of a second and are not visible at this scale. Error
bars for the 95% confidence interval are also plotted, but are not visible due to their small
size.
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Figure 6.3: Degrees of Co-authorship vs Time in seconds, containing only the 2nd and 3rd
degree results. The graph shows that the time taken to compute the 1st and 2nd degrees
fall well within Nielsen’s 10 second limit (shown as a horizontal red line).
The original implementation was written in PHP, but the results were heavily skewed
by memory allocation artefacts. The final implementation was therefore written in Perl.
The overall results can be seen in Figure 6.2. Only the 2nd, 3rd and 4th degree co-
authorship results are plotted in this graph, because the 1st degree co-authorship results
are measured in thousandths of a second and are not visible at this scale. Error bars for
the 95% confidence interval are also plotted, but are not visible due to their small size.
A version of the same graph, but showing only the 2nd and 3rd degree results can
be seen in Figure 6.3. The graph shows that the time taken to compute the 1st and 2nd
degrees fall well within Nielsen’s 10 second limit (shown as a horizontal red line on the
graph). However, the 3rd and fourth degrees are clearly outside this limit. Based on
these results, any policies requiring more than the 2nd “degree of co-authorship” should
consider using more powerful hardware, or pre-calculating the results and caching them
in the author’s profile.
6.3 Degrees of Co-authorship Storage
Given the results in Figure 6.2, a sensible conclusion is that the degrees of co-authorship
should be pre-computed and stored for each individual author, rather than generated
on demand. As co-author relationships will only change slowly over time, this should
constitute a reasonable approach.
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6.3.1 Design
This experiment considers the storage space required to store complete co-author rela-
tionships for increasing degrees of co-authorship. The goal of this experiment was to be
able to store entire degrees for an author, without making the profile larger than 3 MB.
This value was selected because this is a size that can be easily transferred over a 100
Mbit link in under a second. This bandwidth is typical for a LAN.
The degrees of co-authorship computation described previously was re-executed, and
the information obtained was stored in a profile. This experiment ignores the fact that the
profile could contain other information, as the co-author information would most likely
make up the bulk of the profile.
6.3.2 Results
Figure 6.4: Profile sizes with degrees of co-authorship stored. Profile sizes increase as the
degree increases. Only the 2nd, 3rd and 4th degree co-authorship results are plotted in
this graph because the 1st degree co-authorship results are measured in tens of kilobytes
and are not visible at this scale. Error bars for the 95% confidence interval are also plotted.
Figure 6.4 shows how profile sizes increase as the degree increases. Only the 2nd,
3rd and 4th degree co-authorship results are plotted in this graph because the 1st degree
co-authorship results are measured in tens of kilobytes and are not visible at this scale.
Error bars for the 95% confidence interval are also plotted, which show a large variance
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in the profile sizes for each degree. Profile sizes exceed 3 MB at the third “degree of co-
authorship”, meaning that only the 1st and 2nd degree could be cached before becoming
too large. Given that the 1st and 2nd degree can be computed with ease, this result is not
useful.
Figure 6.5: Profile sizes with degrees of co-authorship stored compressed. Profile sizes
increase as the degree increases. However, in this instance, profile data has been com-
pressed using gzip.
Compressing the degrees of co-authorship was considered next. As with the previous
figure, Figure 6.5 shows how profile sizes increase as the degree increases. However, in
this instance, profile data has been compressed using gzip. These results show that pre-
computing and caching up to the 3rd degree in a profile is feasible, if the degrees of
co-authorship information is first compressed. The 4th degree could also be considered
feasible for storage in a profile, but only if the 3 MB limit was raised to 4.5 MB.
6.4 Hirsch Index Calculation
In Section 5.2, a bibliographic source and a ranking source were implemented for the Wiki
case-study. The ranking source provided academic ranking information for individuals.
In particular, this source generated Hirsch Index (H-index) [142] values using Microsoft
Academic Search (MAS). This section examines the performance of the ranking source,
in order to evaluate its usefulness in on-demand applications.
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6.4.1 Design
This experiment considers the average time taken to fetch a page from MAS, as this de-
termines the time to calculate the H-index value for a given author. The implementation
discussed in Chapter 5 assumed that H-index values would be computed and stored in a
profile, but it is useful to consider how quickly a H-index value could be computed for a
given author, and if it falls within the 10 second upper limit given by Nielsen.
As discussed previously in Section 5.2, H-index values were calculated by searching
for an author using MAS and downloading each result page. The JSON2 interface to MAS
was utilised because it is consistent with the RESTful approach used in the remainder of
this work.
A simple program that requests only a single result for an author search was written,
effectively giving a simple “ping” for the MAS API. This program was run every 5 min-
utes using the CRON scheduler, and fed the name of a random author from the sample
list of 20 that was selected for the previous experiment.
6.4.2 Results
Figure 6.6: MAS Average Page Request Time for 28th April 2013. The average page
request time was 8.20 seconds (2 dp), with a standard deviation of 17.20 seconds (2 dp).
The error bars show the 95% confidence interval. All times shown are recorded in EDT
(Eastern Daylight Time). The dashed purple line shows the Chinese working day (0730
CST to 1830 CST), while the unbroken green line shows the European (including the
United Kingdom) working day (0730 CEST to 1830 BST). The greatest variance in the
response time occurs when the Chinese and European working days overlap.
2JavaScript Object Notation, a human readable format used to transfer key/value pairs between a client
and server.
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Figure 6.7: MAS Average Page Request Time for 30th April 2013. The average page
request time was 1.69 seconds (2 dp), with a standard deviation of 2.93 seconds (2 dp).
The error bars show the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 6.6 shows the average time for page requests to the MAS API for Sunday 28th
April 2013. All requests were grouped into hourly results and plotted against the average
time taken to request and retrieve the result from the MAS API. The error bars show the
95% confidence interval. All times shown are recorded in EDT (Eastern Daylight Time).
The dashed purple line shows the Chinese working day (0730 CST to 1830 CST), while
the unbroken green line shows the European (including the United Kingdom) working
day (0730 CEST to 1830 BST). The greatest variance in the response time occurs when the
Chinese and European working days overlap.
For this graph, the average page request time was 8.20 seconds (2 dp), with a standard
deviation of 17.20 seconds (2 dp). At 2 standard deviations from the mean, this gives a
42.6 second (2 dp) page response time. This time is clearly outside of Nielsen’s limits,
especially when considering that some authors have multiple result pages.
Figure 6.7 shows the average time for page requests to the MAS API for Tuesday
30th April 2013. The average page request time was 1.69 seconds (2 dp), with a standard
deviation of 2.93 seconds (2 dp). At 2 standard deviations from the mean, this gives a
7.55 second (2 dp) page response time. This is within Nielsen’s limits, but once again,
would fall outside of the limits in situations where multiple result pages would need
to be fetched. This graph exhibits much less variance than the previous graph. One
possible reason for this difference could be explained by the timing of the United States
spring exams (approximately from 29th April 2013 through to 10th May 2013).
The average single page request time for both days is large, considering the sub-
second times normally experienced when fetching a page from a web server. Based on
these results, it would be impractical to calculate H-index values on-demand when using
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MAS.
These numbers also provide an average upper bound (or worst-case scenario) for
calculating a H-index value when using MAS. Given that MAS only allows a maximum
of 10 result pages per search, the upper bound on any search can be considered to be 10×
42.6 = 426 seconds (with a 95% confidence). As noted previously, this makes interactive
use of this interface impractical, and strongly favours caching this information in profiles.
6.5 Workflow
A prototype workflow implementation using a ranking service was described in Sec-
tion 5.3. This prototype implementation utilises the Anduril workflow engine. It was
installed into the testbed, and the performance was measured in order to gain an under-
standing of real-world execution times, with a particular focus on the ranking service.
6.5.1 Design
The goal of this experiment was to understand the impact of the ranking service on over-
all performance of a workflow. Introducing a ranking service for dynamically determin-
ing an appropriate web service during workflow execution is only useful if it does not
greatly impact the overall time. Understanding the overheads incurred by using a rank-
ing service is crucial for a developer considering the cost-benefit trade off in using the
proposed framework, and is especially important if an interactive user is waiting for the
results of the workflow.
Three different Anduril workflows were measured in this experiment: base, call and
rank. Base represents the simplest “no-op” Anduril workflow and gives a base-case for
workflow execution times. Call uses the “CallService” component to call a web service,
while rank calls the GRAFT ranking service, via “RankService”, and then calls the highest
ranked web service. Each of the three candidate web services is an “echo” service, that
responds with a copy of the input. 4 KB of data was fed to the web service in each
instance.
Each workflow was executed 41 times, with the initial result discarded to ensure that
the effects of caching by the operating system were treated equally across all experiments.
This is important when measuring results from Anudril because it is file-based and, as
such, after the first execution, it has been cached. Measurements were taken with both
local LAN-based and Internet-based web services.
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Figure 6.8: Anduril Workflow Execution times for LAN-based web services
6.5.2 Results
Figure 6.8 shows the execution times for the three different workflows using the LAN-
based web services. The workflows and ranking service were on host 1, while the web
services called by the workflows were all on host 2 (on the local LAN). The error bars
show the 95% confidence interval. The overhead of calling a web service is approximately
0.25 seconds, while calling both the ranking service and the highest ranked web service
is approximately 0.5 seconds.
Figure 6.9: Anduril Workflow Execution times for Internet-based web services
Although the overhead of calling the ranking service should not change if it is called
for a local or remote service, this is worth verifying experimentally to identify any errors
in design or implementation. Figure 6.9 shows the same three Anduril workflows, but
with all of the web services on host 3. The overhead of calling a web service from Anduril
when calling the Internet-based version is approximately a second. Similarly, calling the
ranking service and the highest ranked web service adds just over a second, with the
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majority of that time taken by the call to the highest ranked web service.
In both the local LAN and Internet versions, the average overhead of calling the rank-
ing service is approximately 0.25 seconds. This was expected because the ranking service
resides on host 1, and therefore has a relatively low latency overhead.
6.6 Workflow Simulation
OverSim [40] is a peer-to-peer (P2P) simulator written in C++, which builds on the OM-
NeT++3 simulation environment. OMNeT++ is a discrete simulation environment built
to simulate communications networks. Modules written in C++ are tied together using
a high-level language called NED, allowing the re-use of the components as required.
OverSim4 builds on this infrastructure to deliver an environment that allows for the sim-
ulation of peer-to-peer networks, particularly overlay protocols such as Kademlia.
An initial simulation was built using the SimGrid [58] simulation software. However,
the results from the simulations were inconsistent and, after careful consideration, it was
decided to re-implement the simulation using OverSim. A description of the SimGrid
simulation work and the inconsistencies that were found is available in Section C.1.
6.6.1 Design and Testbed
There were a number of goals for these experiments. Firstly, to measure the effect of
churn and malicious peers on the architecture’s ability to provide profiles to consumers.
Secondly, to ensure that consumers can verify the profiles they have received, even with
an increasing number of malicious peers. Finally, to consider the scalability of the archi-
tecture.
The simulation takes elements from the experiment described in Section 6.5, but does
not replicate it entirely. In particular, there is no ranking service, as this would hide the
effect of churn and malicious peers from the results.
Figure 6.10 illustrates the key components of the simulation testbed. A composer peer
queries a number of peers in the network to obtain profiles they have stored. When it has
received the profiles, it can then verify them using threshold voting, and decide which
service it is going to utilise. This simulation does not incorporate a separate ranking
service, but instead implements the same functionality in the composer peer itself.
The existing Kademlia overlay that comes bundled with OverSim was utilised, with
the addition of two new custom node types, both written in C++. The first of these is
a GRAFT composer peer that attempts to fetch in parallel the profiles for the services in
which it is interested, verify them and then select one service. The second of these new
3http://www.omnetpp.org/ - last accessed October 2014
4http://www.oversim.org/ - last accessed October 2014
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Figure 6.10: Workflow simulation testbed. A composer peer queries a number of peers in
the network to obtain profiles they have stored. When it has received the profiles, it can
then verify them using threshold voting, and decide which service it is going to utilise.
nodes represents a generic peer node that waits for incoming queries and replies with
the appropriate dummy profile. For these experiments, the dummy profiles were set to
be 4KB in size. As with the implementation, there was no Kademlia replication between
nodes.
All simulations using OverSim were run on an Intel Xeon E5-1650 v2 3.50 GHz, 64 GB
RAM, running Arch Linux 2014.02.01.
6.6.2 Parameters
All experiments were run for 9000 seconds simulated time, and were repeated 40 times.
The node creation interval time was set to 0.01 seconds, ensuring that all of the nodes
required for an experiment were running within 100 seconds, and stable within 1000
seconds simulated time. OverSim provides a feature that allows the parameterisation of
key variables, including the seed set used for each experiment. A series of experiments
can thus be entirely automated and repeated, with all variables that were used for a
particular experiment recorded in the log file5.
Depending on the experiment, the total number of peers n in the network were varied
between 1000 and 9000 peers, in increments of 1000. 9000 peers were selected as an upper
5A sample OverSim configuration file that was used in some of the experiments is provided in Section D.4
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Figure 6.11: Workflow simulation testbed within OverSim. OverSim provides the envi-
ronment in which the simulation testbed is executed.
limit to the network size, as this meant that a single simulation could run within a few
hours. The number of services s in which the composer node was interested was set to
either 3 or 5. These were selected as they represent good “multiple choice” situations.
In a similar way, the number of peers p that were queried for profiles was always
set to 5, 7, 9 or 11. Having an odd number of peers means that in perfect situations
(that is, those with a 100% response rate) the number of responses is always over, or
under, exactly half. This ensures that a deadlock situation is avoided when performing a
threshold vote, as the vote either succeeds or fails.
The total queries q issued in an experiment is always p×s. A threshold is implemented
so that although p peers are queried, the lookup of a service profile is considered complete
when a threshold t profile query responses are in agreement. A larger threshold will give
more assurance because a greater number of profiles must be in agreement. However,
this will also take longer, as more profiles must be received by the composer node.
Two different threshold t proportions were used during the experiments. The first,
shown in Equation 6.1 represents the “half” threshold. This threshold succeeds when just
over half of the responses are in agreement, and is termed 1/2 threshold in the following
sections. The second, shown in Equation 6.2 represents the “two-thirds” threshold. This
threshold succeeds when just over two-thirds of the responses are in agreement. This is
termed 2/3 threshold in the following sections.
t =
⌊
q + 1
2
⌋
(6.1)
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t =
⌊
q + 1
3
× 2
⌋
(6.2)
6.6.3 Simulation
New nodes are added to the Kademlia network by OverSim until all the required nodes
are present. The composer peer waits for 8000 seconds in simulated time, and then issues
profile queries to p peers for each service s in which it is interested, resulting in a total
of q profile queries being sent. These queries are sent in parallel, with the composer peer
recording the exact time at which each query was sent, and when a matching response
was received. The number of services s and peers p is varied for each experiment. The
peers p for each run are randomly selected from the available peers before the simulation.
The simulation finishes at 9000 seconds.
6.6.4 Presentation
It should be noted that the tables and graphs shown in the following sections often only
correspond to the smallest and largest combinations of s and p. Information generated
from other variations is often utilised and described, but not always shown. Showing all
of the information generated by the simulations was deemed excessive.
6.7 Simulation: Base Case
This section presents the results from the base case simulations. These simulations do not
implement any churn or malicious peers and simulate a perfect state. These simulations
are intended to provide a base case for later comparisons. In particular, the base case
examines three key metrics. The first is the single query response time. The second is the
inter-arrival time for responses, while the final is the total time taken to reach a threshold.
6.7.1 Single Response Time
The single response time experiment records the average time taken to send a query for a
profile and receive a response. All query response times measured during the simulations
were used to compile the graphs shown here.
Figure 6.12 and Figure 6.13 show the average time taken for a single query and re-
sponse for 3 and 5 services. The variables p (peers queried per service) and n (total num-
ber of peers) are plotted against the time taken to receive a response. These graphs both
have an average single query and response time of 0.62 seconds (2 dp) for 5 peers, rising
to 0.63 (2 dp) seconds for 11 peers. This is as expected, because the number of services
should not influence the total average single query and response time.
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Figure 6.12: Single response time for s = 3.
Figure 6.13: Single response time for s = 5.
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Figure 6.14: Cumulative frequency graphs for s = 3, p = 5.
Another way to examine this information is to consider it using a cumulative fre-
quency graph. Figure 6.14 shows the nine cumulative frequency graphs (one for each
n, from 1000 through to 9000) that make up the set for s = 3, p = 5. On the whole, the
graphs within the set exhibit similar properties and have been combined together in all
later cumulative frequency graphs.
Figure 6.15 shows the cumulative frequency graphs for s = 3, p = 5, 7, 9, 11. As can
be seen from these graphs, they are essentially the same. However, there is a small trend
towards later arriving responses as the value of p increases. A slight shift in the time
taken to reach the 90% cumulative percentage is also apparent when going from p = 5 to
p = 11. However, this cannot be seen on the graphs presented here.
6.7.2 Response Inter-arrival Times
The response inter-arrival time experiments record the time between subsequent responses
arriving at the composer node. As all queries for profiles in the network are generated
in parallel, the inter-arrival times should decrease as more queries are generated. This is
because increasing the number of queries increases the number of responses received.
Figure 6.17 and Figure 6.18 show the inter-arrival times for query responses arriving
at the composer node. As expected, the inter-arrival times decrease as more peers are
queried. In other words, as q increases, either through increasing p or s, the inter-arrival
time decreases. As 5 services require a larger number of queries than 3 services, it exhibits
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Figure 6.15: Combined cumulative frequency graphs for s = 3, p = 5, 7, 9, 11.
Figure 6.16: Combined cumulative frequency graphs for s = 5, p = 5, 7, 9, 11.
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Figure 6.17: Response inter-arrival time for s = 3.
Figure 6.18: Response inter-arrival time for s = 5.
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smaller inter-arrival times than the 3 services graph.
Figure 6.19: Response inter-arrival time for s = 3 and s = 5.
Figure 6.19 compares the inter-arrival times for s = 3 and s = 5. This graph verifies
the earlier stated finding that increasing q decreases the inter-arrival time. This inter-
arrival time graph is useful because it sets an approximate upper bound on the time
between subsequent responses and hence determines a minimum performance require-
ment on any software that implements this approach. Inter-arrival times could also be
used to determine the likely time to receive a given number of responses.
6.7.3 Total Time to Reach Threshold
The total time experiments record the total time taken to reach the 1/2 and 2/3 thresholds.
Since there are no malicious peers, nor any churn, this is simply the time taken to return
the first t responses out of the total q responses.
Figure 6.20 shows the total time taken to reach the threshold number of profiles for
3 services, with a threshold of 1/2. In terms of the number of peers queried p, the total
time increases from an average of 0.597 seconds (3 dp) for 5 peers, to an average of 0.602
seconds (3 dp) for 11 peers. When considering the total number of peers n, the total time
ranges from an average of 0.56 seconds (2 dp) for 1000 peers through to 0.58 seconds (2
dp) for 9000 peers. On average, it can be said that the total time required to fetch all of
the profiles increases as the number of peers queried p increases, and as the total number
of peers n in the network increases.
Figure 6.21 shows the total time taken to reach the threshold number of profiles for
5 services, with a threshold of 2/3. This graph exhibits the same behaviour as the graph
for 3 services, but with the exception that the overall time has increased slightly as the
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Figure 6.20: Total time for s = 3, 1/2 threshold.
Figure 6.21: Total time for s = 5, 2/3 threshold.
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number of services s has increased from 3 to 5. In terms of the number of peers queried
p, the total time taken increases from an average of 0.699 seconds (3 dp) for 5 peers, to
an average of 0.719 seconds (3 dp) for 11 peers. Similarly, when considering the total
number of peers n, the total time ranges from an average of 0.62 seconds (2 dp) for 1000
peers through to 0.79 seconds (2 dp) for 9000 peers.
Using this information and creating an average from the 3 and 5 service total times,
Equation 6.3 describes a rule of thumb that can be used to estimate the total time, given
the fraction f describing the threshold (for example, f = 0.5 when the threshold is 1/2),
and the total number of peers n.
time ≈ 0.000022fn+ 0.60 (6.3)
In 2001, Ripeanu et al. [265] explored the then dominant GNUtella network. They
discovered that at certain times, the GNUtella network contained almost 50,000 nodes.
By 2004, file sharing via DHTs had become popular, and Kutzner et al. [186] found that
the Overnet network had a maximum of approximately 265,000 concurrent nodes online.
More recent estimates place the size of the mainline DHT that supports the BitTorrent
network at about 15-27 million nodes online at any given time [322].
Figure 6.22 extrapolates the total time required to reach the threshold number of pro-
files for network sizes up to one million nodes using Equation 6.3. This size has been
taken as a maximum as further extrapolation is likely to be increasingly inaccurate.
Section 6.2 discussed Nielsen’s three web usability time limits. If Nielsen’s 1 second
limit were taken, then the GRAFT framework would be limited to approximately 60,000
nodes when using 1/2 as the threshold. While this forms a useful baseline, it is not in
itself helpful, as this limit would be impractical in most modern distributed networks.
Therefore, the goal for an interactive session should be to return results to the user within
the 10 second limit set by Nielsen. Rather than aiming for this limit, 5 seconds (being the
halfway point between 1 and 10 seconds) will be used as the limit for any results returned
to an interactive user. This limit is shown on the graph as a horizontal red line with two
intersection points.
What this graph clearly shows is that for interactive sessions, networks over approx-
imately 400,000 nodes (with a 1/2 threshold) and 300,000 nodes (with a 2/3 threshold)
become impractical as the total time taken exceeds 5 seconds. However, it should be
noted that users will tolerate much longer delays if they are kept informed. In particular,
Nah [223] shows that users will, on average, tolerate delays of up to 38 seconds if they
are provided feedback while waiting (2004). Therefore, increasing the time limit to 15
seconds and providing the users with feedback would allow GRAFT to exceed a million
nodes. Further, the time limits discussed do not remove the overall usefulness for non-
interactive systems where waiting time is not important, or where results can be cached
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Figure 6.22: Total time taken versus total number of nodes. The total time required to
reach the threshold number of profiles for network sizes up to one million nodes using
Equation 6.3 is extrapolated.
ahead of time-sensitive operations.
While 400,000 or even a million nodes seem paltry when compared with those of the
mainline DHT, there are a number of approaches that can be used to scale GRAFT further.
These will be discussed in Section 6.11.
The work up to this point has assumed that the 1/2 threshold will continue to be effec-
tive, even when under churn and with malicious nodes. These aspects will be considered
in the following sections.
6.8 Simulation: Base Case with Malicious Peers
The same experiments were run again, but with increasing rates of malicious peers. Ma-
licious peers in these experiments return “corrupted” profiles, and so their responses do
not match the responses from other peers. Threshold voting should eliminate these cor-
rupted profiles, so it is useful to measure how well this mechanism works with malicious
peers.
6.8.1 Design
In this experiment thresholds were ignored in the collection of the data, allowing for a
complete view of the cross-over points between threshold voting succeeding and failing.
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A goal of successful threshold voting with up to 30% malicious peers was set. In existing
literature, values for malicious peers range between 0% and 70%, with typical default
values being 10%, 20% and 30% [335, 364, 358, 61, 194, 290, 309]. Please note that these
experiments do not consider collusive behaviour. This is left as future work.
6.8.2 Correct Responses
For these experiments, rate r controls the probability that any given peer is malicious.
Values used for r in these experiments ranged from 0 through to 0.5. The maximum rate
of 0.5 was used because rates higher than this always result in failure for the 1/2 threshold
(as it is impossible to get sufficient profile copies that are correct). The measure c counts
the number of correct profiles that were received. For threshold voting to be successful,
the number of correct profiles must be greater than or equal to the threshold, c ≥ t.
Nodes Malicious rate
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1000 15 14 12 11 9 8
2000 15 14 13 11 10 8
3000 15 14 12 11 9 8
4000 15 14 13 12 10 9
5000 15 14 12 11 9 8
6000 15 14 12 10 9 7
7000 15 14 12 10 8 7
8000 15 14 12 10 9 7
9000 15 14 13 11 9 7
Table 6.1: Correct responses with malicious peers, s = 3, p = 5. The cell colours show the
values that did not reach the 1/2 threshold (8) in orange, while those not reaching the 2/3
threshold (10) are shown in yellow.
Table 6.1 shows the number of correct responses for both thresholds, for 3 services.
The integer floor value is shown in each instance, as it is not possible to have partial
profiles. The cell colours show the values that did not reach the 1/2 threshold (8) in or-
ange, while those not reaching the 2/3 threshold (10) are shown in yellow. Figure 6.23
is a graphical representation of the same information, with variables n (total number of
peers), r (rate of malicious peers) and c (correct responses) shown as axes on the graph.
Table 6.2 shows the number of correct responses for both thresholds, for 5 services.
The cell colours show the values that did not reach the 1/2 threshold (28) in orange, while
those not reaching the 2/3 threshold (37) are shown in yellow. Figure 6.24 is a graphical
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Figure 6.23: Correct responses with malicious peers, s = 3, p = 5. A graphical represen-
tation of Table 6.1.
Figure 6.24: Correct responses with malicious peers, s = 5, p = 11. A graphical represen-
tation of Table 6.2.
122 CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Nodes Malicious rate
nodes 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1000 55 50 45 39 34 28
2000 55 50 44 39 33 28
3000 55 50 44 40 34 28
4000 55 50 44 38 33 27
5000 55 50 44 38 32 27
6000 55 50 44 38 32 27
7000 55 50 45 39 34 28
8000 55 50 45 40 33 28
9000 55 50 43 39 33 28
Table 6.2: Correct responses with malicious peers, s = 5, p = 11. The cell colours show
the values that did not reach the 1/2 threshold (28) in orange, while those not reaching the
2/3 threshold (37) are shown in yellow.
representation of the same information.
In the perfect situation described by the base case, the tables show that threshold
voting works with a malicious rate of up to 40% with the 1/2 threshold, while the 2/3
threshold works well up to a malicious rate of 30%. Both of the graphs show a similar
trend, with a decreasing number of correct responses c as the rate r of malicious peers
increases.
6.8.3 Trend
s p q t Equation
03 05 15 08 c = -15.84r + 16
03 07 21 11 c = -21.72r + 22
03 09 27 14 c = -27.78r + 28
03 11 33 17 c = -33.66r + 34
Table 6.3: Trend analysis for correct responses. This table shows part of the analysis that
was conducted (in this instance the values relate to s = 3). All values are rounded to 2
decimal places.
When examining all of the correct response results for variations in s and p, a trend
became apparent. The trend is linear, and in general, the coefficient of the equation is
approaching the total queries q. Table 6.3 shows part of the analysis that was conducted
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(in this instance the values relate to s = 3). All values are rounded to 2 decimal places.
Equation 6.4 describes a rule of thumb that can be used to estimate the number of
correct responses c when given the total queries q and the malicious rate r. Building on
this, Equation 6.5 describes a rule of thumb that can be used to determine the boolean
result b: “given c, will the threshold t will be met or exceeded?”.
c ≈ bq − rqc (6.4)
b =
true if t ≥ cfalse otherwise (6.5)
6.9 Simulation: Churn
Churn is generated using a Pareto function, with the mean session time set to 100 seconds.
A Pareto function was selected because this mimics real-world measurements taken on
the BitTorrent network [146], while 100 seconds was selected as Rhea et al. [264] observed
mean session times ranging from one minute up to one hour. Measuring churn using
smaller session time means that the experiments will capture the worst-case behaviour.
In particular, Herrera et al. [140] discuss how increasing membership fluctuations in a
DHT lead to decreasing performance. All other parameters are left unchanged from pre-
vious experiments. As with previous experiments, each experiment ran for 9000 seconds
simulated time, and was repeated 40 times.
6.9.1 Single Response Time
In the same way as the single response time experiment in the base case, this experiment
records the average time taken to send a query for a profile and receive a response.
Figure 6.25 shows the cumulative frequency graphs for s = 3, p = 5, 7, 9, 11, while
Figure 6.26 shows the cumulative frequency graphs for s = 5, p = 5, 7, 9, 11. Compared to
the earlier combined cumulative frequency graphs in Figure 6.15 and Figure 6.16, these
graphs cover a time-period that is more than twice as long (9 seconds instead of the
previous 4 seconds). However, it should be noted that once again, 90% of the responses
have arrived by approximately 1 second. The key difference is the number of responses
that arrive much later than in the earlier experiments.
6.9.2 Response Inter-arrival Times
As with the base case, this experiment records the time between subsequent responses
arriving at the composer node. Since the composer issues queries in parallel, the inter-
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Figure 6.25: Combined cumulative frequency graphs for s = 3, p = 5, 7, 9, 11 and churn.
Figure 6.26: Combined cumulative frequency graphs for s = 5, p = 5, 7, 9, 11 and churn.
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arrival times should decrease as more queries are generated.
Figure 6.27: Response inter-arrival time for s = 3 with churn.
Figure 6.29 compares the inter-arrival times for s = 3 and s = 5 when under churn.
This graph verifies the earlier stated finding that increasing q decreases the inter-arrival
time even when under churn. It is worth noting that the inter-arrival times in this graph
are approximately double the values present in Figure 6.19.
6.9.3 Total Time to Reach Threshold
Similar to the total time experiment in the base case, this experiment records the total
time taken to reach the threshold. As churn may affect the number of responses, a 5
second time limit exists to ensure that the composer node is not left waiting indefinitely.
In those instances where a threshold number of responses was not received with the time
limit, then the total time to reach the threshold has been recorded as 5 seconds. This is
because after hitting the time limit, the composer does not have sufficient responses to
reach a valid conclusion.
Figure 6.30 shows the total time taken to reach the threshold number of profiles for
3 services, with a threshold of 1/2. In terms of the number of peers queried p, the total
time decreases from an average of 0.763 seconds (3 dp) for 5 peers, to an average of 0.672
seconds (3 dp) for 11 peers. When considering the total number of peers n, the total time
ranges from an average of 0.60 seconds (2 dp) for 1000 peers through to 0.73 seconds (2
dp) for 9000 peers. On average, it can be said that the total time required to fetch all of
the profiles increases as the number of peers queried p increases, and as the total number
of peers n in the network increases.
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Figure 6.28: Response inter-arrival time for s = 5 with churn.
Figure 6.29: Response inter-arrival time for s = 3 and s = 5 with churn, base case values
are shown here with dashed lines for comparison.
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Figure 6.30: Total time for s = 3 with churn, 1/2 threshold.
Figure 6.31: Total time for s = 5 with churn, 2/3 threshold.
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Figure 6.31 shows the total time taken to reach the threshold number of profiles for
5 services, with a threshold of 2/3. This graph exhibits the same behaviour as the graph
for 3 services, but with the exception that the overall time has increased slightly as the
number of services s has increased from 3 to 5. In terms of the number of peers queried
p, the total time taken decreases from an average of 1.349 seconds (3 dp) for 5 peers, to
an average of 1.099 seconds (3 dp) for 11 peers. Similarly, when considering the total
number of peers n, the total time ranges from an average of 1.06 seconds (2 dp) for 1000
peers through to 1.17 seconds (2 dp) for 9000 peers.
6.10 Simulation: Churn with Malicious Peers
The same churn experiments were run again, but with increasing rates of malicious peers.
6.10.1 Correct Responses
As in Section 6.8, the rate r controls the probability that any given peer is malicious, while
t is the threshold. c counts the number of correct profiles received. A successful threshold
vote occurs only when c ≥ t.
Nodes Malicious rate
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1000 12 11 10 9 7 6
2000 13 12 11 10 8 6
3000 13 12 10 9 8 7
4000 12 11 10 9 8 7
5000 12 11 10 8 7 6
6000 13 11 10 8 7 6
7000 12 11 9 7 6 5
8000 12 11 9 8 7 5
9000 12 11 10 9 7 5
Table 6.4: Correct responses with churn and malicious peers, s = 3, p = 5. The cell
colours show the values that did not reach the 1/2 threshold (8) in orange, while those not
reaching the 2/3 threshold (10) are shown in yellow.
Table 6.4 shows the number of correct responses for both thresholds, for 3 services.
All values have been rounded down, as it is not possible to have partial profiles. The
cell colours show the values that did not reach the 1/2 threshold (8) in orange, while
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Figure 6.32: Correct responses with churn and malicious peers, s = 3, p = 5. A graphical
representation of Table 6.4.
Figure 6.33: Correct responses with churn and malicious peers, s = 5, p = 11. A graphical
representation of Table 6.5.
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Nodes Malicious rate
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1000 43 38 34 30 26 21
2000 44 40 36 31 26 22
3000 44 39 35 31 27 22
4000 44 39 34 30 25 21
5000 43 39 35 30 25 21
6000 43 39 35 30 25 21
7000 42 38 34 30 26 22
8000 45 41 37 32 27 23
9000 43 38 33 29 25 21
Table 6.5: Correct responses with churn and malicious peers, s = 5, p = 11. The cell
colours show the values that did not reach the 1/2 threshold (28) in orange, while those
not reaching the 2/3 threshold (37) are shown in yellow.
those not reaching the 2/3 threshold (10) are shown in yellow. Figure 6.32 is a graphical
representation of the same information.
Table 6.5 shows the number of correct responses for both thresholds, for 5 services.
The cell colours show the values that did not reach the 1/2 threshold (28) in orange, while
those not reaching the 2/3 threshold (37) are shown in yellow. Figure 6.33 is a graphical
representation of the same information.
As in Section 6.8, the tables show that threshold voting is working. However, the ad-
dition of churn to these experiments has reduced the overall effectiveness of the thresh-
old voting. The 1/2 threshold is now effective up to a malicious rate of 30%, while the
2/3 threshold is now only effective up to a malicious rate of 10%. The latter suggests that
the 2/3 threshold is not practical in real-world situations, leaving only the 1/2 threshold.
Alternatively, both thresholds could be used, with the 1/2 acting as an absolute cut-off,
leaving the other threshold acting only as an untrusted “benchmark”.
6.10.2 Trend
Similarly to Section 6.8, a trend was apparent when examining all of the correct response
results for variations in s and p. An analysis showed that the trend was linear, and that
the coefficient of the equation was a multiple of q. Table 6.6 shows part of the analysis
that was conducted (in this instance the values relate to s = 3). All values are rounded to
2 decimal places.
In the table, the coefficient expresses a value of approximately 0.85q (2 dp). To this
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s p q t Equation
03 05 15 08 c = -12.80r + 12.85
03 07 21 11 c = -17.06r + 17.28
03 09 27 14 c = -22.12r + 22.43
03 11 33 17 c = -26.66r + 27.02
Table 6.6: Trend analysis for correct responses when under churn. This table shows part
of the analysis that was conducted (in this instance the values relate to s = 3). All values
are rounded to 2 decimal places.
end, Equation 6.6 describes a rule of thumb that can be used to estimate the number of
correct responses c when under churn, and given the total queries q and the malicious
rate r.
c ≈ b0.85q − rqc (6.6)
6.11 Summary
The experiments conducted in this chapter show that the architecture is robust and per-
forms as designed. The introduction to this chapter considered the evaluation as con-
taining three distinct aspects: the performance of recommendation sources; the ability to
utilise the architecture to provide services; and finally, the ability to scale the architecture
and efficiently provide and verify profiles.
The operation and performance of the source nodes is critical to the architecture. The
experiments show that the source nodes are feasible, but only for non-interactive usage.
In particular, the recommendation source based on co-authorship relationships takes too
long to fetch and compute those relationships. Pre-computing and storing the co-author
relationship information is feasible up to the 3rd degree when using profile compression.
This clearly favours a non-interactive approach to generating and storing the informa-
tion in profiles. Similarly, the H-index source experienced poor worst-case performance.
Based on these results, a non-interactive approach also makes sense for this source. The
usage of a non-interactive approach matches the original design intent of the architec-
ture. Of particular note is that the non-realtime nature of these updates does not affect
the ability for their respective sources to generate regular updates to profiles.
The ability to utilise the architecture to provide services without significant overheads
being introduced was also important. The experiments used a ranking service example
to demonstrate that the overhead of utilising such a service was minimal.
Finally, the experiments show that the architecture handles both churn and malicious
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peers, and that it can scale with some limitations. The 1/2 threshold has been shown to
work with up to 30% malicious peers while under churn. The simulations also show that
the 2/3 threshold is impractical in real-world situations, as it can only handle a maximum
10% malicious peer rate when churn is present. Extrapolation from the simulation results
show that when limited to a maximum of 5 seconds, and noting that the experiments are
targetted at worst-case performance, the network can scale up to 400,000 nodes using the
1/2 threshold. Increasing the time limit to 15 seconds will allow the network to grow to a
million nodes.
With modern networks scaling to millions of nodes online concurrently, a maximum
of one million nodes is potentially limiting. However, scaling the network to accom-
modate millions of clients can be accomplished without changing the architecture of the
framework.
Firstly, removing all of Nielsen’s user experience time-limits would allow the network
to grow much larger, as has already been demonstrated when increasing the time-limit
from 5 to 15 seconds. As discussed in Nah [223], user experience design will go a long
way towards ameliorating user frustration in waiting for results.
Secondly, the widespread use of agent nodes that act on behalf of non-GRAFT clients
would allow the network to grow significantly. Exactly like the ranking service described
in Section 4.2.1, these agent nodes would provide recommendation services to the com-
munity. Given that any one agent could service a large number of clients, this would
allow the network to scale significantly, also without any design changes. Assuming a
1:100 ratio of agents to clients, the “core” network could reasonably scale to handle over
a 100 million clients.
Thirdly, one of the use cases for GRAFT is in the bootstrapping of new users. For
example, in modern forums, the user registration process often results in an email con-
firmation being sent to validate the email address before granting full access. This regis-
tration can sometimes take anywhere from a few minutes to a few hours, as users often
need to wait for the verification email to arrive. Using this time to fetch and verify a
user’s profile in parallel would obviate any waiting time for that user.
Finally, extensive use of profile caching in services (such as agents), as demonstrated
again by the ranking service, would also remove some of the the waiting time. In partic-
ular, many services are not time critical, or the results can be pre-fetched and cached for
later use.
In summary, the source nodes are feasible as originally intended and designed. Adopt-
ing the GRAFT framework within a service is feasible because using GRAFT does not im-
pose significant performance overheads. Finally, although the “core” network is limited,
this does not impact on the ability for the architecture to service millions of clients.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
This thesis has discussed the design, prototype implementation and evaluation of the
GRAFT framework. GRAFT was designed to meet five clear goals. These goals are re-
stated here from Section 1.3.
G.1 The use of recommendation information derived from non-reputation sources, and
the subsequent usage of this information within a reputation system.
G.2 The integration of human and electronic entities, including the investigation of how
these could be combined into one recommendation system.
G.3 The integration of identity and reputation, with a focus on how reputation informa-
tion could be combined with identity information.
G.4 The use of contextual information within reputation systems. In particular, the abil-
ity to capture and make this information available for use in the evaluation of rec-
ommendations.
G.5 The ability to exchange recommendation information between systems.
The architecture for GRAFT achieves all of the stated requirements. This chapter reviews
the goals, discusses contributions made by this thesis and presents possible future work.
7.1 Review
GRAFT is a generalised framework that supports the collection and distribution of rec-
ommendation information for both people and electronic service entities. The recommen-
dation information is obtained from multiple sources, and fed continuously into GRAFT.
This is then made available to consumers. Recommendation information in GRAFT is
stored in structured documents called profiles, with every profile holding one or more
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recommendations, each from a unique source. The recommendations that make up a
profile support multiple contexts, and contextual attributes.
A profile is located using the OpenID of an entity. All entities within GRAFT have an
OpenID, which acts as both the entity’s identity, and as a key to locate their recommen-
dation profile. In the lightweight model, the location of the profile is discovered using
the OpenID of the user, while in the integrated model, additional copies of the profile are
located by using the OpenID as a key within a Kademlia DHT.
Each source of recommendation information is made up of either explicit, or implicit,
reputation information. A number of different sources of recommendation are discussed
in this thesis, including two sources derived from non-reputation information. In partic-
ular, a source that utilises Hirsch Index (H-index) information and a source that builds
upon co-author relationship information. However, there are no explicit limits on the
types of information that could be fed into GRAFT profiles.
The consumers utilise the information obtained from the sources to either make deci-
sions (using policies) about individual entities, or to pass the information on to a third-
party consumer, such as in the case of the ranking service. The exact policy implemented
by each consumer may be unique and is only limited by the information made avail-
able by the sources. All of the sources and consumers are nodes in a single Kademlia
DHT. Each node may be asked to store a number of profiles for GRAFT. Rather than store
each profile in the network only once, they are each replicated multiple times for both
reliability and resilience against malicious nodes.
7.1.1 Implementation
The GRAFT proof of concept prototype introduced in Chapter 5 includes functional im-
plementations of all of the major components of the framework. To demonstrate the
versatility of the GRAFT framework, three of the case studies presented in Chapter 4
were implemented. These included a forum, a wiki and a workflow implementation.
In the forum implementation, recommendation information from one forum was fed
to another in order to augment a user’s reputation or bootstrap it where the user was
new. This case study demonstrated that GRAFT could be used to transfer recommen-
dation information from one system to another, and that it could also be used to cache
recommendation information for a single consumer/source system.
The wiki implementation used the H-index and co-author relationship sources to im-
plement access control on wiki pages. This allowed the page creator to limit access to
a page based on both the “degrees of co-authorship” relationship to the user and their
academic standing as measured using H-index.
Finally, the workflow implementation added a ranking service and two additional
components to the Anduril workflow engine. The two components allowed a workflow
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to request a list of web services (matching a given context) from the ranking service, and
get back a sorted list of applicable web services. The workflow was then able to call the
highest ranked web service.
7.1.2 Experimental Results and Evaluation
The experimental results and evaluation presented in Chapter 6 show that the GRAFT
framework is robust and performs as designed. Three distinct aspects of the architecture
were evaluated.
Firstly, the two novel recommendation sources were evaluated for their performance.
The evaluation showed that both sources can take significant periods of time to compute
a result and as such are suited only to non-interactive profile updates. However, this
aligns exactly with the original design intent of the architecture.
Secondly, the ability to utilise the framework without introducing significant over-
heads was measured. The evaluation showed that a basic ranking service implementa-
tion added only minimal overhead.
Finally, the third aspect considered the effects of both churn and malicious peers upon
the peer-to-peer network and the ability for the architecture to scale. The architecture was
able to handle both churn and up to 30% malicious peers. A user experience time limit
meant that the network could only scale to 400,000 nodes. However, removing that limit
and adopting some optimisations would allow the architecture to scale successfully to
handle over a 100 million clients.
7.2 Contributions
This thesis makes a number of contributions in the areas of reputation, reputation sys-
tems and access control. The following contributions are re-stated here from Section 1.4.
This thesis:
1. Defines a terminology for reputation that describes reputation, trust and risk and
then discusses the relationships between them. The term recommendation as it is
used in the context of this thesis is also defined and discussed. This contribution
can be found in Section 2.1.
2. Defines a generalised reputation model that can be used to describe reputation in
both online and offline contexts. This model introduces standardised terminology
(based on published research) that is used throughout this thesis. This contribution
can be found in Section 2.2.
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3. Defines an individual reputation context model that describes all of the contexts
that an individual entity may possess. This model is useful in that it helps to de-
scribe the contextual nature of an individual and makes clear the need for multi-
ple context support in reputation systems. This contribution can be found in Sec-
tion 2.2.
4. Provides a survey and taxonomy for reputation systems. The survey, conducted
on both academic and commercial systems, was used to drive the development of
the taxonomy. The taxonomy builds on five commonly accepted dimensions, while
also providing nine new dimensions for those aspects of reputation systems that
had not been covered widely previously, or never considered before. The taxon-
omy is subsequently used to build a classification of existing reputation systems,
generating a large number of research leads. These contributions can be found in
Section 2.3.
5. Presents an architecture (Chapter 3) and prototype (Chapter 5) of a fully distributed
recommendation system that supports both human and electronic service entities.
The architecture and prototype encapsulate a paradigm shift in reputation systems
and exhibit a number of unique ideas:
(a) A novel and well-defined three layer architecture stack that underpins the de-
sign and implementation of GRAFT. The stack allows for a modular approach
to building and integrating components into GRAFT, simplifying new design
and development work. In particular, the separation of raw collection from
integration into the peer-to-peer network allows for efficient nodes that only
implement those aspects of the stack they require.
(b) An exploration of identity and reputation integration. All recommendation
information in GRAFT is tied to identity information. Knowing the identity
of an entity is sufficient to be able to locate and consume their recommenda-
tion information. Previous systems have treated these two concepts as distinct,
leading to classic two-step authenticate and authorise models. GRAFT instead
considers all information about an entity when granting access, leading to bet-
ter decisions.
(c) The integration of both human and electronic service entities into one reputa-
tion system. These two types of entities are treated identically within GRAFT.
Their integration into one reputation system is possible due to the fact that
identity and recommendation information have been combined using OpenID.
(d) The utilisation of a peer-to-peer network to store and replicate recommenda-
tion information. The peer-to-peer network distributes the load evenly across
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the peers that make up the network, whilst also ensuring robustness for pro-
files.
(e) The utilisation of both explicit and implicit reputation information. In par-
ticular, the use of information previously not regarded as being useful when
combined with reputation such as demographic, social and derived informa-
tion.
(f) The ability to retain the context in which reputation information was gener-
ated. Understanding the context of the information allows for it to be utilised
in a meaningful way by a consumer.
(g) The utilisation of recommendation information in policy description and eval-
uation. The ability to combine recommendation information from multiple
sources in the building of policies allows for flexibility that is otherwise not
possible. For example, policies can build on the user’s demographics and their
professional standing, but can also utilise their social relationships.
6. Analysis of the performance of the GRAFT architecture. In particular, the perfor-
mance is measured and significant factors affecting performance are identified us-
ing a series of experiments that utilise both the prototype and large-scale simula-
tions. The simulations consider both the “perfect” state and increasing levels of
churn and malicious peers. These contributions can be found in Chapter 6.
7.3 Future Work
The goals and scope stated in Chapter 1 purposely limited the work that would be ad-
dressed in this thesis. However, a number of areas for future work were identified during
the writing of this thesis and are documented here.
7.3.1 Architecture
Agent nodes
Given the limitations of the architecture, further research should consider the widespread
use of “agents”. Agent nodes would be fully integrated into the network, but act on
behalf of requestors. Much like the ranking service described in Section 4.2.1, these agents
would provide recommendation services to the community. Given that an agent could
service a large number of clients, this would allow the network to scale significantly.
Research is required to determine the scability of agents, and how profile caching affects
both their performance and the accuracy of their results.
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Alternative Frameworks
One of the key requirements that drove the GRAFT design was that it was open and
based on existing standards. OpenID is an open and standard approach to distributed
identity on the Internet. As a key component of the framework, OpenID was critical to
ensuring that identity and reputation could be tied together. An aspect that was not con-
sidered or explored was the use of identity frameworks other than OpenID. Commercial
frameworks were ruled out because of their closed nature. However, there may be other
frameworks that could be used which may confer additional advantages. Further work
is required to establish if other identity frameworks could be used, and if these would
behave in a similar fashion to OpenID, or if compromises would be required.
7.3.2 Profiles
Validation
Within this thesis, profile validation was performed using threshold voting. Further work
is required to determine if other approaches would work when validating profiles, and if
these might be more efficient. For example, it might be possible to store only checksums,
and use these to validate a profile, rather than storing entire replicas. Alternatively, the
use of some kind of homomorphic encryption might radically change the architecture.
Granularity
Although sources generate recommendations, the effective unit of data exchange within
GRAFT is the profile. Further research is required to determine if using recommenda-
tions as the most granular unit would be more efficient, or provide benefits that are not
possible when using profiles as the most granular unit (for example, the avoidance of
concurrency issues). In particular, it might be possible to use some form of indirection to
more efficiently distribute and store profiles within GRAFT.
Context Enumeration
While GRAFT supports multiple contexts, no research has been undertaken to identify
and classify all of the possible contexts. This is useful research because without it, source
and consumer entities will not be able to recognise and compare contexts. In particu-
lar, a classification of contexts will support the exchange of recommendations between
different entities, but also the generalisation of recommendations. The latter allows for
the decomposition of a recommendation generated in a specific context to a more generic
context. For example, a recommendation generated in the “auctioneering” context might
be generalised to the more general “buying and selling” context.
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7.3.3 DHT
Attacks
The GRAFT framework utilises a distributed hash table. It was noted in Chapter 3 that
this leaves GRAFT open to both Sybil and Eclipse attacks. Research is required to eval-
uate possible mitigations against these attacks, and how they affect the network and its
performance. In particular, as GRAFT can carry reputation information about electronic
entities, being able to utilise this information during the normal operation of the network
may help to counter some attacks. The proposed defence would utilise the reputation
information carried by GRAFT during the creation of new nodes. The number of new
nodes that an entity would be allowed to create would be proportional to their repu-
tation. As a component of this work, the ability to map a node ID to an OpenID will
need to be considered. Further, as GRAFT may have a number of long-lived nodes, using
these to moderate new node registrations may also help to play an important role in the
mitigation of Sybil attacks.
Concurrency
The current architecture does not explicitly handle concurrency issues. An optimistic
mechanism seems most appropriate for GRAFT. However, further work is required to
determine how a node might determine that an update was in progress and abort its
own update.
Protocol
This thesis makes extensive use of key/value pair storage within the Kademlia distributed
hash table for storing profiles. Further research is required on minor protocol changes
that would make the fetching and storing of profiles more efficient. In particular, and
as mentioned above, reducing the granularity of the information stored within GRAFT
might make for further efficiency.
Replication
The work in this thesis avoids using Kademlia replication. Further research is required to
determine whether the performance of the distributed hash table could be improved by
enabling replication, and how this might affect the current approach to profile verification
using threshold voting.
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Appendix A
Background
This chapter provides an introduction and overview to some of the key technologies that
GRAFT builds upon. This chapter is not intended to provide a detailed introduction,
but instead focuses on those aspects that are necessary to understanding the work in this
thesis.
A.1 OpenID
OpenID [258] is a decentralised authentication protocol that allows a user to maintain a
single digital identity. This identity can be registered with many sites. Each site, also
known as a Relying-Party (RP), stores only the user’s OpenID and any locally required
state. The RP does not need to implement any authentication mechanisms, or store any
authentication related information. Instead, authentication is only ever performed by the
OpenID Provider (OP) where the OpenID is registered.
Figure A.1 shows a standard OpenID authentication sequence. A user wishing to ob-
tain a service from an RP must first authenticate itself. The user presents their OpenID to
the RP, and is redirected back to his or her OP. The OP authenticates the user using a pre-
viously agreed method. The actual authentication method is unspecified in the OpenID
standard1, however in most instances username and password authentication is used.
Once authenticated, the user is redirected back to the RP with a cryptogrphic token gen-
erated by the OP. The token is verified by the RP by establishing a private connection
with the OP. Once verified, the RP can provide the requested service to the user.
An extension to the OpenID protocol called Attribute eXchange (AX) [134] allows the
relying party to request a set of attributes that further describe the authenticating user.
These attributes usually include information such as the full name, email address and
gender of the user. However, an OP may refuse to provide any or all of the requested
1http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.html - last accessed October 2014.
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Figure A.1: OpenID Authentication. A standard OpenID authentication sequence. A user
wishing to obtain a service from an RP must first authenticate itself. The user presents
their OpenID to the RP, and is redirected back to his or her OP. The OP authenticates the
user using a previously agreed method.
attributes, depending on the user’s privacy preferences.
A.1.1 OpenID Discovery
In order for the RP to automatically find the OP during authentication, it uses something
called endpoint discovery. Endpoint discovery allows the RP to find a URL where it can
obtain service from the OP.
The exact type of endpoint discovery used depends on the type of OpenID used. The
two possible types are URL and XRI-based, however only URL-based OpenID will be
discussed. The OpenID specification states that endpoint discovery will be attempted
using two mechanisms, the Yadis Protocol and the HTML-Discovery Protocol. The Yadis
Protocol is always attempted first, followed by the HTML-Discovery Protocol if that fails.
By preference, the discovery protocol should yield a service descriptor (in the form of an
XRDS file), or simply a URL.
XRDS document
XRDS is an XML-based file format that allows for the discovery of metadata about a
resource. The XRDS document often resides at a web location associated with the re-
source. An XRDS often contains a number of service descriptors, each which describe
a service type and a location where this service can be found. Listing A.1 shows an
example XRDS document that contains two service descriptors. The first describes an
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OpenID service (http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0/signon), while the second describes
an OpenRep service (http://specs.open-rep.net/rx/1.0/).
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xrds:XRDS xmlns:xrds="xri://\$xrds" xmlns="xri://\$xrd*(\$v*2.0)">
<XRD>
<Service priority="10">
<Type>http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0/signon</Type>
<URI>https://provider.org/endpoint/</URI>
</Service>
<Service priority="50">
<Type>http://specs.open-rep.net/rx/1.0/</Type>
<URI>http://provider.com/endpoint/</URI>
</Service>
</XRD>
</xrds:XRDS>
Listing A.1: Example of an XRDS document
The Yadis Protocol
The Yadis protocol2 attempts to obtain one or more relevant service descriptors from an
XRDS document. In many instances the OpenID will itself point directly at an XRDS
document. The XRDS document will contain one or more service descriptors that tell
the discoverer where to find services for that OpenID. The example service descriptor in
Listing A.2 shows an OpenID2 endpoint. The URI field tells the discoverer where the OP
for the current endpoint can be found.
<Service priority="40">
<Type>http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0/signon</Type>
<URI>https://provider.org/endpoint/</URI>
</Service>
Listing A.2: Example of an XRDS service descriptor
In some instances the OpenID may point to a HTML document. In these cases, an X-
XRDS-Location meta tag in the HTML header may be provided. The URL within this
meta tag, if it exists, will point to an XRDS document. Listing A.3 shows an example of
such a meta tag.
<meta http-equiv="X-XRDS-Location" content="http://forum.com/?q=xrds" />
Listing A.3: Example of a HTML meta tag
2http://yadis.org/ - last accessed January 2013.
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HTML-Discovery Protocol
If the Yadis Protocol failed to resolve to a meaningful XRDS document, or the XRDS doc-
ument did not contain any relevant service descriptors, the HTML-Discovery protocol
will be used. This protocol requires the discoverer to search for OpenID2 link tags within
the HTML header of the document found at the endpoint. Listing A.4 shows the URL of
an OpenID2 endpoint within a HTML link tag.
<link rel="openid2.provider" href="http://provider.org/endpoint/" />
Listing A.4: Example of a HTML link tag
A.2 OpenRep
OpenRep is the collective name for the GRAFT OpenID extensions. OpenRep has three
major components:
• OpenRep discovery
• OpenRep authentication transfer
• OpenRep web interfaces
These components are described in the following sections.
A.2.1 OpenRep Discovery
As with OpenID, a GP can be discovered using OpenID endpoint discovery. The URL
discovered in an XRDS document or in the HTML document at the endpoint will point
to a GRAFT provider. This provider will maintain the entity’s “default” profile copy. In
Listing A.5, the target has made available an XRDS document at the OpenID Identifier
endpoint. The XRDS document has one service entry for the target’s provider.
<Service priority="50">
<Type>http://specs.open-rep.net/rx/1.0/</Type>
<URI>http://provider.com/endpoint/</URI>
</Service>
Listing A.5: Service descriptor for GRAFT provider
In those cases where an OpenID endpoint does not have an XRDS document, HTML
discovery may yield appropriate meta tags in the HTML document. Listing A.6 shows
the same provider link as the previous example.
<link rel="openrep.provider" href="http://provider.com/endpoint/" />
Listing A.6: HTML link tag for GRAFT provider
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A.2.2 OpenRep Authentication Transfer
As discussed in Section 3.3, the last step of the OpenID authentication sequence includes
a profile transfer from the GP. This copy is obtained using the Attribute eXchange (AX)
extension to OpenID. This extension is widely supported and is often used to transfer
nickname or email address details to the RP. In this instance the AX extension is used to
transfer a profile with a single recommendation. The recommendation is the one gener-
ated by the RP, or one from another site, but in the same context.
A.2.3 OpenRep Web Interfaces
Once located, the GP maintains a RESTful interface [109] implemented using HTTP.
Aside from the standard OpenID functions, each GP is able to fetch and store profiles,
using the target entity’s OpenID as a key. The profile for a given entity can be retrieved
using HTTP GET with the following URL syntax:
http://provider.com/?openrep.ns=http://specs.open-rep.net/rx/1.0/&openrep.mode=
fetch&openrep.identity=openid
Listing A.7: OpenRep HTTP Fetch
If the resulting HTTP status code is 200, the response body will contain a valid profile.
Otherwise, the response body will contain an error message. Profiles can be updated
using HTTP PUT with the following URL syntax:
http://provider.com/?openrep.ns=http://specs.open-rep.net/rx/1.0/&openrep.mode=
store&openrep.identity=openid
Listing A.8: OpenRep HTTP Store
The profile for the user should be in plain ASCII and contained in the body of the PUT
operation. If the resulting HTTP status code is 200, the profile was stored correctly. Oth-
erwise, the response body will contain an error message. Providers may reject profiles
where the “updated” element is earlier than the one it already has.
A.3 Distributed Hash Tables
A distributed hash table (DHT) is a distributed approach to the classic hash table. Keys
and their associated values (often called key/value pairs) are stored in the nodes that
comprise the system. Any participating node can retrieve a value using only its key. In
theory, a DHT can locate any given key within O(logN) hops on average, where N is the
total number of peers [198].
Nodes joining the system are assigned an ID, often randomly generated or based on
their IP address [298, 247]. In a DHT that is structured as a ring of N nodes, each node
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will then get responsibility for 1/N of the total key space. When a new key/value pair is
introduced into the system, it is routed towards the nodes whose ID are most similar to
the key. In many cases, the key is simply a hash of the value that is being stored. SHA1
is used as the hashing algorithm in both Chord [298] and Kademlia [211]. Replicas of
values could be maintained in a distributed hash table by associating multiple hashes
with a single value.
In general, the mapping of keys to nodes is done in such a way as to minimise the
impact on the system of any nodes joining or leaving. Consistent Hashing [169] is one
such approach. Consistent hashing works by assigning keys to nodes in such as way that
when a node joins or leaves, it only affects a small number of keys. In theory, only K/N
keys are affected, where K is the total number of keys and N is the total number of peers
[298].
As a direct result of both the O(logN) key lookup performance and consistent hash-
ing, DHTs are able to scale to large numbers of nodes and perform well even under churn.
A.3.1 Kademlia
Kademlia is a distributed hash table implementation that was designed by Maymounkov
and Mazie`res [211].
Nodes joining the network are assigned a 160-bit identifier, generated using the SHA-
1 hash function across a random number [103]. This same identifier is also used by the
Kademlia protocol to locate keys that are stored in the network. The distance between
any two nodes in Kademlia is based on the exclusive OR (XOR) operation. Nodes in the
network are structured into a binary tree, where every node is effectively a leaf in the
tree. The shortest unique prefix of the node’s identifier controls a node’s location in the
tree. The XOR distance metric means that the distance from node x to y is the same as
the distance from node y to x. This last part is an important property of Kademlia as
other DHTs need to implement a stabilization protocol in order to compensate for the
asymmetric nature of the overlay [41].
Appendix B
Comparison of GRAFT and XACML
B.1 Comparison of GRAFT and XACML
The XML Access Control Mark-up Language (XACML) [123] is “standard that describes
both a policy language and an access control decision request/response language”1.
XACML is primarily an Attribute-Based Access Control system (ABAC), where all
access decisions are based on characteristics of three elements: the requestor, the resource
being requested and the environment. The characteristics of any of these elements are
called attributes, and are used during policy evaluation to decide if the requestor should
have access.
The policy language in XACML is used to define access control requirements, while
the request/response language allows a policy enforcement point to query if an action
should be allowed and understand the result of that query.
XACML operates using the three attribute elements identified above, plus an addi-
tional “action” attribute element:
• Subject Attributes. A subject represents an entity such as a user or electronic ser-
vice [348, 252, 123]. Every subject has a set of attributes that help to identify and
define the subject. Common attributes for subjects include name, title, role and
organisation.
• Resource Attributes. A resource, sometimes called an object, has an action per-
formed on it by a subject. Resources include information, services or hardware.
Common attributes for resources include name, owner, creation and/or last changed
dates. Resource attributes are sometimes extracted from the metadata associated
with the resource [348, 252], for example the dimension metadata might be ex-
tracted from an image resource.
1https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/2713/Brief_Introduction_
to_XACML.html - last accessed October 2014.
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• Action Attributes. An action is an operation on a resource [123].
• Environment Attributes. Environmental attributes are those that define the context
of the environment in which the subject and resource reside. These attributes are
independent of the subject, resource or action [123]. Typical examples include the
time and date, operational state and resource availability.
While GRAFT is geared towards providing up to date attributes for both subjects
and resources, it does not explicitly consider separate action or environmental attributes.
These types of information are typically handled via variables in the policy language.
Determining which policies apply when using XACML is handled using dynamic bind-
ing. In GRAFT, it is the situation that determines which policies are executed. If the user
is seeking access to a particular resource, it is the attributes of the subject and resource,
along with the access request that cause a GRAFT client to evaluate a particular policy.
This makes it simple to determine which policy is evaluated when.
Subject PEP Resource
PIP
PAP
PDP
Attributes
PIP
PIP
Policy Store
Figure B.1: A simple attribute-based authorisation architecture.
Figure B.1 shows a simple attribute-based authorisation architecture. Using the terminol-
ogy promogulated by [314] (with the exception of the Policy Administration Point), the
key components of this architecture can be described as:
• Policy Enforcement Point. The PEP intercepts the subject’s request to access the
resource, and asks the PDP to make a decision about the request. The PEP acts on
the decision received from the PDP by either allowing or denying the request.
• Policy Decision Point. The PDP is responsible for evaluating the stored policies
against access requests received from the PEP [252]. Any subject or resource at-
tributes required during policy evaluation are obtained from the PIPs.
• Policy Information Point. PIPs are the source of subject, resource and environ-
mental attribute values. Although a PIP is not necessarily the originator of these
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attribute values, it is nevertheless responsible for obtaining the attributes and en-
suring that they are matched to the right subjects, resources and environments.
• Policy Administration Point. The PAP manages the stored policies. Policies typi-
cally consist of rules for accessing resources. The rules may consist of conditional
statements involving attributes related to the subject, resource, action or environ-
ment.
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Policy Store
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Figure B.2: Comparison of XACML and GRAFT.
In XACML, the policy language is used to define access control rules and conditions.
Many rules can be combined into one policy, which in turn can be combined to form a
policy set. XACML depends on the PAP to author appropriate policies and on the PIPs to
create and maintain attributes for subjects, resources and environments. These policies
and attributes are often created manually. The potential number of attributes on subjects
and resources (the NSA agreed to 13 subject attributes for use within the US Department
of Defense [171]), can lead to significant work.
In GRAFT however, the PAP is optional, as it is up to each individual PDP to decide
how it will manage its access control policies. The examples in this paper have used a
PHP-based rules engine, however a PDP could equally have implemented its policies us-
ing XACML. GRAFT sources can be seen as dynamic PIPs, collecting and making avail-
able attributes for subjects and resources. As mentioned previously, GRAFT does not
handle attributes for actions and environments, these are handled as part of the access
control decision.
Likewise, in GRAFT, there is no explicit requirement for a separate access control
request/response language as each policy decision point can implement their access con-
trol policies as they desire. In fact, the XACML Request/Response language could be
utilised if desired.
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Appendix C
SimGrid
A simulation using the SimGrid [58] simulation software was built initially. The exper-
imental work using this simulation software was stopped at the base case because of
unexpected and unexplainable results. This section documents some of those results.
C.1 SimGrid
SimGrid1 is a tool designed to study large-scale, distributed systems. SimGrid provides
a library of routines that a simulation is linked against, giving us an API for the control
of processes and messages.
All SimGrid simulations require a platform file that describes the networks and hosts
that simulated peers will run on. All of the experiments were based on two platform
files. The first, called “Cluster”, described a single large cluster that contained all of
the hosts. The second, called “Grid5000”, described a modified Grid’5000 environment2.
The structure of the autonomous systems (AS) and the routing between them was not
changed for the experiments. However, clusters within each AS were modified to hold
the same number of hosts, so that a uniform distribution of hosts was possible.
Similarly, every SimGrid simulation also requires a deployment file that controls how
the simulated peers are deployed across the hosts specified in the platform file. In each
simulation, peers are deployed to hosts either randomly, or in a uniform fashion such
that clusters are filled evenly.
The simulation, based in part on sample code provided as part of the SimGrid distri-
bution, implements a Kademlia DHT with n identical peers and a single service composer
peer. Each peer joins the network, and then answers “find node” and “profile queries”.
The composer peer waits until after the network has stabilised, and then issues profile
queries to p peers for each service s that it is interested in, resulting in a total of q profile
1http://simgrid.gforge.inria.fr/ - last accessed April 2014.
2https://www.grid5000.fr/ - last accessed April 2014.
151
152 APPENDIX C. SIMGRID
queries being sent. The number of services s and peers p is varied as required. The p
peers for each run are randomly selected from the available peers before the simulation.
A simple threshold was implemented so that although p peers are queried, the lookup
of a profile was considered complete when a threshold of t profile query responses is in
agreement. The threshold value is set to 3/4 of the queried peers. For example, if there are
11 peers, the threshold value will be 8 profile query responses.
C.1.1 Cluster Platform
Figure C.1: Total time for s = 3 on Cluster Platform.
As can be seen from Figure C.1, the average total time to receive t profiles increased
linearly with the number of peers queried p for each service and with the total number of
peers n. In contrast to the graphs presented in Chapter 6, the slope on the graph changes
noticeably at two points. The first of these is at around 800 nodes, and the second at
around 2000 nodes.
The inter-arrival time for profiles is shown in Figure C.2. This graph shows a trend to-
ward decreasing inter-arrival times with increasing queries q, however the slope changes
at 800 and 2000 nodes are again visible. There is nothing apparent in the configuration or
simulated environment that would allow an explanation for these inflexion points.
C.1.2 Grid5000 Platform
The average total time to receive t profiles is shown in Figure C.3. This figure shows the
same linear increase in time as Figure C.1, however there is an unexpected increase in
time at 800 nodes, and another change in trend at 2000 nodes. The increase at 800 nodes
represents approximately 0.3 seconds.
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Figure C.2: Response inter-arrival time for s = 3 on Cluster Platform.
Figure C.3: Total time for s = 3 on Grid’5000 Platform.
Given that the entire platform and deployment model for the nodes in this simulation
have changed, the issues at 800 and 2000 nodes are unexplained from a simulation per-
spective. A reasonable, but unproven, explanation for these issues is that the simulator
implementation has a number of internal limits, and once these are reached, it changes
the overall time taken to process the simulation.
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Appendix D
Samples
This chapter provides sample listings for some of the key components developed in
Chapter 5: Implementation.
D.1 GRAFT Profiles
The fictional profile given in Listing D.1 contains two recommendations. The subject, or
target, of both recommendations is Alice. The first recommendation, from a forum site,
describes a simple membership relationship, with a rating score of 126. This recommen-
dation may be useful to other sites that operate within the same context, which in this
instance is enumerated as “public.forum”. The second recommendation, from a fictional
DBLP source evaluates Alice in an academic context. This recommendation source has
assigned Alice a H-index score of 31.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<container xmlns="http://specs.open-rep.net/rx/1.0/">
<recommendations count="2">
<recommendation id="http://www.forum.net/">
<target type="openid">http://id.example.net/alice/</target>
<source type="openid">http://www.forum.net/</source>
<assert type="member" context="public.forum"/>
<assert type="rating" context="public.forum">126</assert>
<updated>2013-07-16T03:23:45+00:00</updated>
</recommendation>
<recommendation id="http://scholar.dblp.org/">
<target type="openid">http://id.example.net/alice/</target>
<source type="openid">http://scholar.dblp.org/</source>
<assert type="hindex" context="academic.scholarship">31</assert>
<updated>2013-07-18T08:11:59+00:00</updated>
</recommendation>
</recommendations>
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</container>
Listing D.1: Sample of a profile
In the sample profile in listing D.2, Alice has nominated Bob as her delegate in the “pub-
lic.forum” context. This means that Bob may temporarily utilise Alice’s permissions in
that given context. If Alice does not have any permissions in the system in question, then
Bob is not able to obtain them through Alice.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<container xmlns="http://specs.open-rep.net/rx/1.0/">
<recommendations count="1">
<recommendation id="http://provider.com/endpoint/">
<target type="openid">http://id.example.net/alice/</target>
<source type="openid">http://provider.com/endpoint/</source>
<delegate context="public.forum" type="openid">http://id.example.net/bob/
</delegate>
<updated>2013-07-19T12:51:10+00:00</updated>
</recommendation>
</recommendations>
</container>
Listing D.2: Sample of a profile with delegation
D.2 GRAFT Policies
In the implementation described in Chapter 5, GRAFT polices were written using the
PHP-based rules engine Ruler. The following sample policies were utilised in the im-
plementation. Equations 5.1 and 5.2 describe common situations in the forum scenario
described in Section 5.1, and are implemented in Ruler by the following code fragments.
$rb->logicalOr(
$rb[’rating’]->lessThan(10),
$rb[’admin’]->equalTo(null)
)
Listing D.3: Sample Ruler policy for Equation 5.1
$rb->logicalAnd(
$rb[’rating’]->greaterThanOrEqualTo(100),
$rb[’forum’]->notEqualTo(’administration’)
)
Listing D.4: Sample Ruler policy for Equation 5.2
In a similar fashion, Section 5.2 describes the implementation of a GRAFT-enabled wiki.
Equations 5.3 and 5.4 describe common situations in a wiki scenario, and are imple-
mented in Ruler by the following code fragments.
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$rb->logicalAnd(
$rb[’hindex’]->greaterThanOrEqualTo(1),
$rb->logicalAnd(
$rb[’degree’]->greaterThanOrEqualTo(0),
$rb[’degree’]->lessThanOrEqualTo(3)
)
)
Listing D.5: Sample Ruler policy for Equation 5.3
$rb->logicalAnd(
$rb[’hindex’]->greaterThanOrEqualTo(20),
$rb->logicalAnd(
$rb[’degree’]->greaterThanOrEqualTo(0),
$rb[’degree’]->lessThanOrEqualTo(2)
)
)
Listing D.6: Sample Ruler policy for Equation 5.4
D.3 Workflow
The Anduril workflow given in Listing D.7 illustrates the use of the “CallService” com-
ponent that was written for GRAFT. This component calls one or more web services with
the given input data. The first parameter passed to the component is a list of URLs that
represent web services. These are tried in order, until one succeeds. Any data pased to
the component as the second parameter is passed to the web service. Data returned from
the call is made available to the workflow engine via the output of the component.
data = INPUT(path="data.txt")
list = INPUT(path="list.csv")
output = CallService(list, data)
OUTPUT(output)
Listing D.7: Sample workflow with CallService
The Anduril workflow in Listing D.8 is almost identical to the previous listing, with the
exception that the “RankService” component is initially called to generate a list of web
services. This component is passed only a single parameter, the “category”, that controls
the context of the web services that are returned.
data = INPUT(path="data.txt")
list = RankService(category="public.services")
output = CallService(list, data)
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OUTPUT(list)
OUTPUT(output)
Listing D.8: Sample workflow with RankService
D.4 Oversim
The OverSim configuration given in Listing D.9 was used for the churn experiments dis-
cussed in Section 6.9.
[Config GRAFT]
description = GRAFT
repeat = 40
seed-set = ${runnumber}
**.transitionTime = 500s
**.measurementTime = 9000s
**.churnGeneratorTypes = "oversim.common.NoChurn oversim.common.ParetoChurn"
**.churnGenerator[0].targetOverlayTerminalNum = 1
**-0[*].overlayType = "oversim.overlay.kademlia.KademliaModules"
**-0[*].tier1Type = "oversim.applications.graft.GCompModules"
**.churnGenerator[1].targetOverlayTerminalNum = ${N=1000, 2000, 3000, 4000,
5000, 6000, 7000, 8000, 9000}
**-1[*].overlayType = "oversim.overlay.kademlia.KademliaModules"
**-1[*].tier1Type = "oversim.applications.graft.GNodeModules"
**-1[*].lifetimeMean = 100s
**-1[*].deadtimeMean = 100s
**.initPhaseCreationInterval = 0.01s
**.sampPeriod = 1000s
**.waitPeriod = 8000s
**.numServices = ${S=3, 5}
**.numPeers = ${P=5, 7, 9, 11}
**.numQueries = ${Q=($S)*($P)}
**.overlay.kademlia.lookupRedundantNodes = 16
**.overlay.kademlia.s = 8
**.overlay.kademlia.k = 16
**.overlay.kademlia.lookupMerge = true
**.overlay.kademlia.lookupParallelPaths = 1
**.overlay.kademlia.lookupParallelRpcs = 1
Listing D.9: Sample OverSim Configuration
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Glossary
Churn The rate at which peers enter and leave a network.
Co-authorship The state of two (or more) authors having worked together on a single
manuscript. For example, if Alice and Bob write a manuscript together, they are
considered co-authors.
Context The domain in which information was generated. Most reputation systems em-
ploy a single, or personal, context.
Contextual attributes Data that provides additional information about the context in
which reputation was generated.
DBLP The DBLP Computer Science Bibliography. An online bibliography of computer
science journals and conferences. DBLP makes available its database of authors and
papers, allowing the derivation of co-authorship information.
DHT Distributed Hash Table. This concept is further discussed in Section A.3.
Entity An entity describes an independent agent. Both people and machines (or services)
are considered to be entities in this thesis.
GP A GRAFT Provider. This means an OpenID Provider (OP) combined with GRAFT
profile storage.
GRAFT Generalised Recommendation Framework. The framework that is developed
and evaluated in this thesis.
Kademlia An implementation of a DHT, discussed further in Section A.3.1.
Malicious peers Peers that try to subvert the network for their own gain.
MAS Microsoft Academic Search.
OpenID A decentralised authentication protocol that allows an entity to maintain a sin-
gle digital identity. OpenID is further discussed in Section A.1.
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192 GLOSSARY
OpenRep GRAFT OpenID extensions that support discovery and exchange of recom-
mendation profiles. Please see Section A.2 for more information.
OP An OpenID Provider. An OP authenticates the entities that are registered with it.
Please see Section A.1 for more information.
Peer A single participant in a network of peers. Each peer is equal to every other peer
and may act as both a client and a server to other peers.
P2P Peer-to-Peer. A distributed network of peers where resources are coordinated amongst
peers, without any centralised control.
PostgreSQL An opensource database compliant with SQL standards.
Recommendation Recommendations are endorsements of the target agent by a third
party. These endorsements are based on the target’s characteristics, capabilities,
affiliations, and reputation.
Reputation According to the Collins English Dictionary, reputation is “the estimation in
which a person or thing is generally held; opinion”. Reputation is discussed in depth in
Chapter 2.
RP A Relying-Party provides services to entities. An RP will authenticate entities with
their OPs (or GPs) using the OpenID protocol. Please see Section A.1 for more
information.
XRDS XML-based document that allows for the discovery of web-based resources. Utilised
by the OpenID protocol to enumerate authentication service locations. Please see
Section A.1 for more information.
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